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This essay analyzes emerging trends in entrapment law, and is the first to describe the declining
numbers of reported cases that involve the entrapment defense. This phenomenon is attributed
to decreasing levels of uncertainty in the rules pertaining to the defense, and to discreet
procedural issues. The shifting degrees of certainty in penal rules, which have become
increasingly mechanical and mathematical over time, are shown to disfavor certain defendants
inherently, to the point of being a snare or source of “entrapment” themselves for these
individuals.

Most articles about entrapment discuss the competing legal tests used to approach the
problem, typically arguing in favor of one rule as opposed to the other.1 This essay focuses
instead on how the entrapment defense is currently functioning in our legal landscape, and
highlights some important emerging trends.
As the rules for entrapment become increasingly well-defined and established, the
defense itself becomes less relevant. The proportion of cases where entrapment arises as a

1

See PAUL MARCUS , THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 104 (3rd 2002) (noting that “the vast majority of legal
scholars regard the objective test favorably.”); Gregory Deis, supra note 1, at 1218 (Deis himself does not favor the
objective test but acknowledges that he is in the minority in the academy); Park, supra note 12, at 167. When Park
wrote in 1975, he could only find one lone article from the previous twenty-five years criticizing the objective test,
and that article proposed abolishing the entrapment defense completely. See id at 167 n. 13, citing Michael De Feo,
Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory, and Application, 1 U.S.F. L. REV. 243
(1967). Park in the same footnote remarks that there had been over one hundred student notes from the same period
almost uniformly advocated for the objective test (my own research indicates that this continues to be a
disproportionately popular subject for student comments and case notes). Justice Stewart noted the clear tilt of the
academy to his side when he dissented in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 445 n.3 (1973)(Stewart, J.,
dissenting). See also Model Penal Code Comment § 2.13, subs. (1) n. 3 for a list of influential early articles on the
subject.
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defense appears to be decreasing in almost every state, as well as in the federal courts.2 In most
states, the raw number of reported cases has dropped off in recent years, or has leveled off in
comparison with the mushrooming criminal dockets, meaning entrapment cases are a
diminishing proportion of the overall criminal caseload. This is especially true of drug cases,
which constitute the vast majority of entrapment claims. Entrapment as a defense seems to have
peaked in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, correlating roughly to the unprecedented explosion of
drug-related cases, and has since fallen to a fraction of the levels during this period,3 even though
drug convictions continue to rise. It is also surprising that the defense most closely related to
undercover police work and sting operations would not keep pace with the growth of its
attendant police activity.
Across jurisdictions, this leveling-off of the defense appears to be unrelated to the legal
test used – there are two leading contenders, the so-called “objective” and “subjective”
approaches.4 The cases that do occur seem disproportionately concentrated in certain
jurisdictions, some using one test, and some using the other. This waning of a particular criminal
defense is interesting not only for the study of that defense itself, but also for understanding our
legal system overall. We normally study defenses as element-based, formalistic concepts, rather
than as a social phenomenon that goes in or out of style.
A second emerging trend, previously overlooked in the relevant literature, is the
disproportionate number of entrapment cases that arise as post-sentencing appeals, 5 often
couched as ineffective assistance of counsel claims, or challenging a judge’s refusal to give any
entrapment instructions to the jury. In either case, the defense really functions as a “second bite

2

See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III and sources cited therein.
4
See infra Section II for discussion and history of the two tests.
5
See infra Section III.D and sources cited therein.
3
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at the apple,” a last-resort defense used only after others have failed. Framing entrapment in an
“assistance of counsel” appeal rarely works,6 due in part to the defendant’s burden of showing
that his lawyer’s shortcomings determined the outcome of the verdict. Entrapment appeals based
on jury instructions generally fare better (the defendant’s burden is functionally much lighter),
but is still far from a safe bet for the defendant. The procedural posture of these cases suggests
that entrapment now functions less as a means of second-guessing the aggressive activity of the
police (which was the defense’s genesis) and more as a way of second-guessing the attorneys
and judges.
A third trend is the shift from cases about the classic elements of the defense, such as
“inducement” or “predisposition,” to newer variations such as “sentencing entrapment”7
(manipulation of sentencing factors by savvy undercover agents) or “entrapment by estoppel”8
(where the defendant relied upon official assurances about the legality of the activity charged as
an offense). Both of these variations operate under special rules and have yet to be accepted in
most jurisdictions. While conceptually related to traditional entrapment, they really function as
separate defenses. There is currently a split among the federal circuits about whether to
recognize “sentencing entrapment,” meaning the Supreme Court is likely to address the issue at
some point.9 Most of the literature to date frames “sentencing entrapment” as a problem of
excessive investigative/prosecutorial discretion resulting from the adoption of mechanical
sentencing guidelines, designed to limit judicial discretion.10 This article proposes, modestly,

6

See infra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
See infra Section IV.A and sources cited therein.
8
See infra Section IV.D and sources cited therein.
9
The Eleventh Circuit has rejected it entirely, the Seventh Circuit “disparages” it, but several other circuits
recognize it. See infra notes 94-119 and accompanying text.
10
See, e.g., Note, The Ills of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Search for a Cure: Using Sentence
Entrapment to Combat Governmental Manipulation of Sentencing, 49 VAND. L. REV. 197 (1996); Comment, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Failure To Eliminate Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before
Arrest,1993 WIS. L. REV. 187 (1993); see also infra notes __ and accompanying text. For an excellent recent
7
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that both “sentencing entrapment” and “entrapment by estoppel” might better be understood as a
function of varying levels of “Knightian” uncertainty in legal rules and the effects of disparate ex
ante legal knowledge.11 Understood within this framework, the practice of setting up defendants
for stiffer sentences during the sting operation may not seem so nefarious as most commentators
have asserted thus far.12 The increasingly rigid, mathematical nature of penal rules, whether

treatment of the subject of the sentencing guidelines, including a concise survey of the history and summary of the
current state of appellate review, see Andrew D. Goldstein, Note, What Feeney Got Right: Why Courts of Appeals
should Review Sentencing Departures De Novo, 113 YALE L. J. 1955 (2004).
11
See generally FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, & PROFIT (1921). The DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
offers the following succinct explanation of “uncertainty” as opposed to risk:
[Uncertainty is] the state in which the number of possible outcomes exceeds the number of actual
outcomes and when no probabilities can be attached to each possible outcome. It differs from risk,
which is defined as having measurable probabilities. Where probabilities are measurable,
insurance can be taken out to cover the worst contingencies – the risk of them occurring is spread
among many people or taken on by someone who can reasonably be certain to bear them. In the
case of uncertainty, however, no insurance company could properly assess what premium to
charge to cover bad outcomes – it is simply a possibility that has to be faced. It is the role of the
entrepreneur to face each uncertainty when setting up a new company that justifies profit as a
reward.
GRAHAM BANNOCK, R.E. BAXTER, & EVAN DAVIS, EDS., DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 390 (7thed., 2002).
See also Marcello Basili, Knightian Uncertainty in Financial Markets: An Assessment, available at
www.ssrn.com (demonstrating that uncertainty in financial markets tends to generate inertia in investing decisions);
See also Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. Econ. 643 (1961).. Ellsberg
demonstrated that individuals act “as though the worst were somewhat more likely than his best estimates of
likelihood,” which would “indicate he distorted his best estimates of likelihood, in the direction of increased
emphasis on the less favorable outcomes and to a degree depending on his best estimate.” Ellsberg conducted
famous experiments in which subject faced two urns, M and N, which each contained one hundred red or black
balls. Subjects were informed that Urn M contained exactly half red and half black balls; the other contained an
unknown proportion of each. Bets were placed on the subject’s ability to draw a black ball from either urn; subject
showed a strong preference for Urn M, for which they knew the likelihood of winning (fifty percent); this presented
a contradiction to the classic rational-actor model of economic thought, because the subjects had no rational basis
for such a consistent preference—uncertainty was just as likely to favor them, especially when compared to a fiftyfifty chance, as it was to disfavor them. This pattern of human decision-making has been verified in innumerable
subsequent experiments and came to be known as Ellsberg’s Paradox. Uncertainty can take the form of
straightforward ambiguity—the individual knows the set of possible outcomes, but cannot ascertain the relative
likelihood of one as opposed to another. Alternatively, uncertainty can take the form of the individual’s recognition
that there are unknown or hitherto unimagined possible outcomes of a situation, an awareness of one’s own
ignorance. This latter type of uncertainty would not apply to Ellsberg’s experiment, of course, because the subjects
knew that they would either draw a black ball or a red one; there was no chance of drawing yellow or blue.
12
Other commentators have recently begun to apply the principles of uncertainty and risk to criminal law,
but this remains a new and fertile area for research and discussion. See, e.g., Alon Harel and Uzi Segal, Criminal
Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime,
1-2 AM. L. ECON. REV. 276 (1999) (discussion how uncertainty in criminal sanctions serves as a better deterrent
than increased sanctions or enforcement); Tom Baker, Alon Harel, & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues Of Uncertainty In
Law: An Experimental Approach, (February 14, 2003) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=380302 (also describing
the previously unappreciated value of orchestrated uncertainty in law enforcement as an effective deterrent against
crime).
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gradated levels of offenses or sentencing guidelines, do not confer discretion or allow more room
for abuse, but they do allow state agents to plan the outcomes of their cases before an
investigation even begins.
Not surprisingly, the last few years have also seen a spate of cases about entrapment via
the Internet,13 particularly in online chat rooms trawled by pedophiles.14 Agents are able to
exploit the anonymity of the Internet to impersonate young adolescents (usually females)
supposedly willing to meet up with strangers for a sexual rendezvous (where the defendant’s
arrest occurs).15 These cases proceed under traditional rules for entrapment in the given
jurisdiction (and generally result in upheld convictions), but the classic entrapment rules do not
account for the lack of face-to-face contact in criminal activity conducted entirely through a
computer, and how this significantly changes the nature of both crimes and sting operations.16

13

See infra Section V and sources cited therein.
See, e.g., U.S. v. Mitchell, 353 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 2003); State v. Cunningham, __ N.E.2d __, 2004 WL
829881 (Ohio App. 2004); State v. Turner, 805 N.E.2d 124 (Ohio. App. 2004); State v. Canaday, 641 N.W.2d 13
(Neb. 2003); People v. Superior Court, 2003 WL 21246774 (Cal. App. 2003); State v. Snyder, 801 N.E.2d 876
(Ohio App. 2003); Marreel v. State, 841 So.2d 600 (Fla. App. 2003); Kirwan v. State, 96 S.W.3d 724 (Ark. 2003);
Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147 (Ind. App. 2002); People v. Martin, 2001 WL 1699653 (Mich. App. 2001);
State v. Jones, 271 Kan. 201, 21 P.3d 569 (Kan., Apr 20, 2001); U.S. v. Burgess, 175 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 1999);
People v. Barrows, 177 Misc. 2d 712, 677 N.Y.S. 2d 672, (N.Y Sup., Jun 09, 1998); see also infra Section V.
15
See generally Donald S. Yamagami, Prosecuting Cyber-Pedophiles: How Can Intent Be Shown In A
Virtual World In Light Of The Fantasy Defense? 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547 (2001) (arguing for legislative
changes to facilitate greater law enforcement against online pedophiles, specifically to deal with newfangled
defenses that the online environment has generated); William R. Graham, Jr., Uncovering And Eliminating Child
Pornography Rings On The Internet: Issues Regarding and Avenues Facilitating Law Enforcement's Access To
'Wonderland,' 2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 457 (2000).
16
See, generally, Jarrod S. Hanson, Entrapment In Cyberspace: A Renewed Call For Reasonable
Suspicion, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 535 (1996) (arguing that entrapment no longer provides adequate safeguards for
civil liberties in cyberspace, and should have an added element of reasonable individualized suspicion prior to
commencement of online sting operations); Jennifer Gregg, Caught In The Web: Entrapment In Cyberspace, 19
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 157, 170 (1996) (arguing that traditional entrapment rules provide inadequate
safeguards against abuses by law enforcement in the cyberspace arena). Both of these student comments take the
position that online law enforcement activities should be more circumscribed, somewhat contrary to the position
taken in this article. The strength of these two pieces of scholarship is the way in which they highlight the
obsolescence of certain traditional rules and defenses pertaining to computer crime and computer-based law
enforcement. See discussion infra Section V.
14
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While all these trends may at first glance appear unrelated, together they form a realist’s
picture of the entrapment defense and its evolving shape within our legal system. As a whole,
the defense is in a state of decline, as indicated by both the decreasing number of cases and the
procedural weakness in which they arise (post-sentencing). Newer areas such as sentencing
entrapment and entrapment by estoppel have not produced a boon for questionably-convicted
defendants, but probably need to be re-formulated in terms of legal uncertainty, which really
drives these niche cases. Newer cases introducing novelties such as Internet chat room stings
illustrate the obsolescence of the traditional rules because of the cumbersome application of the
traditional rules to modern online communication.
Part II of this essay provides a very brief description of traditional entrapment rules and
the issues that have created perennial controversy. The purpose of this section is to provide
background for the reader. Part III describes the decline in entrapment cases in recent years and
offers possible explanations for this phenomenon, as well as an assessment of its significance for
our legal system. This section also includes a discussion of the weak procedural posture of many
of the cases. Part IV discusses sentencing entrapment and entrapment by estoppel as a
manifestation of uncertainty about legal rules, and offers the modest proposal that these two
areas could be understood differently than most commentators have suggested. Part V discusses
online chat room sting operations, and how they reflect on the current state of entrapment rules.
Part VI offers a brief conclusion.

II. BACKGROUND

6
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Entrapment is a creature of American Law, recognized nowhere else in the world.17 It is
entirely a function of undercover operations18 (there is no entrapment from private individuals,
only agents and informants).19 Undercover operations are a function of a special type of criminal

17

See Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and the Problem of Deterring Police Misconduct, 37 CONN. L. REV. __
, __ (2004) (FORTHCOMING), discussing the origins of the defense in this country and its absence elsewhere. For a
thoughtful comparative-law analysis of entrapment, contrasting the approaches used in Europe with the United
States, see generally Jacqueline Ross, Tradeoffs in Undercover Investigations: A Comparative Perspective, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1501 (2002) (explaining that in Europe the general rule is for the defendant to be found guilty but for
the police to be charged as accessories to the crime in situations that would be analogous to entrapment in the U.S.).
Ross discusses the fact that entrapment is a defense to criminal liability nowhere outside the United States. She
adds: “Most Western European legal systems instead treat entrapment as a mode of complicity that fails to excuse
targets but implicates the investigator in the crime . . . European systems treat such conduct as criminal unless a law
expressly exempts the investigator from liability for specified acts.” Id. at 1521-22. Ian Walden & Anne Flanagan,
Honeypots: A Sticky Legal Landscape? 29 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH L. J. 317 (comparing entrapment rules for the
U.S., England, Canada, and Australia, particularly with regards to computer-crime decoys known as “honeypots”).
Canada has taken an approach that resembles this (but it is a more stark variation). In Queen v. Mack, 2
S.C.R. 903 (1988), the Supreme Court of Canada defined its rule on entrapment in light of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, a Constitutional Act passed in 1982. The Canadian high court does not recognize entrapment
as a defense to a crime, in the sense that the defendant can obtain a complete acquittal; nonetheless, it empowered
the judiciary to use its discretion in rejecting “the spectacle of an accused’s being convicted of an offense which was
the work of the state.” Id. at 81. When a court finds, after the defendant is convicted, that the “authorities provide
an opportunity to persons to commit an offence [sic] without reasonable suspicion or acting mala fides . . .”, the
judge can issue a “stay of proceedings,” which puts the case on hold indefinitely without sentencing the defendant at
all.
The entrapment defense may have emerged in this country and not elsewhere because both versions of the
defense allow the courts to appropriate for themselves the power to supervise the criminal justice system, even
though that power of the judiciary is not clearly present in the Constitution. For an argument along these lines, see
Nancy Y. T. Hanewicz, Jacobson v. United States: The Entrapment Defense and Judicial Supervision of the
Criminal Justice System, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1163 (1993) (arguing that both tests for entrapment serve the same
basic purpose of giving the courts a self-appointed monitoring position over the police and sting operations). The
subjective test enables courts to achieve this supposed goal less explicitly—and therefore is less likely to rankle the
populace or the other branches of government—than the objective test. The enhanced power of the courts through
the entrapment defense comports overall with the greater policy-making power of the judiciary in the United States
than most other countries. Of course, another explanation may lie in the fact that many other countries have not
regulated vices like sex crimes and addictive substances to the extent that the United States has, and thus have less
need for sting operations. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics Of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 572-73 (2001). Many countries also simply lack the resources for elaborate sting operations.
18
See Stevenson, supra note 17, at __:
Not all sting operations would constitute entrapment; but entrapment almost definitionally
involves sting operations. No discussion of entrapment could have much depth without touching
on public policy about government stings. Sting operations are but one method of law
enforcement; police can also focus on investigating crimes that have already been committed, or
engage in more monitoring and surveillance to catch would-be offenders in the nick of time.
19
See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 334 (“Simply stated, there is no defense of private entrapment when the
individual who induces the defendant is acting purely as a private citizen, not on behalf of the government. This
rule is accepted by virtually every court in the United States, with little challenge.”). Private entrapment may,
however, constitute criminal solicitation, subjecting the entrapper to criminal liability. See id. at 335, n. 21.
Government agents are generally immune from this risk. For examples of failed attempts at raising “private
entrapment” as a defense, see U.S. v. Turner, 2003 WL 22056405 at *2 n.3 (D.Mass. Sep 04, 2003) (“There is
simply no defense of private entrapment as Turner's hypothetical seems to suggest.”); U.S. v. Squillacote,
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law, those focusing on “willing party” activities, like sexual impropriety with minors, sales of
contraband and firearms, bribery, etc.20 These consensual crimes naturally go unreported and
are notoriously difficult to detect without excessive surveillance (which many would find overintrusive).21 Using stings and setups becomes the most feasible and efficient way to catch
lawbreakers under these circumstances.
Stings and setups, however, can ensnare almost anyone if taken far enough. American
courts began, therefore, to draw lines to separate true criminals (albeit gullible ones) from those

221 F.3d 542, (4th Cir. 2000) (“Thus, there is no defense of private entrapment; a defendant who was induced to
commit a crime by a private party, without any government involvement, cannot claim that he was entrapped.”);
State v. O’Neill, 967 P.2d 985, 991 (Wash.App. 1998) ("a reasonable amount of persuasion to overcome reluctance
does not constitute entrapment."); United States v. Emmert, 9 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.1993) (defendant not entitled to
entrapment because he failed to show facts of improper government inducement); Prince v. State, 638 So.2d 1022
(Fla.App. 1994) (“The court held that entrapment was not an available defense when a middleman, not a state agent,
induced appellant to engage in a crime.”); U.S. v. Marren, 890 F.2d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 1989) (district court propery
refused to instruct the jury on entrapment because the defendant failed to prove that he was not predisposed to
commit the crime); United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 911 n. 15 (D.C.Cir.1978) ("Persuasion, seduction, or
cajoling by a private party does not qualify as entrapment even if the defendant was not predisposed to commit the
crime prior to such pressure.").
A similar principle, of course, applies to evidentiary exclusionary rules: see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,
166, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (Even "[t]he most outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to
secure evidence against a defendant does not make that evidence inadmissible under the Due Process Clause.").
20
For more discussion of the historical correlation between entrapment and these transactional-type crimes,
see Michael DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory, and Application, 1 U.
S. F. L. REV. 244, 250-251 (1967); MARCUS, supra note 1, at 12. for a very thoughtful discussion of the prevalence
of vice-related crimes in American law, and some of the unintended consequences, see Stuntz, supra note 17, at
573-76. Stuntz notes the ironies inherent in such legislated morality, but also notes that such crimes do indeed
create costly externalities that concentrate in the neediest sectors of society:
Gambling, sex for hire, and intoxicants are all things that a large portion of the public wants, and
these goods and services are sufficiently cheap, at least in some forms, that people of all social
classes can afford them. At the same time, these things generate both intense disapproval among
another large slice of the population, and substantial social costs that tend to concentrate in poor
communities. The result is complicated: anti-vice crusades tend to have strong public support, but
only so long as the crusades are targeted at a fairly small subset of the population. Our tradition of
giving police and prosecutors basically unregulated enforcement discretion makes that targeting
easy, which in turn permits legislatures to define criminal liability in ways that might otherwise be
politically impossible.
Id. at 573.
21
Justice Rehnquist observed this point with eloquence:
The illicit manufacture of drugs is not a sporadic, isolated criminal incident, but a continuing,
though illegal, business enterprise. In order to obtain convictions for illegally manufacturing
drugs, the gathering of evidence of past unlawful conduct frequently proves to be an all but
impossible task. Thus in drug-related offenses law enforcement personnel have turned to one of
the only practicable means of detection: the infiltration of drug rings and a limited participation in
their unlawful practices. Such infiltration is a recognized and permissible means of investigation.
Russell, 411 U.S. at 21.
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who appeared to be simply victims, regular citizens dragged into activity they would never have
done without police inducement.22 These lines were drawn in two ways. The Supreme Court
crafted a rule focused on defendants’ “predisposition” to commit crime.23 Because its rule was
binding on all federal courts and influential on many states, this approach became the majority
rule, commonly called the “subjective test.”24
22

The first federal court to uphold an entrapment defense (at least with a published decision) was Woo Wai
v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915), in which an immigration enforcement officer (in the nascent days of
immigration restrictions) had lured the defendant into a scheme for smuggling Chinese illegal aliens into the
country. The recruitment process had taken eighteen months; the court focused on the lack of evidence that the
criminal intention had originated in the defendant’s mind. Id. at 415. There are a few English cases, starting in the
late eighteenth century, that considered the defense, but English courts never accepted it, and the House of Lords
officially disavowed it for the last time in the 1970’s. Some of the English cases did include dicta or dissenting
opinions sharply criticizing police overreaching, but they did not acquit the defendant. There are also three or four
(perhaps more) American cases from the nineteenth century, but the courts did not begin to recognize the defense
until the early 1900’s. Perhaps the most frequently cited is Board of Comm'rs v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., 1864), with its memorable but disdainful commentary:“Even if inducements to commit crime could be
assumed to exist in this case, the allegation of the defendant would be but the repetition of the plea as ancient as the
world, and first interposed in Paradise: ‘The serpent beguiled me and I did eat.’" The first known state court to grant
an acquittal based on entrapment was the Texas Court of Appeals in O'Brien v. State, 6 Tex.App. 665 (1879).
See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 2-14; for a discussion of recent material from the House of Lords, see
Andrew Ashworth, Re-Drawing the Boundaries of Entrapment, 2002 CRIM. L. REV. 161 (U.K. 2002).
23
The Supreme Court cases are as follows (listed in chronological order for readers’ convenience): Sorrels
v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210 (1932); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (holding that
entrapment was established as a matter of law because petitioner was induced to commit the crime); U.S. v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423, 93 (1973) (the “defendant's concession that there was evidence to support the jury's finding that he
was predisposed to commit the crime was fatal to his claim of entrapment.”); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S.
484 (1976) (holding that the defense of emtrapment was unavailable to the defendant because he was predisposed to
commit the crime); Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988) (denying the
entrapment defense because defendant failed to meet all of the elements); and Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S.
540 (1992) (reversing the defendant’s conviction because the government failed to establish that defendant was
independently predisposed to commit the crime for which he was arrested).
The first Supreme Court case was Sorrels, where a federal agent posing as a tourist/fellow war veteran enticed his
host, a hospitable farmer, to sell him some liquor during the Prohibition years. The lower courts had denied the
availability of the entrapment defense; the Supreme Court reversed, stating that the defense should be available, at
least in a pre-trial hearing. Justice Roberts wrote a concurrence arguing that no trial should occur at all where the
police instigated the offense, whereas the majority focused too much on the defendant’s predisposition.
24
See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 55 (“The overwhelming concern is with the ‘otherwise innocent’ person,
not with the nature of the government activity.”); Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163
(1976) (hereinafter “Park”), for an exhaustive survey of cases up to that date. Park takes the position of defending
the approach used in the federal courts, and he was one of the first two commentators to do so. Park attempted to
change the terminology from “subjective test” to “federal entrapment defense,” because he felt that the word
“subjective” was confusing, given its different meanings in different areas of law. Id. at 166 n. 4. His nomenclature
did not catch on, however; to this day courts and commentators universally use the original terms.
The Supreme Court’s position on entrapment takes on special pragmatic importance for three reasons: 1)
the increasing federalization of criminal law in the United States means that federal rules have an ever-greater
relevance for law enforcement; 2) the federal criminal code comprehensively covers many of the so-called
“victimless crimes” that lend themselves to enforcement via sting operations, and hence would naturally give rise to
more entrapment claims; and 3) entrapment remains a common-law defense in the federal courts, meaning that the
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A dissenting and vocal minority of the Supreme Court, however, insisted over the course
of several decades that the rule should focus instead on the police activities themselves.25 This
would allow more rules could be made about exactly which tricks were acceptable and which
were not.26 The drafters of the Model Penal Code (MPC) agreed, as it fit better with the more
progressive agenda of having juridical (and more mechanical) regulation of law enforcement.27
As states adopted portions of the MPC into their own statutes, several included in the MPC’s

Court’s jurisprudence on the issue completely carries the day. See also William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics
Of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 517-19, 525 (2001), discussing the issue of federalization and willingparty (morality-based) crimes.
25
The early cases had consistent dissenters favoring the other approach. See Sorrels v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210 (1932); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), U.S. v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93
S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973). See also Park, supra note __ , at 166:
Supreme Court Justices have been the oracles for both theories of entrapment. In two leading
cases decided between 1932 and 1958-- Sorrels v. United States and Sherman v. United States—
the Court endorsed the subjective defense. However, articulate minorities, led by Justices Roberts
and Frankfurter respectively, urged a version that would focus solely on the issue of whether
police conduct had fallen below proper standards.
The majority, however, has never wavered from the subjective test, and the more recent cases indicate that
the dissenters have given up or are no longer on the Court. See, e.g., Matthews, 485 U.S. at 66-67 (“I have
previously joined or written four opinions dissenting from this Court's holdings that the defendant's
predisposition is relevant to the entrapment defense . . . Therefore I bow to stare decisis, and today join the
judgment and reasoning of the Court.”).
26
See generally Hanewicz, supra note 17 (arguing that both tests for entrapment serve the same basic
purpose of giving the courts a self-appointed monitoring position over the police and sting operations).
27
See Model Penal Code § 2.13 (1980); Model Penal Code § 2.11 comment 406-7, 412 (1985)(entrapment
defense is an “attempt to deter wrongful conduct on the part of the government;” “. . .the primary justification for the
defense . . . is to discourage unsavory police tactics.”). Robinson & Darley identify the availability of the
entrapment defense as one of several factors that undermine the deterrent value of criminal laws generally. See Paul
H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 Oxford J. Leg.
Stud. ___ (2004) (forthcoming).
The Model Penal Code’s (MPC) position on entrapment has an interesting interplay with its approach to
conspiracies, especially in light of the fact that entrapment and conspiracy crimes are interrelated. The MPC allows
a conspiracy conviction even where the only other conspirator besides the defendant was a government agent. See
MPC § 5.03(1) (1980). This is usually called the “unilateral approach” to conspiracy, which differs from the
traditional (majority) rule known as the “bilateral approach,” which requires at least two real criminal (nongovernment agent) members of a conspiracy before any member may be convicted of the charge. For a detailed
discussion of this plurality requirement, see LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 605-10 (§ 6.5(g)). The MPC therefore makes
it easier for the government to obtain convictions by using sting operations—all one needs is a single victim
(defendant) and one government agent—but then imposes a rule for the entrapment defense that is less favorable to
law enforcement, as it focuses on the actions of the agents and not the defendant’s predisposition. It is not clear if
the drafters intended this to be a balancing-out feature of the MPC, or if the odd combination was a coincidence.
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“objective test” for entrapment.28 A few states, most notably Florida, have attempted to use both
approaches simultaneously.29
Both approaches present problems. The subjective test’s focus on the predisposition of
the individual defendant opens the door for evidence of past crimes, which is prejudicial for
many juries.30 Also, given the defendant cannot deny having committed the crime itself (stings

28

See Note, “The Government Made Me Do It”: A Proposed Approach to Entrapment Under Jacobson v.
United States, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 995, 1002 (1994)(listing thirteen; but the rules are constantly changing in the
state courts and legislatures, with sometimes the courts adopting a different rule than appears to be in the statute,
making it difficult to get a precise count). Alaska was the first jurisdiction to officially adopt the test in 1969,
although it had won the hearts of innumerable commentators and dissenters on courts before then. See Grossman v.
State, 457 P.2d 226 (Ala. 1969).
For more explanation and criticism of the “objective test” see Stevenson, supra note 17, at __:
The objective test is so named because it purports to look at what a hypothetical “average person”
would have done if confronted with the same police come-on used in the defendant’s case. In this
sense it resembles a “reasonable person” standard from torts, albeit not exactly, because the
“reasonableness” in torts is more or less synonymous with “socially desirable,” while no one
would claim that the defendant’s commission of a crime, which has always occurred in an
entrapment case, would be “socially desirable” or something courts would want to encourage.
Courts using the objective test actually focus less on what the imaginary average person would do
than what the actual police did in the case before them.
The name “objective test” is sometimes used interchangeably with a defense called the “outrageous
government conduct test,” but the latter refers to a constitutional due process violation as opposed to a
common-law affirmative defense. In the federal system, it appears to have been put to rest by recent
Supreme Court cases. For discussion, see Daloia, supra note __ (arguing that such a test, although
currently not used anywhere, should be mandated legislatively for sexual enticement in sting operations);
Buretta, supra note __ (suggesting merging entrapment and outrageous government conduct into a single
constitutional due process test); Lord, supra note __.
29
Florida, Indiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and New Mexico have variations on the objective test that
appear to be hybrids. See Fla. Stat. Ann.777.201 (West 1992); Ind. Code. Ann. 35-41-3-9 (Burns 1985); State v.
Little, 435 A.2d 517 (N.H. 1981) (holding that the burden is on the defendant to prove the defense of entrapment);
N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:2-12 (West 1982); Baca v. State, 742 P.2d 1043 (N.M. 1987) (ruling that the defendant proved
entrapment as a defense because he was improperly induced to commit the crime); see discussion in MARCUS, supra
note 1, at 180-84 (“A misreading of the objective test can cause inclusion of the predisposition element.”). A few
commentators have proposed hybrid approaches, but the idea has not gained widespread acceptance. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey N. Klar, The Need for A Dual Approach to Entrapment, 59 WASH.. U. L. Q. 199 (1981); see generally Note,
supra note 17; Lord, supra note 63 (arguing for both a hybrid entrapment defense to be available as well as a
separate due process type defense).
30
See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 458 (Roberts, J. dissenting); LAFAVE, supra note 12 at § 5.2(d). Such evidence
may often be admissible anyway, to impeach the character of the defendant if she testifies on her own behalf, and to
impeach the reliability of other character witnesses for the defense (“Did you know your “trusted friend” had three
felony convictions? Are you sure you know this person very well?”). This, in turn, can provide enforcement too
much latitude in targeting people with previous convictions, rather than looking for actual perpetrators of the latest
unsolved crimes. Laurie Levenson notes a similar phenomenon in the context of “three-strikes-you’re-out” rules,
claiming that defendants with previous convictions will not risk life imprisonment and therefore plead guilty easily.
When the defendant enters a plea agreement instead of going to trial, there is no opportunity to raise the
exclusionary rules or claim that there were Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations. Thus, Levenson argues, police
can afford to be much more cavalier about the exclusionary rules in cases where they know the suspect has two
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usually set up the defendant to be caught in the act), denying the disposition to do it sounds
contradictory to the jury.31
The objective test purports to avoid these pitfalls,32 but instead allows the awkward
situation of acquitting some obviously dangerous criminals simply because the judge feels
squeamish about the undercover agent’s aggressive tactics.33 There is also doubt about whether
the objective test is effective in deterring police misconduct, given that police tend to measure
their success in terms of the number of arrests they make rather than the number of convictions
to which they contribute.34 The fact that arrestees may eventually end up going free is a less

previous convictions. See Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 SUFF. U. L. REV.
1 (2001).
31
Justice Stewart put it this way in his dissent in Russell: “The very fact that he has committed an act that
Congress has determined to be illegal demonstrates conclusively that he is not innocent of the offense.” Russell, 451
U.S. at 442 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
In addition, the term itself can be confusing for juries. See, e.g., Deis, supra note 1, at 1209 (stating that
“predisposition” is defined as “one who would have likely committed the same crime, without government
inducement, only in circumstances that would have made police detection more difficult and more costly”); Posner,
supra note 30, at 1220. This begs the question, of course. Does “likely to commit the crime” mean more than 50%
(i.e., “probable”)? Or could it mean likely enough to be “not remote” (i.e., 25%)? It is an unanswered question how
much “likelihood” is enough to make the person dangerous enough to be a burden to society.
Some critics contend that the subjective approach seems to give law enforcement carte blanche to employ
any form of trickery or even coercion to get the defendant to commit a crime; no one can feel safe in such a society.
See LA FAVE, CRIMINAL LAW at 458 (§ 5.2(d))(“A second criticism of the subjective approach is that it creates, in
effect, an ‘anything goes’ rule for use against persons who can be shown by their prior convictions or otherwise to
have predisposed to engage in criminal behavior.”).
32
Paul Marcus put it nicely: “The greatest strength of the objective test may simply be that it avoids the
problems of the subjective test.” MARCUS, supra note 1, at 104.
33
See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW §5.2(e), p. 459; MARCUS, supra note 1, at 108. Paul Marcus observes that
many object that the test is rather unworkable in its application, which seems to be another way of saying the same
thing: “The second major criticism of the objective test deals with its practical application. Because the standard
involves the hypothetical “average person,” or “reasonable person,” or “normally law-abiding person,” it may be
difficult to apply. The conceptual difficulty is that such individuals generally do not commit crimes.” MARCUS,
supra note 1, at 109; see also Pascu v. State, 577 P.2d 1064 (Alaska 1978) (complaining that the test in
unmanageable for the same reason). Justice Scalia stated in his concurrence in Matthews that “the defense of
entrapment will rarely be genuinely inconsistent with the defense on its merits,” which perhaps hinting that he views
the defense as mostly unnecessary. Matthews, 485 U.S. at 67 (Scalia, J., dssenting).
34
See Stevenson, supra note 17 at __. There seems to be a growing consensus among commentators that
police maximize arrests, not convictions. For a review of the relevant literature, see Stuntz, supra note 17, at 538 n.
133. Stuntz himself concludes:
Police differ from prosecutors in (at least) two critical ways. Their focus is on a different stage of
criminal proceedings. With some qualifications, prosecutors maximize convictions; police are
more likely to maximize arrests. And they are more culturally distinct from the rest of the
population than are prosecutors, so that departmental culture is a more powerful force in police
conduct than it is in prosecutorial behavior.
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urgent concern than catching the perpetrator in the first place. In addition, the objective test
creates a type of legal certainty that is more likely to favor the state than potential defendants.
Jurisdictions using the objective test (nearly a third of the states, according to some authorities)
generate clear precedents about the lines undercover agents cannot cross. The agents are more
likely to have ex ante legal knowledge of these specific parameters than the general population
(which knows very little about the law) or even potential criminals. The state actors therefore
are in a superior position to find loopholes in the rules, to plan around them, and to make sure
their tactics fall just shy of the line. This is true in general; greater specificity in legal rules
favors the parties that are more established in society and have greater resources for obtaining
legal counsel beforehand.35 Thus, even though the objective test seems on the surface to be more

Id. at 538. See also Slobogin, supra note 27, at 377-378 (“But the sociological literature strongly suggests that the
primary goal of officers in the field in the average case is to get a ‘collar.’ If they do, they've done their job. It is the
prosecutor's job to convict.”). Roger Park notes that police sometimes find enough satisfaction in harassing or
inconveniencing suspects with arrests that the final outcome of the case is not critical to them. Park, supra note 12 ,
at 232.
There is more ongoing controversy, however, over the question of whether prosecutors also have
motivations other than maximizing convictions; see, e.g., Daniel Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating
Away Prosecutorial Accountability? 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 981-89 (1997) (suggesting that besides political and public
relations concerns, some prosecutors’ offices believe it is much more valuable to prosecute serious or dangerous
criminals than first-time or petty offenders, even though the latter would often be easier cases to win); but see
Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It Is Not Whether You Win Or Lose, It Is How You Play The Game: Is The Win-Loss
Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice For Prosecutors? 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283 (2001) (arguing, mostly
anecdotally, that prosecutors are obsessed with winning); Thomas A. Hagemann, Confessions From a Scorekeeper:
A Reply to Mr. Bresler, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 151 (1996) (arguing that winning is very important to many
prosecutors, but that this is not necessarily mutually exclusive with the pursuit of justice); Scott Baker Claudio
Mezzetti, Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision To Go To Trial, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 149,
150-51 (2001)(presenting conventional model that prosecutors maximize convictions subject to cost restraints);
State v. Rummer, 189 W.Va. 369, 432 S.E.2d 39 (1993)(“Today's goal is simply to maximize convictions. This
need to convict has driven prosecutors to rely on the plea bargain as a quick and easy way to maximize the number
of convictions.”).
35
See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal
Sanctions, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984) (arguing generally that uncertainty overdeters and underdeters the wrong
people respectively); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information about
Whether Acts are Subject to Sanctions, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1990); Michael F. Ferguson and Stephen R. Peters,
But I Know It When I See It: An Economic Analysis of Vague Rules, unpublished manuscript available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=218968 (arguing that vague rules have more deterrent value and are
often more efficient); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking,” J. LEG. STUD.
257 (1974) (arguing that vagueness-related uncertainty in legal sanctions is inefficient).
I have maintained elsewhere, however, that over-deterrence is of limited concern in criminal law because
most crimes do not border on socially desirable behaviors; that is, many of the activities that come “close” to the line
of illegality would present no social loss in being avoided; in addition, the under-deterrent effect would be weaker
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pro-defendant – it scrutinizes the police rather than the accused – the ultimate effect may be to
make the state’s sting operations almost invincible and the defendant’s conviction more certain,
due to the greater certainty in the rules.
The nature of the entrapment defense creates some problems with accumulating reliable
data. Defendants who assert the defense successfully are acquitted (or have charges dismissed),
and there is usually no written decision issued in such a case that would appear on Westlaw or
Lexis or in the published reports. The written opinions – especially the appellate opinions, due
to double jeopardy concerns—usually reflect only the cases where the entrapment defense failed.
It is therefore difficult to determine exactly how often the defense is raised or how often it
succeeds, although the reported cases do provide helpful clues. The conventional wisdom is that
is it rarely raised (probably due to the risks of self-incrimination that go along with it) and that it
rarely succeeds,36 but this assertion seldom comes supported by empirical data or even survey
evidence.

than any over-deterrent effect, given that aversion to uncertainty outweighs aversion to risk. See generally Dru
Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. __ (2004) (publication
forthcoming); see also Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. L.,
ECON. & ORG. 279, 299 (1986) (“Our analysis shows that if the uncertainty created by the legal system is distributed
normally about the optimal level of compliance, and if the uncertainty is not too large – two seemingly plausible
assumptions – then the result under normal damage rules will be too much deterrence rather than too little.”);
Ehrlich & Posner, supra this note, at 263 (“Those costs [of overdeterrence through uncertainty] must be compared
with the costs in reduced prevention of socially undesirable activity as a result of loopholes that must arise when the
legislature reformulates the statutory prohibition in more specific terms.”); Ferguson and Peters, supra this note, at 7
(“More complex rules provide a greater advantage to those skilled in creating loopholes.”).
36
See, e.g., Carrie Casey & Lisa Marino, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 577, 599
(2003) (“The entrapment defense is also only rarely successful.”); Raphael Prober & Jill Randall, Federal Criminal
Conspiracy, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 571, 593 (2002) (“The entrapment defense is also only rarely successful.”); Beth
Allison Davis & Josh Vitullo, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 777, 803 (2001); Bruce A.
Green, There But For Fortune: Real-Life Vs. Fictional "Case Studies" In Legal Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 977,
985 (2000); Keri C. McGrath & Jennifer L. Pfeiffer, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 661, 681
(1999); John D. Lombardo, Causation and Objective Entrapment: Toward A Culpability-Centered Approach, 43
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 209, 213 (1996), citing Park’s article, supra note 12 at 272; LaFave also mentions this problem in
his section on the procedural aspects of the defense, noting that it is perceived to be a minefield for defendants
wherein their character is put at issue; some consider it a defense of last resort. See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 460 (§
5.2 (f)).
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III. CONCENTRATION & DECLINE
A. Introduction
Entrapment cases are disproportionately concentrated in a few states;37 they are declining
almost everywhere, including these concentration points. Many factors could account for this,
but my thesis is that both these phenomenon are largely dependent on levels of uncertainty and
knowledge of the relevant legal rules.
The data supporting these conclusions is more survey-oriented than scientific or
statistical. True scientific mapping of the entrapment defense, if possible in spite of the
limitations already mentioned, could be the subject of future research. Even though the nature of
written judicial opinions restricts a survey to cases where criminal defenses failed, we can draw
some useful inferences from the numbers such a survey provides.
The numbers indicate that in both the federal and state systems, entrapment cases are on
the decline.38 This is particularly striking because the number of criminal cases, especially drug

37

California, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington are among the states
with far more entrapment cases than other states with large populations and significant crime rates.
38
For example, a search in the “ALLFEDS” database of Westlaw reveals only nineteen federal entrapment
cases for the first half of 2004 (not including sentencing entrapment and entrapment by estoppel, which are really
distinct defenses); about forty-four each year for 2003 and 2002, but seventy-two for 2001, whereas the numbers in
the early 1990’s were in the hundreds. For 2004 federal entrapment cases, not counting sentencing entrapment and
entrapment by estoppel, see U.S. v. Kennedy, --- F.3d ----, 2004 WL 1405166 (4th Cir. 2004) (unsuccessful appeal
of failed “perjury entrapment” defense); U.S. v. Ross, --- F.3d ----, 2004 WL 1375522, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R.
7446 (9th Cir. 2004) (defense failed); U.S. v. Chavez, 98 Fed.Appx. 806, 2004 WL 1157780 (10th Cir. 2004) (jury
rejects defendant’s entrapment defense); U.S. v. Guevara, 2004 WL 1147091 (2nd Cir. 2004) (unsuccessful
entrapment defense); U.S. v. Ferby, 2004 WL 1147087 (2nd Cir. 2004) (upholding trial court’s refusal to give
entrapment instruction to jury); U.S. v. Anderson, 96 Fed.Appx. 81, 2004 WL 857442 (3rd Cir 2004) (ineffective
assistance appeal for failing to raise entrapment defense); U.S. v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2004) (defendant not
entitled to entrapment instruction); U.S. v. Vega, 94 Fed.Appx. 588, 2004 WL 785311 (9th Cir. 2004) (jury rejects
entrapment defense); Cunigan v. Hurley, 2004 WL 540446 (6th Cir. 2004) (Ineffective assistance for failing to
request entrapment instruction at trial, conviction affirmed); U.S. v. Valenzuela, 88 Fed.Appx. 909, 2004 WL
376852 (6th Cir. 2004) (insufficient evidence of lack of predisposition); U.S. v. Gallardo, 89 Fed.Appx. 23, 2004
WL 300423 (9th Cir 2004) (attempt to withdraw guilty plea in order to raise entrapment defense post-sentencing);
U.S. v. Glaum, 356 F.3d 169 (1st Cir. 2004) (unsuccessful entrapment defense); U.S. v. King, 356 F.3d 774, 63
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 452 (7th Cir. 2004) (entrapment defense abandoned in middle of proceedings); Ozoroski v.
Klem, 2004 WL 1446046 (E.D.Pa., Jun 28, 2004) (unsuccessful ineffective assistance of counsel appeal, where one
witness was brought to support entrapment defense); U.S. v. McGee, 2004 WL 1125893 (N.D.Ill., May 19, 2004)
(ineffective assistance of counsel appeal for failure to raise defense); U.S. v. Al Selami, 2004 WL 1146116

16

16 J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2005)

Entrapment By Numbers

(N.D.Ill., May 18, 2004)(unsuccessful entrapment defense); Padgett v. U.S., 302 F.Supp.2d 593 (D.S.C., Feb 09,
2004) (entrapment rejected); U.S. v. Alvarez, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2004 WL 1053195 (C.D.Cal., Jan 29, 2004);
Barnes v. Dretke, 2004 WL 323941 (N.D.Tex., Jan 26, 2004)(unsuccessful entrapment defense at trial).
The forty-four federal entrapment cases for 2003 illustrate the general failure of the defense: U.S. v. Pratt,
351 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 2003) (defendant not entitled to jury instructions on multiple conspiracies or entrapment
defense); U.S. v. Howard, 81 Fed.Appx. 511, 2003 WL 22849815 (5th Cir 2003) (defendant not entitled to
entrapment jury instruction); U.S. v. Franklin, 82 Fed.Appx. 1, 2003 WL 22854571 (10th Cir. 2003) (ineffective
assistance of counsel appeal); U.S. v. Capelton, 350 F.3d 231, 62 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1583 (1st Cir. 2003) (evidence
supported findings that defendant voluntarily sold drugs to undercover officer, defeating entrapment defense); U.S.
v. Persinger, 83 Fed.Appx. 55, 2003 WL 22905307 (6th Cir. 2003) (unsuccessful entrapment defense); U.S. v.
Lewis, 349 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2003) (entrapment unsuccessful at trial); U.S. v. Carrillo, 81 Fed.Appx. 141, 2003
WL 22682509 (9th Cir. 2003);U.S. v. Vlanich, 75 Fed.Appx. 104, 2003 WL 22213951 (3rd Cir. 2003) (refusal to
allow entrapment defense as matter of law); U.S. v. Edwards, 76 Fed.Appx. 335, 2003 WL 22239582 (D.C.Cir.
2003) (admitting “other crimes” as evidence is necessary to determine defendant’s predisposition to commit the
crime); U.S. v. Jackson, 345 F.3d 59 (2nd Cir. 2003) (affirming jury’s rejection of defendant’s entrapment defense,
given his eagerness to commit the crimes); U.S. v. Tignor, 74 Fed.Appx. 295, 2003 WL 22113628 (4th Cir. 2003)
(entrapment jury instruction refused); U.S. v. Si, 343 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2003) (jury rejects defense); U.S. v.
Medina, 73 Fed.Appx. 464, 2003 WL 22016375 (1st Cir. 2003) (defendants not entitled to entrapment instructions);
U.S. v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2003) (not entitled to entrapment instructions where defendant’s burden
of proof not met); U.S. v. Hanson, 339 F.3d 983 (D.C.Cir. 2003) (defendants prohibited from withdrawing guilty
plea in order to raise entrapment); U.S. v. Gutierrez, 343 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2003) (sting operation did not induce
defendant's criminal activity so as to warrant entrapment instruction); U.S. v. Tafoya, 72 Fed.Appx. 675, 2003 WL
21949167 (9th Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Jahner, 72 Fed.Appx. 665, 2003 WL 21920011 (9th Cir. 2003) (unsuccessful
entrapment defense); U.S. v. Shults, 68 Fed.Appx. 648, 2003 WL 21500006 (6th Cir. 2003) (entrapment defense
waived by guilty plea, cannot be withdrawn); U.S. v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944 (9th Cir 2003) (reversing where
defendant was forbidden to submit entrapment evidence to jury); U.S. v. Pedraza, 65 Fed.Appx. 702, 2003 WL
21246583 (10th Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Ogle, 328 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court’s refusal to give an
entrapment instruction to jury in money laundering case); U.S. v. Broadwater, 65 Fed.Appx. 571, 2003 WL
21265185 (7th Cir. 2003) unsuccessful entrapment defense); U.S. v. Brooks, 64 Fed.Appx. 641, 2003 WL
21147412 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Defendant's entrapment defense failed because there was no showing that defendant was
induced to commit the crime by illegal acts of the government agents.”); U.S. v. Curtis, 328 F.3d 141, 61 Fed. R.
Evid. Serv. 300 (4th Cir. 2003) (defendant unsuccessfully claimed a psychological condition made him abnormally
susceptible to entrapment); U.S. v. Kimley, 60 Fed.Appx. 369, 2003 WL 1090706 (3rd Cir. 2003) (deciding not to
downward departure for sentence entrapment); U.S. v. Thomas, 56 Fed.Appx. 196, 2003 WL 593384 (4th Cir.
2003) (holding that the entrapment defense inapplicable); Urias v. Lucero, 59 Fed.Appx. 317, 2003 WL 359448
(10th Cir. 2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to present an entrapment defense); U.S. v. Morin, 60
Fed.Appx. 17, 2003 WL 344344 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A]ffirming refusal to apply downward adjustment where
defendant indicated that he had not intended to violate the law and that the authorities "steered" him toward child
pornography”); U.S. v. Fuentes, 57 Fed.Appx. 822, 2003 WL 191442 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Assertion of the
entrapment defense coupled with acknowledgment of the underlying criminal activity did not automatically entitle
defendant to a two-point acceptance of responsibility reduction.”); U.S. v. Schake, 57 Fed.Appx. 523, 2003 WL
202439 (3rd Cir. 2003) (“Affirming, the court agreed with the district court that defendant had failed to show how
trial counsel's arguably deficient performance prejudiced defendant's trial to the extent that it undermined confidence
in the trial's outcome.”); U.S. v. Salazar, 57 Fed.Appx. 800, 2003 WL 165940 (10th Cir. 2003) (refusing to give the
jury a definition of “inducement” did not significantly affect the jury verdict); U.S. v. Coger, 58 Fed.Appx. 575,
2003 WL 149848 (4th Cir. 2003) (ruling that the defendant did not meet the burden of showing that the district court
erred in denying him the use of the entrapment defense); Towles v. Dretke, 2003 WL 22952820 (N.D.Tex., Dec 10,
2003) (ineffective assistance appeal contending that had counsel talked to potential defense witnesses regarding his
entrapment defense prior to trial, counsel would have known the witnesses were not going to testify favorably);
Unsell v. Dretke, 2003 WL 22328904 (N.D.Tex., Oct 08, 2003) (jury unconvinced by attempted entrapment
defense); U.S. v. Waddy, 2003 WL 22429047 (E.D.Pa., Sep 18, 2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal for
failing to raise defense); Montag v. U.S., 2003 WL 22075759 (D.Minn., Aug 05, 2003) (ineffective assistance of
counsel appeal for failing to raise defense); U.S. v. Turner, 2003 WL 22056405 (D.Mass., Sep 04, 2003) (“vicarious
entrapment” defense unsuccessful); McMillen v. U.S., 2003 WL 21751707 (N.D.Tex., Jul 28, 2003) (defense
regarded as frivolous in this case); U.S. v. Carmichael, 269 F.Supp.2d 588 (D.N.J., Jul 02, 2003) (unsuccessful
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cases, generally increases over time with the population and with the ongoing advances of the
War on Drugs.39 There is no reason to think, for instance, that undercover or sting operations
themselves are decreasing. For example, a Westlaw search comparing drug-related entrapment
cases with the overall number of drug related cases in a given year shows that the ratio of
reported entrapment cases to the larger body of cases for the same substantive offense has
dropped to single digits (usually five or less) in almost every state. The same ratio was well into
the double-digits almost everywhere approximately fifteen years ago. These are not precise
figures or even categories, of course, but the trends are remarkable. Westlaw searches are not
perfect—they turn up many false positives—but one would expect similar numbers of false
positives for the same search conducted for different years (but perhaps not across jurisdictions).
Yet almost every jurisdiction saw a spike in the ratio of entrapment cases around 1988, and a
smaller surge in the early 1990’s, and then a steady decline since then to numbers half the size of
the peaks figures, or even less.

entrapment defense); U.S. v. Duncan, 2003 WL 21305469 (D.Conn., Jun 04, 2003) (jury rejects entrapment
defense); U.S. v. Nguyen, 2003 WL 1785884 (N.D.Iowa, Apr 03, 2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel); U.S. v.
Davis, 2003 WL 1463263 (D.Kan., Mar 19, 2003)(unsuccessful entrapment defense at trial); Miles v. Jackson,
2003 WL 1119930 (E.D.Mich., Feb 11, 2003).
39
There is evidence that interpersonal crime (murder, assault, rape, etc.) and larceny decreased noticeably
in the 1990’s, and there are competing explanations for this phenomenon (changes in gun laws, economic
conditions, etc.). For a thought-provoking survey of the various explanations, see Steven D. Levitt, Understanding
Why Crime Fell in the 1990’s; Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163
(2004). Levitt does not discuss the types of crimes that are typically the subject of sting operations, however; it is
difficult to find data on these crimes in particular. The numbers of reported cases on Westlaw continue to grow, of
course. Another recent publication by Levitt, reviewing the work of others, discusses the War on Drugs and notes
that the number of those incarcerated on drug charges grew from 30,000 nationwide in 1980 to 400,000 by 1996, the
period during which entrapment cases peaked and then began to decline. Steven D. Levitt, Review of Drug Way
Heresies by MacCoun and Reuter, 41 J. ECON. LIT. 540, 541 (2003).
Levitt offers a way to reconcile these disparate trends (increases in drug convictions, decreases in violent
crimes):
. . . [V]iolent and property crime are 1-3 percent lower as a result of the incarceration of drug
offenders. This result may seem counterintuitive since increased drug prisoners have crowded out
punishments for other offenders. Empirically, however, incarcerating a drug criminal yields
almost as large a reduction in violent and property crime as locking up someone convicted of those
crimes. As a consequence, the net effect of increasing drug punishment is to reduce other crimes.
Id. at 544.
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Given that the written decisions reflect mostly losing defenses,40 one explanation for the
decline might be that more defendants are winning now when they raise entrapment; this might

40

See supra note __ and cases cited therein for the most recent two years; the 2002 cases are similarly
uniformaly dismal from a defendant’s perspective, and are few enough to be cited in their entirety: Bradley v.
Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (trial court’s refusal to give entrapment instruction merited reversal); U.S. v.
Valle-leanos, 53 Fed.Appx. 813, 2002 WL 31779833 (9th Cir. 2002) (entrapment completely unsupported by
evidence); U.S. v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2002) (failed motion for directed verdict on entrapment defense);
U.S. v. Hines, 50 Fed.Appx. 130, 2002 WL 31496420 (4th Cir. 2002) (entrapment instruction refused); U.S. v.
Fridley, 43 Fed.Appx. 830, 2002 WL 1808448 (6th Cir. 2002) (refusal to give entrapment jury instruction); U.S. v.
Burns, 41 Fed.Appx. 33 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming trial court’s denial of entrapment defense in drug case); U.S. v.
Corona, 41 Fed.Appx. 33 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing for new trial due to government’s refusal to provide undercover
informant’s statements to defendant for preparation of entrapment defense); U.S. v. Scott, 41 Fed.Appx. 372, 2002
WL 1150819 (10th Cir. 2002) (failed entrapment defense); U.S. v. Mannar, 34 Fed.Appx. 930, 2002 WL 1020705
(4th Cir. 2002) (jury disbelieved entrapment defense); U.S. v. Ryan, 289 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2002) (government
informant's favorable terms for sale of narcotics did not entitle defendant to submission of entrapment defense); U.S.
v. Arnold, 33 Fed.Appx. 837, 2002 WL 598056 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the factual findings support the court’s
decision not to reduce sentencing because of entrapment); U.S. v. Pedroni, 45 Fed.Appx. 103, 2002 WL 993573
(3rd Cir. 2002) (defense failed); U.S. v. Desena, 287 F.3d 170 (2nd Cir. 2002) (defense failed); Aros. v. Stewart, 39
Fed.Appx. 514, 2002 WL 530536 (9th Cir. 2002) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal, failed); U.S. v. Coleman,
284 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 2002) (jury disbelieved entrapment defense); U.S. v. Johnson, 39 Fed.Appx. 1, 2002 WL
431936 (4th Cir. 2002) (jury rejects entrapment defense); U.S. v. Tierney, 38 Fed.Appx. 424, 2002 WL 461750 (9th
Cir. 2002) (elements of entrapment not met); U.S. v. Kurkowski, 281 F.3d 699 (8th Cir. 2002) (entrapment rejected
as a matter of law); U.S. v. Thomas, 28 Fed.Appx. 427, 2002 WL 89670 (6th Cir. 2002) (failed entrapment claim);
U.S. v. Khalil, 279 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 2002) (unsuccessful); Slusher v. Furlong, 29 Fed.Appx. 490, 2002 WL 12252
(10th Cir. 2002) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal, failed); U.S. v. James, 2002 WL 31749174 (N.D.Ill., Dec
03, 2002) (pre-trail rejection of entrapment defense); Tocco v. Senkowski, 2002 WL 31465803 (S.D.N.Y., Nov 04,
2002) (refusal to give entrapment jury instruction upheld); U.S. v. DeWoody, 226 F.Supp.2d 956 (N.D.Ill., Oct 25,
2002) (claim that destruction of evidence by government fatally undermined entrapment defense rejected as
harmless error); Lombardo v. U.S., 222 F.Supp.2d 1367 (S.D.Fla., Oct 09, 2002) (failed entrapment defense); U.S.
v. Hospedales, 247 F.Supp.2d 530 (D.Vt., Sep 20, 2002) (failed entrapment defense); U.S. v. Adamidov, 2002 WL
31971836 (D.Or., Sep 04, 2002) (defense failed); U.S. v. Gambini, 2002 WL 1767418 (E.D.La., Jul 30, 2002)
(unsuccessful); Causey v. Bock, 2002 WL 1461766 (E.D.Mich., Jul 02, 2002) (failed entrapment defense); Sims v.
Cockrell, 2002 WL 1315797 (N.D.Tex., Jun 12, 2002) (exclusion of evidence to support possible entrapment
defense); Petta v. Cain, 2002 WL 1216619 (E.D.La., Jun 03, 2002) (jury disbelieved entrapment defense); U.S. v.
Brunshtein, 2002 WL 987275 (S.D.N.Y., May 13, 2002) (defendant not entitled to new trial to present entrapment
defense); U.S. v. Barragan-Rangel, 198 F.Supp.2d 973 (N.D.Ill., Apr 30, 2002) (ineffective assistance of counsel
appeal, failed); U.S. v. Richardson, 2002 WL 461662 (E.D.La., Mar 21, 2002) (evidentiary contest unrelated to
contemplated entrapment defense);U.S. v. Merlino, 204 F.Supp.2d 83 (D.Mass., Mar 07, 2002) (rejection of
attempted “entrapment as matter of law” defense); Perkins v. U.S., 2002 WL 368523 (N.D.Tex., Mar 06, 2002)
(unsuccessful entrapment defense); U.S. v. Perez, 2002 WL 442231 (N.D.Tex., Mar 05, 2002) (unsuccessful
entrapment defense at trial); Decker v. Cockrell, 2002 WL 180888 (N.D.Tex., Feb 01, 2002) (ineffective assistance
of counsel appeal); U.S. v. Grass, 2002 WL 59364 (E.D.Pa., Jan 16, 2002) (failed entrapment defense); U.S. v.
Richardson, 2002 WL 59412 (E.D.La., Jan 14, 2002) (evidentiary ruling jeopardizing entrapment defense); U.S. v.
Hall, 56 M.J. 432 (U.S. Armed Forces, May 02, 2002) (military entrapment case, defense unsuccessful). See also
Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 2001) (habeas petition contesting plea agreement, discusses failed
entrapment defense in state court proceedings); U.S. v. Nunez, 6 Fed.Appx. 500, 2001 WL 277832 (8th Cir. 2001)
(affirming rejection of defendant’s entrapment claims); U.S. v. Martinez-Villegas, 5 Fed.Appx. 696, 2001 WL
219893 (9th Cir. 2001) (defense disproved sufficiently by prosecution); U.S. v. Terry, 240 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2001)
(appellant blamed unsuccessful entrapment defense on jury instructions, conviction affirmed); U.S. v. Barriga, 246
F.3d 676 (Table), 2000 WL 1844271 (9th Cir. 2000)(upholding trial court’s rejection of entrapment defense); U.S.
v. Pinque, 234 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 2000) (defendant not entitled to entrapment instruction); U.S. v. Boyd, 248 F.3d
1160 (Table, Text in WESTLAW), 2000 WL 1801251 (7th Cir 2000)(unsuccessful entrapment defense at trial); U.S.
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seem to explain the drop in entrapment-related appeals. This explanation, however, is
inadequate for the following reasons.
First, the opinions we do have, although representing cases where the defense failed at trial
(or failed to arise procedurally), describe in vivid detail the facts and circumstances under which
entrapment defenses lose. These fact summaries can leave the reader wondering if any
defendant could ever win under such strict rules – many of the failed entrapment claims seem
plausible. Entrapment is an “affirmative defense,” meaning the defendant bears the burden of
offering some evidence of entrapment before the prosecution must respond as part of proving the
state’s case (the level of proof required of the defendant varies somewhat from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, but is lower than a burden of proof). Courts regularly find insufficient evidence of
entrapment where the stipulated facts record a complex, heavy-handed sting operation. In other
words, the cases we have leave no reason to believe that other defendants easily prevail with the
entrapment defense.
Second, if a decline was due to more defendants winning, one would expect this, in turn, to
be explained by some sudden shift in the rules to favor defendants. This has not occurred. The
rules of entrapment in almost all jurisdictions have been the same since the early 1980’s, if not
earlier.
Third, even if the rules had become more lenient (or the courts had found some other
mechanism to accomplish the same thing), a rise in acquittal rates from the entrapment defense
would presumably increase its popularity with more marginal defendants, especially given the
existence of a defined set of local defense attorneys. An easy acquittal technique would be
v. Cox, 242 F.3d 368 (Table, Text in WESTLAW), 2000 WL 1761884 (2nd Cir. 2000)(defendant’s entrapment
defense unsuccessful because government proved he had the predisposition to sell cocaine).
But see Barbee v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2002 WL 1784318 (W.D.Tenn., Jul 16, 2002) (defendants
acquitted on entrapment defense); U.S. v. Garcia, 1 Fed.Appx. 641, 2001 WL 30043 (9th Cir. 2001) (trial court’s
refusal to give entrapment instructions held to be error, cases reversed and remanded).
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adopted by everyone, even those with marginal claims to the defense. This would reduce the
number of plea agreements and increase the number of defendants losing at trial, at least for a
short time period. In fact, one might expect the numbers of losing cases to rise along with the
numbers of wins, until the real boundaries became clear. This observation could also apply in
reverse: a spike in the number of entrapment appeals, even though they were loser defenses,
could reflect more unreported acquittals for the same period.
For these reasons, it is reasonable to glean some tentative, general conclusions from the
reported entrapment cases, even if they do prove only a partial picture. The partial picture we
have indicates that entrapment is on the decline as a defense everywhere. In addition, the cases
tend to be concentrated in a few states: California,41 Florida,42 Michigan,43 Ohio,44 Tennessee,
41

See, e.g., People v. Reyes, 2004 WL 1354298 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., Jun 17, 2004); People v. Reiner, 2004
WL 1171507 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., May 26, 2004), Reh’g den. June 14, 2004 (defense unsuccessful in extortion case);
People v. Smith, 2004 WL 1120878 (Cal.App. 6 Dist., May 20, 2004); People v. Estrada, 2004 WL 765958
(Cal.App. 2 Dist., Apr 12, 2004); People v. Hale, 2004 WL 602641 (Cal.App. 3 Dist., Mar 26, 2004); People v.
Dang, 2004 WL 370791 (Cal.App. 1 Dist., Mar 01, 2004); People v. Johnson, 2004 WL 194035 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.,
Feb 02, 2004); People v. Tinoco, 2004 WL 156873 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., Jan 28, 2004); People v. Hernandez, 2003
WL 23101085 (Cal.App. 6 Dist., Dec 30, 2003); People v. Washington, 2003 WL 22966235 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., Dec
18, 2003); People v. Huerta, 2003 WL 22839284 (Cal.App. 1 Dist., Nov 26, 2003); People v. Buckmaster, 2003
WL 22520497 (Cal.App. 3 Dist., Nov 07, 2003); People v. Pigage, 112 Cal.App.4th 1359, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 88
(Cal.App. 4 Dist., Oct 30, 2003); People v. Nicolas, 2003 WL 21738954 (Cal.App. 1 Dist., Jul 28, 2003); People v.
Jefferson, 2003 WL 2008282 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., May 02, 2003); People v. Flores, 2003 WL 1522005 (Cal.App. 1
Dist., Mar 25, 2003); People v. Bristow, 2003 WL 257372 (Cal.App. 5 Dist., Feb 07, 2003); People v. Adair, 29
Cal.4th 895, 62 P.3d 45, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 799 (Cal., Jan 30, 2003);
42
See, e.g., Delice v. State, 2004 WL 1103543 (Fla.App. 4 Dist., May 19, 2004); State v. Blanco, 2004
WL 86646, (Fla.App. 4 Dist., Jan 21, 2004) (the celebrated “hottie defense” case); Perez v. State, 856 So.2d 1074
(Fla.App. 5 Dist., Oct 17, 2003) (holding that evidence of prior convictions showed defendant’s predisposition to
commit the crime); Concepcion v. State, 857 So.2d 299 (Fla.App. 5 Dist., Oct 03, 2003) ( holding that jury
instructions and the use of the word “or” constituted reversible error); Worley v. State, 848 So.2d 491 (Fla.App. 5
Dist., Jul 03, 2003); Marreel v. State, 841 So.2d 600 (Fla.App. 4 Dist., Apr 02, 2003) (ruling that the entrapment
defense is denied because law enforcement agents did not properly induce the defendant).
43
See, e.g., People v. Mills, 2004 WL 787145 (Mich.App., Apr 13, 2004) (ineffective assistance appeal);
People v. Anderson, 2004 WL 103189 (Mich.App., Jan 22, 2004)(ineffective assistance of counsel appeal); People
v. Leonard, 2003 WL 22681789 (Mich.App., Nov 13, 2003); People v. Micheau, 2003 WL 22358874 (Mich.App.,
Oct 16, 2003); People v. Hunter, 2003 WL 22112435 (Mich.App., Sep 11, 2003)(ineffective assistance of counsel
appeal).
44
Se, e.g., State v. Klapka, 2004 WL 1238411, 2004-Ohio
- 2921 (Ohio App. 11 Dist., Jun 04, 2004) (trial
court refusal to give entrapment instruction); State v. Burgins, 2004 WL 1240373, 2004-Ohio
- 2932 (Ohio App. 7
Dist., Jun 04, 2004) (failed entrapment defense); State v. Bolden, 2004 WL 1043317, 2004-Ohio-2315 (Ohio App.
2 Dist., May 07, 2004); State v. Scurles, 2004 WL 937276, 2004-Ohio
- 2214 (Ohio App. 6 Dist., Apr 30, 2004);
State v. Cunningham, 156 Ohio App.3d 714, 808 N.E.2d 488, 2004-Ohio
- 1935 (Ohio App. 2 Dist., Apr 16,
2004)(Internet chat room case); State v. Turner, 156 Ohio App.3d 177, 805 N.E.2d 124, 2004-Ohio
- 464 (Ohio
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Texas,45 and Washington46 are states with the highest numbers of entrapment cases. The large
criminal dockets of these cases helps explain the larger number of cases for a certain criminal
defense, but states like New York,47 Pennsylvania,48 New Jersey,49 and Illinois50 are surprisingly
absent from the list. These latter states have large populations and large criminal dockets, but
their numbers of reported entrapment cases are less than five or ten per year.

App. 2 Dist., Feb 06, 2004); Chong Hadaway, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control Com'n, 2004 WL 232147, 2004-Ohio
548 (Ohio App. 10 Dist., Feb 03, 2004) (a rare administrative enforcement-entrapment case, defense unsuccessful);
City of Dayton v. Clark, 2004 WL 67945, 2004-Ohio
- 162 (Ohio App. 2 Dist., Jan 16, 2004); State v. Carter, 2004
WL 35458, 2004-Ohio- 39 (Ohio App. 5 Dist., Jan 05, 2004); State v. Ellison, 2003 WL 22946188, 2003-Ohio-6748
(Ohio App. 6 Dist., Dec 12, 2003); State v. Snyder, 155 Ohio App.3d 453, 801 N.E.2d 876, 2003-Ohio
- 6399 (Ohio
App. 3 Dist., Dec 01, 2003) (rejecting the defendant’s entrapment defense); State v. Mahan, 2003 WL 22326562,
2003-Ohio
- 5430 (Ohio App. 12 Dist., Oct 13, 2003); State v. Charlton, 2003 WL 21185794, 2003-Ohio
- 2631 (Ohio
App. 9 Dist., May 21, 2003); State v. Graves, 2003 WL 21040652, 2003-Ohio-2359 (Ohio App. 6 Dist., May 09,
2003); State v. Matthews, 2003 WL 1699926, 2003-Ohio
- 1623 (Ohio App. 6 Dist., Mar 31, 2003); State v.
Edwards, 2003 WL 257383, 2003-Ohio- 571 (Ohio App. 6 Dist., Feb 07, 2003); State v. West, 2003 WL 139976,
2003-Ohio
- 215 (Ohio App. 2 Dist., Jan 17, 2003).
45
See, e.g. (note entrapment failed in every one of the following cases): Hernandez v. State, 2004 WL
1403706 (Tex.App.-Austin, Jun 24, 2004); Busby v. State, 2003 WL 22999526 (Tex.App.-Hous. (1 Dist.), Dec 18,
2003); Warfield v. State, 2003 WL 22480405 (Tex.App.-Tyler, Oct 31, 2003); Sullivan v. State, 2003 WL
22456326 (Tex.App.-Dallas, Oct 30, 2003); Garza v. State, 2003 WL 22232836 (Tex.App.-Texarkana, Sep 30,
2003); Jang v. State, 2003 WL 22020788 (Tex.App.-Dallas, Aug 28, 2003); Fautner v. State, 2003 WL 21783349
(Tex.App.-Dallas, Aug 04, 2003); Routier v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554 (Tex.Crim.App., May 21, 2003); Gonzalez v.
State, 2003 WL 21101520 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth, May 15, 2003); O'Dell v. State, 2003 WL 21047576 (Tex.App.Eastland, May 08, 2003); Faughn v. State, 2003 WL 1987855 (Tex.App.-Hous. (14 Dist.), May 01, 2003); Dow v.
State, 2003 WL 1922435 (Tex.App.-Austin, Apr 24, 2003); Chowdhury v. State, 2003 WL 1738414 (Tex.App.Hous. (14 Dist.), Apr 03, 2003); Garcia v. State, 2003 WL 748858 (Tex.App.-Hous. (14 Dist.), Mar 06, 2003);
Sanchez v. State, 98 S.W.3d 349 (Tex.App.-Hous. (1 Dist.), Jan 23, 2003).
46
See, e.g., State v. Bradley, 2004 WL 880382 (Wash.App. Div. 1, Apr 26, 2004); State v. Woodman, 121
Wash.App. 1002, 2004 WL 729198 (Wash.App. Div. 2, Apr 06, 2004); State v. Rivera, 120 Wash.App. 1003, 2004
WL 188306 (Wash.App. Div. 1, Feb 02, 2004); State v. Wright, 119 Wash.App. 1052, 2003 WL 22970974
(Wash.App. Div. 3, Dec 18, 2003); State v. Finnie, 119 Wash.App. 1025, 2003 WL 22753621 (Wash.App. Div. 3,
Nov 20, 2003); State v. Gisvold, 117 Wash.App. 1006, 2003 WL 21267822 (Wash.App. Div. 1, Jun 02, 2003);
State v. Whipple, 116 Wash.App. 1048, 2003 WL 1963239 (Wash.App. Div. 1, Apr 28, 2003).
47
See infra notes __ - __ for a list of recent cases.
48
See infra note __, listing recent cases.
49
See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 366 N.J.Super. 447, 841 A.2d 505 (N.J.Super.A.D., Feb 11, 2004) (rejecting
the defendant’s entrapment defense); State v. Williams, 364 N.J.Super. 23, 834 A.2d 433 (N.J.Super.A.D., Nov 06,
2003) (stating that the confidential informant aided law enforcement in a drug bust by pointing out the defendant);
State v. Williams, 356 N.J.Super. 599, 813 A.2d 1215 (N.J.Super.A.D., Jan 15, 2003) (holding that the identity of
the informant was not necessary for this case).
50
See, e.g., People v. Glenn, 345 Ill.App.3d 974, 804 N.E.2d 661 (Ill.App. Feb 04, 2004) (rejecting the
defendant’s entrapment defense); People v. Rose, 342 Ill.App.3d 203, 794 N.E.2d 1004 (Ill.App. Jul 29, 2003)
(holding that the defendant’s entrapment defense did not warrant releasing the informant’s identity); People v.
Gonzalez, 339 Ill.App.3d 914, 791 N.E.2d 578 (Ill.App. Jun 09, 2003) (involving ineffective assistance of counsel);
People v. Mendez, 336 Ill.App.3d 935, 784 N.E.2d 425 (Ill.App. Feb 07, 2003) (claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel).
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There are, therefore, two parallel phenomena operating in tandem: the concentration of
entrapment cases in certain places, and the overall decline in every jurisdiction. Both merit
discussion.

B. Concentration & Uncertainty
One might expect that the difference in legal rules between jurisdictions would explain
the concentration of cases in certain areas. Such a view would have an inherent appeal to those
who believe in the rule of law as the causal factor for legal outcomes. The appeal is heightened,
naturally, where there are two rival rules at play, a subjective and objective approach.
Regardless of the relative merits of the rules, they do not appear to affect the relative
number of entrapment cases that arise. Pennsylvania, for example, uses the objective test, but
has had only five reported entrapment cases in the last three years; 51 it had only three in the three
years before that.52 New York uses the subjective test, 53 and its number of entrapment cases for

51

Com. v. Joseph, 848 A.2d 934, 2004 PA Super 119 (Pa.Super., Apr 15, 2004)(Internet chat room case);
Com. v. Zingarelli, 839 A.2d 1064, 2003 PA Super 424 (Pa.Super., Nov 12, 2003) (Internet chat room case); Com.
v. Boyd, 835 A.2d 812, 2003 PA Super 412 (Pa.Super., Nov 03, 2003); Com. v. Lebo, 795 A.2d 987, 2002 PA
Super 76 (Pa.Super., Mar 20, 2002) (child pornography case); Com. v. Wilson, 829 A.2d 1194, 2003 PA Super 276
(Pa.Super., Jul 25, 2003) (remanding for re-sentencing due to issues dealing with how close the drugs where to a
school zone).
52
Com. v. Chmiel, 558 Pa. 478, 738 A.2d 406 (Pa., Aug 19, 1999) (claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel); Com. v. Boyle, 733 A.2d 633, 1999 PA Super 142 (Pa.Super., Jun 09, 1999) (allowing past offenses into
court to show the likelihood that defendant was involved with the transaction); Com. v. Medley, 725 A.2d 1225,
1999 PA Super 20 (Pa.Super., Jan 27, 1999) (rejecting the defendant’s entrapment defense).
53
By comparison, covering the exact same time period as the preceding footnotes, see People v. Moultrie,
5 A.D.3d 241, 773 N.Y.S.2d 287 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept., Mar 18, 2004) (denying the defendant’s request to charge the
affirmative defense of entrapment because there was no evidence that defendant was improperly induced to commit
the crime); People v. Coleman, 4 A.D.3d 677, 773 N.Y.S.2d 146 (N.Y.A.D. Feb 26, 2004) (holding that the
entrapment defense was neither raised nor preserved); People v. Delaney, 309 A.D.2d 968, 765 N.Y.S.2d 696
(N.Y.A.D. Oct 23, 2003) (rejecting the defendant’s entrapment defense because there was no evidence that the
officer actively persuaded the defendant to engage in the transaction); People v. Otto, 2003 WL 21974317, 2003
(N.Y. 2003)(administrative entrapment case); People v. Arias, 303 A.D.2d 592, 756 N.Y.S.2d 487 (N.Y2003);
People v. Missrie, 300 A.D.2d 35, 751 N.Y.S.2d 16 (N.Y. Dec 05, 2002) (granting a new trial because of erroneous
jury instructions on entrapment); People v. Castro, 299 A.D.2d 557, 750 N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y. 2002) (rejecting the
defendant’s entrapment defense because he was predisposed to commit the offense); People v. Dover, 294 A.D.2d
594, 743 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. 2002) (denying the defendant’s claim of ineffective counsel based on his counsel’s
failure to raise the entrapment defense); People v. Chou, 292 A.D.2d 199, 738 N.Y.S.2d 210 (N.Y. 2002) (rejecting
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the last three years was little more than Pennsylvania’s; but the numbers are still paltry for a state
with such an active and interesting criminal docket. Ohio54 and Texas,55 in contrast, each had
over twenty-five entrapment cases in the last three years – their numbers are close, yet Ohio uses
the subjective test and Texas the subjective test. Numerous other comparisons could be made to
illustrate the same phenomenon: the test used by courts in a given jurisdiction is not very
predictive of how many entrapment cases will arise, and therefore the effect of the rules on more
causal factors (like the activities of police or the acquittal rates for defendants) is also in doubt.
The concentration of entrapment cases in certain jurisdictions is more likely to result
from a combination of three factors other than the rule of law: 1) undercover or sting operations
being favored by local law enforcement chiefs; 2) peer influence among the local defense bar,
and 3) a state of uncertainty about the legal rules in a given jurisdiction. I contend that the first
two factors are largely dependent on the third, but not vice-versa, making the third the most
important variable.
There is no question that undercover operations are unevenly distributed across the
United States. Certain law enforcement agencies embark on undercover or sting operations as
part of a discreet project targeting a particular crime. Ohio, for example, recently deployed
enforcement officers to pose as decoys in Internet chat rooms to catch pedophiles,56 imitating a
job often done by federal agents; this led to a few Internet-entrapment cases in Ohio that are not
typical for most states. Such projects depend on available resources, local political pressure to
respond to crime waves, etc. Undercover activities may also react to legal rules, although police
the defendant’s entrapment defense); People v. Alicea, 289 A.D.2d 939, 734 N.Y.S.2d 525 (N.Y. 2001) (deciding
not to the defendant’s entrapment defense on appeal); People v. Rojas, 97 N.Y.2d 32, 760 N.E.2d 1265, 735
N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. 2001); People v. Gilbert, 281 A.D.2d 288, 722 N.Y.S.2d 144 (N.Y. 2001).
54
See supra note __.
55
See supra note __.
56
See, e.g., State v. Snyder, 155 Ohio App.3d 453, 801 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ohio App. 2003) (Lima Police
Department sting operation on importuning); State v. Moller, 2002 WL 628634 (Ohio App.2002) (“The Xenia
Police Department created the Xenia Computer Crime Unit in 2000 to capture Internet criminals.”).
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are generally more focused on making arrests than obtaining convictions. Bright-line rules are
conducive to planning operations ahead of time, so as to work around the rules or to find
loopholes.57 For example, if police know that certain types of sting operations are expressly
rejected by local courts, the police can simply resort to alternative schemes to sidestep the rules.
Clarity and specificity in legal rules create legal loopholes.58 Those with good ex ante legal
knowledge and time to plan ahead are in the best position to take advantage of loopholes in the
rules. In other words, legal certainty favors entities that are established, endowed with resources,
and able to afford legal counsel (or get it for free somehow). Few entities fit this profile better
than the state itself, including its enforcement arm.59 Legal certainty disfavors small or lessenfranchised parties, such as individual defendants, who are unwary of the stronger party’s
strategy (designed around the rules). Weaker parties also face less recourse or redress when the
case is in court, because the inflexibility of bright-line rules determines the outcome.60 This is
not to say bright-line rules are wrong or right; they are efficient to the extent that they yield
predictable, consistent results, but predictable results are most beneficial to those with the
knowledge ahead of time. Legal foresight is not evenly distributed.
Conversely, small parties or individual defendants are sometimes favored by uncertainty
in the law, which allows for windfall benefits in individual cases that would otherwise be
unavailable – the legal equivalent of “profits” in Frank Knight’s use of the term.61 Thus, one
would expect to find more undercover or sting operations in jurisdictions with clear, specific
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See, e.g., Ferguson & Peters, supra note 35.
Id.
59
Id. at __.
60
Id.
61
See generally KNIGHT, supra note __; ELLSBERG, supra note __, at 131-43 (explaining “uncertanties that
are not risks”).
58
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rules about entrapment, just as ex ante sentencing manipulation by agents occurs in the presence
of mechanical sentencing guidelines.
The opportunities for entrapment cases depend on the number of undercover operations –
or rather, the number of undercover operations conducted at the margins of legality. Entrapment
cases are necessarily a subset of the number of sting operations; factors that encourage more
sting operations, like bright-line rules about what tactics are permissible, will also be factors that
can increase the number of entrapment cases in that area. At the same time, as more entrapment
cases come, challenging various undercover tactics, more lines are drawn, or the lines become
clearer, which makes subsequent attempts at pleading entrapment futile – the outcome will be
predictable.
Peer influences among criminal defense lawyers also affect the proliferation of certain
defenses or trial strategies. If a few defendants succeed with the entrapment defense, this will
quickly become known to other lawyers working in that courthouse, who will consider adopting
it for their own clients. This, too, is dependent on uncertainty in the legal rules. Uncertain
outcomes will encourage defendants and their attorneys to take their chances at trial, but this
becomes futile as the outcomes become a sure thing; plea agreements replace trials as certainty
increases.62 Uncertainty is the most important variable determining where entrapment cases will
concentrate.

62

Obviously bright-line rules are more efficient for moving cases on the judicial docket, and generally
lower transaction costs for all the parties. Criminal defendants, however, do not always benefit from an efficient,
predictable prosecutorial system as much as they do from a system allowing for some unpredictable results.
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C. Declines and Uncertainty
The overall rise and fall of the entrapment cases over the last twenty years63 also relates
to the varying levels of uncertainty in the legal rules. The first real spike in the entrapment cases
(for example, where they went to double-digit percentages of the overall drug-crime docket)
occurred in almost every state in the three years between 1988 and 1991, followed by a second
large spike in the three years between 1991 and 1995. There was a significant drop-off after
1995, and a continuing decline to the present, where the levels have returned to their pre-1998
state.
The temporary surge in entrapment cases in the late eighties and early nineties was due to
two contemporaneous (and related) events: the War on Drugs (there was a huge increase in drug
convictions and undercover endeavors in the late 1980’s) and a pair of entrapment decisions by
the Supreme Court. The War on Drugs generated far more undercover operations than ever
before, not only for narcotics but also for related crimes, such as firearm offenses and money
laundering. These ensnaring tactics were new to many defense attorneys and defendants alike; it
would have been easy to see a possible entrapment claim in every case. The defense had been
relatively rare prior to this time, but so were undercover operations (at least compared to the
present time)64 so it is unsurprising that many of those caught in the new abundance of sting
operations would try the defense created to address this very form of law enforcement, even
though it must have been only vaguely familiar to many of those using it. As the courts

63

The reported cases from earlier decades, such as the 1960’s and 70’s, reveal rare instances of the
entrapment defense, which could be explained in terms of predating the War on Drugs (which made undercover
operations much more commonplace) and the modern Supreme Court cases on the subject. The problem with
drawing any sort of conclusions from these early periods is that older cases are less likely to be available on
Westlaw and Lexis – especially unpublished opinions.
64
The first Supreme Court cases from the Prohibition Era contain similar comments that the defense,
unknown at common law, was turning up everywhere as undercover operations to enforce prohibition and Comstock
laws were becoming more widespread. There is no available data to draw a comparison to the present time, but one
may surmise that the present era has far surpassed any earlier periods in this regard.
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addressed the cases and the rules and outcomes became more predictable, the defense would
have become less useful. Prosecutors would not bother to take cases to trial where it was clear
that the defendant had a strong case for entrapment, and defendants with weaker arguments
would tend to enter plea bargains. Legal uncertainty is likely to last for only a certain number of
cases (a dozen or two in a jurisdiction would probably cover enough fact patterns to have
something relevant for most new cases).
A 1988 ruling by the Supreme Court, Mathews v. United States,65 also seemed to spur the
increase in entrapment cases everywhere. The defendant was an employee of the Small Business
Administration and was caught accepting a bribe as part of a sting operation.66 He was denied a
jury instruction on entrapment because he refused to admit to certain elements of the charges.67
The Court held that defendants are entitled, as a matter of law, to jury instructions regarding
entrapment whenever there is sufficient evidence to indicate the possibility of entrapment.68 The
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on entrapment is naturally very influential even in states using
other tests.69 Even though this case was not an obvious expansion of the entrapment defense, its
subtle tinkering created uncertainty about how to apply the rules to various fact patterns,
allowing more fodder for litigation.
65

485 U.S. 58 (1988).
Mathews, 485 U.S. at 60.
67
Id. at 61.
68
Id. at 62.
69
The Supreme Court’s decision generated a small flurry of law review articles and case notes in the next
two or three years. See, e.g., George Robert Hicks, III, Note, The 'No I Didn't, And Yes I Did But . . .' Defense: Is
the Entrapment Defense Available to Criminal Defendants Who Deny Doing the Crime?—Mathews v. United States,
11 CAMPBELL L. REV. 279 (1989) (urging state court adopting of Mathews rule); Jerry Schreibstein, Note,
Entrapment in Light of Mathews v. United States: The Property of Inconsistency and the Need for Objectivity, 24
U.S.F. L. REV. 541 (1990) (arguing in support of Mathews holding); Laura Gardner Webster, Building A Better
Mousetrap: Reconstructing Federal Entrapment Theory From Sorrells To Mathews, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 605 (1990)
(criticizing Mathews Court for not taking the opportunity to adopt the objective test instead of the subjective test for
entrapment generally); Lana Wender , Comment, Mathews V. United States: Simultaneous Denial of Crime and
Claim of Entrapment--Should Inconsistency Preclude Availability of the Entrapment Defense? 23 GA. L. REV. 257
(1988) (supporting Mathews holding as a victory for justice and fairness); Kristine K. Keller, Note, Evolution and
Application of the Entrapment Defense: Abandonment of the Inconsistency Rule, 11 HAMLINE L. REV. 351 (1988)
(arguing in favor of allowing defendants to plead inconsistent defenses simultaneously).
66
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The second of the pair of Supreme Court cases from this period was the 1992 case
Jacobson v. United States,70 in which the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendant in a
child-pornography case. The government agents in this case had spent two years sending
increasingly provocative (and increasingly focused on underage subjects) pornography, until the
defendant succumbed to the pressure to order some explicitly illegal material, which prompted
his arrest.71 This case led to a flurry of speculation in the academic journals72 about the rules
being relaxed, because the defendant won in this given case. Jacobson also generated a spate of
new attempts to use the entrapment defense by hopeful parties. The rules were uncertain. As the
70

503 U.S. 540 (1992).
See generally id.
72
See, e.g., .Paul Marcus, Presenting, Back from the [Almost] Dead, The Entrapment Defense, 47 FLA. L.
REV. 205 (1995) (arguing that entrapment will always have the inducement of the defendant by the government
element, as well as the lack of predisposition to commit the crime by the defendant element ); Christopher D.
Moore, Comment, The Elusive Foundation of the Entrapment Defense, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1151 (1995); Scott C.
Paton, Note, "The Government Made Me Do It": A Proposed Approach to Entrapment Under Jacobson v. United
States, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 995 (1994) (discussing the subjective and objective approaches to the entrapment
defense); Amy Perkins, Comment, Jacobson v. United States--Entrapment Redefined? 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 847
(1994) (discussing a defendant’s predisposition); Aubry Matt Pesnell, Note, The Entrapment Defense: A Cry for
Decisiveness, Consistency, and Resolution, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 163 (1993); Brian Thomas Feeney, Note, Scrutiny
For The Serpent: The Court Refines Entrapment Law In Jacobson v. United States, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 1027
(1993) (discussing the objective approach and the predisposition element); J. Patrick Sullivan, Note, The Evolution
of the Federal Law of Entrapment: A Need For A New Approach Jacobson v. United States, 58 MO. L. REV. 403
(1993); Leslie G. Bleifuss, Note, Entrapment and Jacobson v. United States: "Doesn't The Government Realize
That They Can Destroy A Man's Life?" 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 431 (1993); Damon D. Camp, Out of the Quagmire
After Jacobson v. United States: Towards A More Balanced Entrapment Standard, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1055 (1993) (discussing the subjective and objective approaches to the entrapment defense); Elena Luisa Garella,
Note, Reshaping The Federal Entrapment Defense: Jacobson v. United States 68 WASH. L. REV. 185 (1993) (stating
that “a defendant asserting entrapment cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own
conduct and predisposition."); Michael O. Zabriskie, Comment, If The Postman Always "Stings" Twice, Who Is The
Next Target?--An Examination Of The Entrapment Theory 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 217 (1993); Erich Weyand,
Comment Entrapment: From Sorrells To Jacobson--The Development Continues 20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 293 (1993)
(showing some criticism of the entrapment defense); Jack B. Harrison, Note The Government As Pornographer:
Government Sting Operations And Entrapment: United States v. Jacobson, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1067 (1993)
(discussing the question that is at the heart of every discussion of the entrapment defense: “Can the government
encourage persons to violate the law by creating the mechanism which makes such a violation possible and then
prosecute the person for that violation?”); Nancy Y.T. Hanewicz, Note Jacobson v. United States: The Entrapment
Defense and Judicial Supervision of the Criminal Justice System 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1163 (1993) (“explores the
interaction between the Supreme Court's approach to entrapment and its stand on the issue of judicial supervisory
power by analyzing the Jacobson opinion”); Fred Warren Bennett, From Sorrells To Jacobson: Reflections On Six
Decades Of Entrapment Law, And Related Defenses, In Federal Court, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 829 (1992);
Lance B. Levy, Comment, The "Sting" of Government Operations: An Analysis Of Predisposition As It Relates To
The Entrapment Defense—Jacobson v. United States 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1177 (1992) (discussing a child
pornography case where the court found that the defendant did not have the predisposition to commit the offense).
See also Cynthia Perez, Casenote, United States v. Jacobson: Are Child Pornography Stings Creative Law
Enforcement Or Entrapment?, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 235 (1991).
71
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first few rounds of new cases were litigated, however, it became clear that any change in the
entrapment rules would be applicable to only a narrow set of circumstances or facts, and the
furor subsided. In fact, by raising the uncertainty temporarily (because of the narrowness of its
ruling), the Supreme Court’s somewhat confusing ruling probably contributed to an eventual
decrease in the number of entrapment cases. The temporary uncertainty would have spawned
new attempts at entrapment claims; the new surplus of cases provided opportunities for more
judicial holdings on more fact patterns, regarding various subtleties of the rules; and once the
new batch of cases was resolved, the rules would be clearer than ever. This would make
entrapment claims in the trial context more and more unfruitful. The Jacobson ruling was
narrow enough to result in uncertainty for only a short time;73 it did not require a wholesale
reassessment of the defense.
It should be noted that simply creating a definitive rule does not equal legal certainty.
For example, several legislatures have codified their test for entrapment (whether subjective or
objective),74 perhaps to pre-empt the courts from choosing a test for themselves. Changed rules
cause a surge in related cases until the courts have time to apply the new rules to various sets of
facts. Once a number of fact patterns have been adjudicated, the certainty effect sets in, and the
cases that are tried or appealed diminish.

73

The main uncertainty resulting from Jacobson was whether the government would thereafter have to
show some individualized reasonable suspicion of the defendant before commencing the “inducement” phase of a
sting; no courts subsequently adopted this approach, however, and the issue has subsided.
74
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Washington. See ALA. CODE §13A-3-31 (2002); ALASKA
STAT. §11.81.450 (2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13.206; ARK. CODE § 5-2-209 (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-709
(2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-15 (2002); DEL. CODE ANN. Title 11, § 432 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 777.201
(2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-237 (2002); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-12
(2002); IND. CODE § 35-41-3-9 (2002); KANS. STAT. ANN. § 21-3210 (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 505.010
(2002); MO. REV. STAT. § 562.066 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-213 (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:5
(2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12 (2002); N.Y. CRIM. LAW § 40.05 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11
(2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.275 (2002); 18 PA.C.S.A. § 313 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. §39-11-505 (2004); TEX.
PENAL CODE § 8.06 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (2004); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.070 (2004).
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D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The procedural posture of a defense can be another signal of decline. In the context of
entrapment, procedural posture reaches the level of paradox.
Entrapment is an “affirmative defense,” which means the defendant does not deny the
allegations but rather asserts some extenuating circumstances that should cancel out any
culpability.75 Affirmative defenses76 are supposed to appear early in the drama of the criminal
trial; many states require that defendants notify the court and prosecution of a contemplated
entrapment defense (and other affirmative defenses as well) before a trial is set,77 often so that

75

Delaware’s entrapment statute sums this up particularly well: “The defense of entrapment as defined by
this Criminal Code concedes the commission of the act charged but claims that it should not be punished because of
the wrongdoing of the officer….” DEL. CODE ANN. Title 11, § 432 (2004). For a thoughtful discussion of
affirmative defenses, see generally Leslie Yalof Garfield, Back To The Future: Does Apprendi Bar A Legislature's
Power To Shift The Burden Of Proof Away From The Prosecution By Labeling An Element Of A Traditional Crime
As An Affirmative Defense? 35 CONN. L. REV. 1351 (2003) (discussing recent Supreme Court rulings on the issue);
B. Patrick Costello, Jr., Comment, Apprendi v. New Jersey: "Who Decides What Constitutes A Crime?" An Analysis
of Whether A Legislature Is Constitutionally Free To "Allocate" An Element of an Offense to an Affirmative Defense
Or A Sentencing Factor Without Judicial Review 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1205 (2002).
76
Generally speaking, unless a defense that goes to the merits of the prosecutor’s allegations, affirmative
defenses involve shifting the burdens of proof in a criminal case from the prosecution to the defendant, usually
temporarily and to a lesser degree, and then back to the prosecutor. Regarding entrapment, “The courts have split as
to which parts of the entrapment defense must be proven by whom. In addition, questions are raised as to the
standards of proof and the allocation of burdens.” MARCUS, supra note 1, at 216. Furthermore, the United States
Supreme Court has not defined the burden of proof issue precisely for the subjective test used in federal courts. Id.
Most jurisdictions require the defendant to make a prima facie case for entrapment – most use a “preponderance of
evidence” burden of proof at this point – before the burden shifts back to the prosecutor to disprove the allegations
or to show that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. Id. at 216-23. The prosecutor carries the
normal burden of proof on this point. Id. at 226. States using the objective test almost always place the burden on
the defendant to show that the police activity was outrageous. Id. at 227-28.
77
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-323 (2) (2004) (“Within 30 days after the arraignment or at a later
time as the court may for good cause permit, the defendant shall provide the prosecutor with a written notice of the
defendant's intention to introduce evidence at trial of good character or the defenses of alibi, compulsion,
entrapment, justifiable use of force, or mistaken identity”) State v. Dezeeuw, 297 Mont. 379, 382, 992 P.2d 1276,
1278 (Mont., Dec 27, 1999); People v. Day, 665 N.E.2d 867, 870 (Ill. App. 1996) (“he gave the state notice of his
intent to use the entrapment defense at trial”). See also NEW MEXICO RULES §5-508; FLA. R. CRIM. P. RULE §
3.200.
Such pre-trial notice does not necessarily bind the state or the defense to bring the defense up at trial,
depending on the jurisdiction. See State v. Davis, 14 Or.App. 422, 512 P.2d 1366 (Or.App. 1973). The pre-trial
notice rule has been challenged, sometimes successfully. See, e.g., State v. Lane, 2002 WL 1299771 (Ohio App.
2002) (successful challenge to such a rule by defendant).
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the court can weigh the claim in a preliminary hearing.78 In some states (especially those using
the objective test) a decision in the defendant’s favor at this stage results in a complete dismissal
of the charges,79 rather than an acquittal (which has both pros and cons for the defendant).80
Even in states where entrapment is a question for the jury to decide after trial (the majority rule),
the entrapment defense is intended or designed to arise early in the case.
Yet that is not how the cases always play out. In fact, a surprising number of the cases –
possibly a third to half of all entrapment claims in recent years – occur in the context of posttrial, post-sentencing appeals. Some of these appeals are complaints against the trial judge for
refusing to let the jury consider an entrapment defense.81 More interesting is the large number of
cases couched as appeals for ineffective assistance of counsel, where the defense attorney did not
78

See, e.g., U.S. v. James, 2002 WL 31749174 (N.D.Ill., Dec 03, 2002) (pre-trail rejection of entrapment

defense).
79

See., e.g., Hernandez v. State, 2004 WL 1403706 at *6 (Tex.App. 2004) (defendant successful where
“The proper remedy when the state fails to disprove the entrapment defense at a pretrial hearing is dismissal of the
prosecution with prejudice.”); Taylor v. State, 886 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tex.Crim.App., 1994) (holding that the defense
was successful because the pretrial determination was in the nature of an acquittal and did not impact the charging
instrument); State v. Turner, 805 N.E.2d 124 (Ohio. App. 2004) (defendant unsuccessful at obtaining dismissal);
West v. Com., 2004 WL 68524 at *4 (Ky.App., Jan 16, 2004).
80
A dismissal of criminal charges can be beneficial to the defendant in that it eliminates the legal costs of
going through a trial (as required to obtain an acquittal), and can avoid trial evidence and testimony that would
generally tarnish the defendant’s reputation. On the other hand, dismissal does not trigger double jeopardy
protections, meaning the defendant could face revamped charges relating to the same events if the prosecutor wishes
to try again.
81
See, e.g., U.S. v. Ferby, 2004 WL 1147087 (2nd Cir. 2004) (upholding trial court’s refusal to give
entrapment instruction to jury); U.S. v. Pratt, 351 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 2003) (defendant not entitled to jury
instructions on multiple conspiracies or entrapment defense); U.S. v. Vlanich, 75 Fed.Appx. 104, 2003 WL
22213951 (3rd Cir. 2003) (refusal to allow entrapment defense as matter of law); ); U.S. v. Medina, 73 Fed.Appx.
464, 2003 WL 22016375 (1st Cir. 2003) (defendants not entitled to entrapment instructions); U.S. v. Nishnianidze,
342 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2003) (not entitled to entrapment instructions where defendant’s burden of proof not met); U.S.
v. Pedraza, 65 Fed.Appx. 702, 2003 WL 21246583 (10th Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Ogle, 328 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2003)
(affirming district court’s refusal to give an entrapment instruction to jury in money laundering case); U.S. v. Hines,
50 Fed.Appx. 130, 2002 WL 31496420 (4th Cir. 2002) (entrapment instruction refused); U.S. v. Ryan, 289 F.3d
1339 (11th Cir. 2002) (government informant's favorable terms for sale of narcotics did not entitle defendant to
submission of entrapment defense); U.S. v. Kurkowski, 281 F.3d 699 (8th Cir. 2002) (entrapment rejected as a
matter of law); Tocco v. Senkowski, 2002 WL 31465803 (S.D.N.Y., Nov 04, 2002) (refusal to give entrapment jury
instruction upheld); U.S. v. Barriga, 246 F.3d 676 (Table), 2000 WL 1844271 (9th Cir. 2000)(upholding trial
court’s rejection of entrapment defense); U.S. v. Pinque, 234 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 2000) (defendant not entitled to
entrapment instruction); Barr v. State, 79 P.3d 795, 2003 WL 22831503 (Kan.App., Nov 26, 2003).
But see U.S. v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944 (9th Cir 2003) (reversing where defendant was forbidden to submit
entrapment evidence to jury); U.S. v. Garcia, 1 Fed.Appx. 641, 2001 WL 30043 (9th Cir. 2001) (trial court’s refusal
to give entrapment instructions held to be error, cases reversed and remanded).
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raise the defense earlier.82 Either the trial attorney encouraged defendants to accept a plea
agreement, which they regret once they receive their sentence,83 or an alternative trial strategy,
like defeating the charges on the merits, made the entrapment defense untenable. In other words,
the defendant opted for another strategy besides entrapment the first time around (a plea bargain
or a denial/alibi), and used entrapment either as an afterthought or a backup plan. These are
notoriously difficult appeals to win.
Even the appeals about jury instructions often involve the defense being raised too late,
procedurally, for the judge to include it in the instructions without creating confusion or bias. In
82

See, e.g., U.S. v. Anderson, 96 Fed.Appx. 81, 2004 WL 857442 (3rd Cir 2004) (ineffective assistance
appeal for failing to raise entrapment defense); Cunigan v. Hurley, 2004 WL 540446 (6th Cir. Ineffective assistance
for failing to request entrapment instruction at trial, conviction affirmed); U.S. v. McGee, 2004 WL 1125893
(N.D.Ill., May 19, 2004) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal for failure to raise defense); U.S. v. Franklin, 82
Fed.Appx. 1, 2003 WL 22854571 (10th Cir. 2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal); Urias v. Lucero, 59
Fed.Appx. 317, 2003 WL 359448 (10th Cir. 2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to present an
entrapment defense); U.S. v. Coger, 58 Fed.Appx. 575, 2003 WL 149848 (4th Cir. 2003); Towles v. Dretke, 2003
WL 22952820 (N.D.Tex., Dec 10, 2003) (ineffective assistance appeal contending that had counsel talked to
potential defense witnesses regarding his entrapment defense prior to trial, counsel would have known the witnesses
were not going to testify favorably); U.S. v. Waddy, 2003 WL 22429047 (E.D.Pa., Sep 18, 2003) (ineffective
assistance of counsel appeal for failing to raise defense); Montag v. U.S., 2003 WL 22075759 (D.Minn., Aug 05,
2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal for failing to raise defense); U.S. v. Nguyen, 2003 WL 1785884
(N.D.Iowa, Apr 03, 2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel); Aros. v. Stewart, 39 Fed.Appx. 514, 2002 WL
530536 (9th Cir. 2002) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal, failed); Slusher v. Furlong, 29 Fed.Appx. 490,
2002 WL 12252 (10th Cir. 2002) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal, failed); Decker v. Cockrell, 2002 WL
180888 (N.D.Tex., Feb 01, 2002) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal); People v. Hunter, 2003 WL 22112435
(Mich.App., Sep 11, 2003) (sentencing issues due to the school zone statute); Com. v. Wilson, 829 A.2d 1194
(Pa.Super., Jul 25, 2003); State v. Sanders, 266 Wis.2d 693, 667 N.W.2d 377 (Table), 2003 WL 21461479
(Wis.App., Jun 25, 2003)(requires special hearing to determine if counsel was ineffective in this manner); State v.
Shipley, 2003 WL 21299580 (Utah App., May 08, 2003) (remanding case for counsel’s failure to raise subjective
entrapment defense when there were witnesses available to show police misconduct); Lanier v. State, 826 So.2d
460 (Fla.App. 2002); State v. Bojorquez-Ochoa, 112 Wash.App. 1007, 2002 WL 1290180 (Wash.App. 2002)
(choosing not to review ineffective assistance of counsel claim); People v. Burton, 2002 WL 1204405 (Cal.App.
Jun 5, 2002); State v. Freeman, 796 So.2d 574 (Fla.App. Sep 7, 2001) (ineffective assistance of counsel); Duke v.
State, 2004 WL 578586 (Tenn.Crim.App., 2004); People v. Anderson, 2004 WL 103189 (Mich.App., Jan 22,
2004); Com. v. Harding, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 1109, 797 N.E.2d 946 (Table), 2003 WL 22439674 (Mass.App. 2003);
Whitham v. State, 2003 WL 22100472 (Ark., Sep 11, 2003); People v. Hunter, 2003 WL 22112435 (Mich.App.,
Sep 11, 2003); People v. Shook, 2002 WL 31379664 (Mich.App., Oct 22, 2002); State v. Higgins, 2002 WL
31016491 (Iowa App., Sep 11, 2002); Ex parte Dwyer, 2002 WL 28018 (Tex.App.-El Paso, Jan 10, 2002); People
v. Brooks, 2001 WL 1545903 (Mich.App., Nov 30, 2001).
83
See, e.g., U.S. v. Gallardo, 89 Fed.Appx. 23, 2004 WL 300423 (9th Cir 2004) (attempt to withdraw
guilty plea in order to raise entrapment defense post-sentencing); Whitham v. State, 2003 WL 22100472 (Ark., Sep.
11, 2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel for recommending plea instead of developing entrapment defese);
People v. Mendez, 336 Ill.App.3d 935, 784 N.E.2d 425 (Ill.App. 2003) (holding counsel ineffective for failing to
advise client on the entrapment defense); Harris v. State, 806 So.2d 1127 (Miss., Feb 07, 2002) (counsel
erroneously advised client); Campbell v. State, 2004 WL 422593 (Miss.App., Mar 09, 2004); Johnson v. State, 817
So.2d 619 (Miss.App., May 21, 2002) (denying defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
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these cases, the feeling comes through again that the defense was an afterthought or “plan B”
when the trial itself started to go badly.84 Entrapment was not the dominant theory of the
defendant’s case in the first place.
There is a paradox, then, between entrapment’s official procedural (to arise at the
beginning of the case) and the posture it often takes in practice. There are, of course, strategic
reasons for saving entrapment as a last resort. It usually requires the defendant to admit the
allegations,85 and to have one’s “rap sheet” come in for the jury’s review;86 both of these can
backfire, making this a gamble. If the defendant believes the prosecution’s case is weak on the
merits, entrapment would not be the first choice, regardless of what the undercover agents did.
Once the defendant loses and is in prison, however, there is little to lose by adding entrapment to
the appeal.
The fact that so many of the entrapment cases arise after conviction, however, highlights
the image of a defense in decline. The paltry numbers of cases in recent years would be even
smaller if one excluded those that are truly desperate attempts at an “ineffective assistance”
appeal. The weaker posture of the defense in this context contributes to the result that the
majority of reported entrapment claims are losers. The appeals for ineffective assistance of

84

The remaining instructions-related appeals are almost always cases where the defense was asserted halfheartedly (i.e., no supporting evidence was proffered) or contradicted the defendant’s other arguments.
85
The entrapment defense usually includes an admission that the defendant committed the acts charged,
with full intent, but should be excused due to entrapment; a regular defense (not one of the “affirmative defenses”)
means denying either the actions alleged or the requisite criminal intent. Most courts impose restrictions on
inconsistent defenses. See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 261-65. The Supreme Court opened the door for some
inconsistent defense in Matthews, 485 U.S. 58 (1988), but many courts still impose some restrictions. Id.
86
See supra note _ and cases cited therein. “When the entrapment defense is raised, the prosecution may
produce evidence concerning relevant prior acts of the defendant to show predisposition.” MARCUS, supra note 1, at
149. Such evidence would normally be inadmissible and can prejudice the jury against the defendant.
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counsel lose almost invariably, due to the appellant’s special burden of showing that the
neglected strategy would have affected the outcome.87
In hindsight, courts feel that the entrapment defense would have failed even if it had
arisen at trial. Of course, these cases are self-selected to be the ones with the worst facts for
claiming entrapment. The effect on precedent for future defendants can only be deleterious,
because they include a recitation of a fact sting-operation fact pattern and then a dismissive
conclusion: the defendant did not show that an entrapment defense would have mattered in this
case.88 Although the holding strictly means only that the defendant failed to submit enough
evidence, the subtle effect is to hint that similar facts in future cases would make an entrapment
defense a waste of time. The challenges to the jury instructions fare better89 but this is still not a
“silver bullet” for defendants – many such appeals fail, and those remanded sometimes express
doubt about the likelihood of convincing the jury on the second try.
Entrapment, then, is often a second-best defense, as indicated by its continuing place as a
backup plan. As mentioned above, asserting entrapment can be very risky, so the numbers are
not terribly surprising in this sense. It seems that many of the affirmative defenses would present
similar strategic risks, as many involve admission of the alleged actions, a burden of production

87

In federal courts, the defendant must show “that but for counsel's failure to request an entrapment
instruction, "the result of the proceeding would have been different." Cunigan v. Hurley, 2004 WL 540446 (6th Cir.
2004); “The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); "[A] defendant must
show that [trial] counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that he was
prejudiced by trial counsel's representation. People v. Pickens, 446 Mich. 298, 303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
But see State v. Coleman, 2001 WL 1448026 (Iowa App., Nov 16, 2001)(reversing and remanding).
88
See, e.g., Tse v. United States, 290 F.3d 462, 465 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]he evidence at trial did not come
close to demonstrating the sort of government overreaching that would warrant an entrapment instruction.”); People
v. Anderson, 2004 WL 103189 *2 (Mich.App., Jan 22, 2004) (“Although counsel's trial strategy ultimately failed, it
did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, an entrapment defense would have been unsuccessful
because defendant was not entrapped; thus, defendant has failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
89
See, e.g., U.S. v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944 (9th Cir 2003) (reversing where defendant was forbidden to
submit entrapment evidence to jury); U.S. v. Garcia, 1 Fed.Appx. 641, 2001 WL 30043 (9th Cir. 2001) (trial court’s
refusal to give entrapment instructions held to be error, cases reversed and remanded).
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or persuasion, and a relaxing of evidentiary protections.90 To the extent this is true, many of the
“affirmative defenses” must be second-best strategies, and would tend to appear frequently as
appeals. We might refer to these as “secondary defenses,” given their strategic and procedural
weaknesses.
To summarize, the numbers of cases indicate that the entrapment defense is declining,
that the cases are concentrated in a few areas, and that many of the cases have a weak procedural
posture that decreases the likelihood of success. Legal uncertainty seems to drive the entrapment
numbers; as the rules become well-defined and the odds of prevailing or losing become more
quantifiable, the number of cases goes down. Figure 1 illustrates the numbers of reported cases
for both federal and state courts for the last eleven years, and shows the relative proportion of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to the defense.
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IV.

SENTENCING ENTRAPMENT AND ENTRAPMENT BY ESTOPPEL

Sentencing entrapment91 provides a poignant illustration of the decline in entrapment as a
defense as well as the role of uncertainty in this area of law. Entrapment by estoppel,92 which is
a more established defense but less common, also sheds light on the determinative effects of
legal certainty on certain behaviors and cases.

A. Sentencing Entrapment
The advent of mechanical sentencing guidelines (and, to a lesser extent, codified gradations
of felonies and “aggravating factor” categories) allows undercover agents to “ratchet up” a crime
by design.93 For example, those planning a sting operation can decide the amount of drugs to be
bought or sold 94 – or the substance sold, as different drugs carry different punishments95 – in

91

See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 353-59.
See id. at 47-49.
93
The phrase “ratchet up” seems to have first been used by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Richardson,
925 F.2d 112, 117 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1237 (1991) in a money laundering case.
94
See United States v. Lenefesty, 923 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that the defendant argues that
the undercover agents only motive in repeatedly purchasing from her was to increase her sentence);United States v.
Stuart, 923 F.2d 607, 614 (8th Cir. 1991) (recapping the defendant’s contention that he was entrapped by the
92
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order to catapult the defendant into a higher sentencing range, sometimes making the difference
of decades on a sentence. Other cases involve an agent suggesting that the defendant come to the
transaction heavily armed, as the presence of firearms often generates a sentencing
enhancement96 (more so for certain types of weapons, like automatic rifles, which agents
sometimes request specifically).97 Similarly, agents posing as decoys for pedophiles in Internet
chat rooms ascribe an age to themselves that is just young enough to implicate the most serious

government’s act of fronting money to purchase a larger quantity of drugs than the defendant was predisposed to
sell); United States v. Barth, 788 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that “[t]he Court finds it not at all
fortuitous that the agent arrested the defendant only after he had arranged enough successive buys to reach the magic
number (in reference to the 50 grams of cocaine, which doubles the minimum mandatory sentence from 5 years to
10 years)”), vacated, 990 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1993); People v. Cousins, No. 239767, 2003 WL 22222056 at *7
(Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2003) (holding that the defendant was not a victim of sentencing entrapment when he was
asked to supply a larger quantity of cocaine for the third transaction); State v. Burnett, No. C9-98-1201, 1999 WL
289221 at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. May 11, 1999) (holding that it was not enough to establish sentencing entrapment
when the undercover agent had contacted her supervisor before making the last sale to determine if the addition of
that amount would establish a first degree offense).
95
Often times a claim of sentencing entrapment arises under circumstance where an undercover agent
requests the defendant to transform powder cocaine into cocaine base or to provide the agent with cocaine base
rather than powder cocaine. Cocaine base carries a higher penalty under the Sentencing Guidelines, 120-135
months, whereas powder cocaine carries a sixty month minimum mandatory sentence Cocaine base is crack cocaine,
powder cocaine can be “cooked” in a microwave to become crack.. See United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1330
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that “a request by a government agent for crack cocaine upon a seller’s delivery of powder
cocaine, without more, does not establish a claim of ‘sentencing entrapment.’); United States v. Saulter, 60 F.3d
270, 280 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the defendant’s contention that downward departure from the Guidelines is
warranted due to the undercover agent’s encouragement of having the defendant transform the powder cocaine into
crack);United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105, 112 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that the undercover agent’s
insistence that the purchase of cocaine was conditioned on the defendant transforming the cocaine powder into crack
was impermissible because this demand did not further the investigation); United States v. Kimley, No. 01-4324,
2003 WL 1090706, at * 1 (3rd Cir. March, 12, 2003) (reiterating the defendant’s claim that the informant both
induced him to sell crack rather than powdered cocaine and manipulated his sentence by making repeat purchases
from him).
96
See 18 U.S.C. §924 (c) (establishing a minimum five year enhancement for the use of a firearm in drug
trafficking, ten years if the firearm is a short-barreled shotgun, thirty years if the firearm is a machine gun or a gun
equipped with a silencer).
97
See United States v. Jones, 102 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that sentencing entrapment was not
warranted to the defendant’s allegation that the agents knew that they would arrest him already but only insisted
upon him exchanging a machine gun for drugs in an attempt to lengthen his sentence); United States v. RamirezRangel, 103 F.3d 1501 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the trial court should have held a private hearing in chambers to
decide whether the confidential informant’s testimony would be relevant to the defendants’ claim that the agents
chose to exchange machine guns for their methamphetamines instead of handguns, in an attempt to enlarge their
sentences by a mandatory thirty years); United States v. Cannon, 886 F. Supp. 705, 708 (D.N.D. 1995) (holding that
an undercover agent’s encouragement of buying handguns and a machine gun warranted a downward departure
because the sole purpose of this action was to increase the defendants’ sentences by 25 years), rev’d on other
grounds, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996).
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category of attempted sexual predation, while not so young as to limit the appeal to the most
radical perpetrators.98
The idea of agents planning and scheming around the specific provisions of the
sentencing guidelines strikes many as an abuse.99 Some courts, therefore, entertain arguments
that the defendant’s sentence should be mitigated to offset the increase that state agents
manipulated.100 The conviction itself stands, but the sentence can be for less time101 if the case
meets the applicable test.102

98

This tactic does not have to rely on subjectivity or passions of judges exclusively, of course; sometimes
the grading of punishments or sentencing guideline enhancements are explicit and are drawn at somewhat arbitrary
lines. For example, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines contain a two-level enhancement for attempts to engage in
prohibited sexual conduct with a minor or an undercover agent posing as a minor or an adult with custody of the
minor. U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual §2A3.2(b)(3)(B). See United States v. McGraw, 351 F.3d 443
(10th Cir. 2003) (involving Internet and child pornography); United States v. Robertson, 350 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir.
2003) (stating that the Sentencing Guidelines do not draw a distinction between someone posing as a child over the
Internet or someone posing as a panderer, so no distinction should be drawn between the two); United States v.
Dotson, 324 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that Internet advertising for child pornography is not an abuse of
power). The Sentencing Guidelines explicitly state that for pedophiliac computer crimes, it does not matter whether
there was a real “victim” or merely an undercover agent posing as a victim. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2A3.1,
cmt., application n.1.
The prospect of sentencing enhancement, or sentencing entrapment, may be one of the more important
distinctions between the exclusionary rules and the entrapment defense, at least in practical terms from the vantage
point of deterring the police. Violation of an exclusionary rule may be the end of the case for that defendant; but the
idea of sentencing entrapment means that even where undercover agents have botched the case regarding one
charge, they can keep going and get the defendant on others, with a little more inducement.
99
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was created to remedy the level of judicial discretion in determining
sentence duration. Therefore, the Sentencing Guidelines established minimum mandatory sentences for drug
transactions, focusing on the quantity and type of drugs involved in the exchange. Many scholars have noted that the
new system has now shifted the discretion and abuse to the prosecutors and undercover agents that determine the
amount of drugs sold, types of drugs sold, and who to target. See e.g. Eric P. Berlin, Comment, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines' Failure To Eliminate Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest,
1993 WIS. L. REV. 187 (1993) (arguing that the Sentence Guidelines create an increase in the severity of punishment
and double prison populations nationwide); Andrew G. Deiss, Comment: Making The Crime Fit The Punishment:
Pre-Arrest Sentence Manipulation By Investigators Under The Sentencing Guidelines, 1994 U. CHI. LEG. F. 419
(1994) (stating that the minority view is that the Guidelines give the undercover agents too much discretion, the
majority opinion is that the Guidelines give the prosecutors too much discretion);Joan Malmud, Comment:
Defending A Sentence: The Judicial Establishment Of Sentencing Entrapment And Sentencing Manipulation
Defenses, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1359 (1997) (discussing the history of abuse in sentencing and the possible remedies);
Mark Thomas, Comment, Sentencing Entrapment: How Far Should The Federal Courts Go?, 33 IDAHO L. REV.
147 (1996) (discussing the history of abuse in sentencing and arguing that sentencing entrapment should not be used
for “straight” stings”).
100
See 18 U.S.C. §3553(b) (“The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range referred to
in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstances of a kind, or to
a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that
should result in a sentence different from that described.”); United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir.
1994) (stating that before the advent of the Sentencing Guidelines courts could prevent sentencing entrapment by
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Not surprisingly, there are two rival tests, generally tracking the “subjective” and
“objective” tests for regular entrapment. Most of the courts categorize the issue as “sentencing
entrapment” and use a predisposition test: was the defendant predisposed to commit the crime to
the degree charged (i.e., to buy/sell the full quantity of drugs involved), or something less, but
for the agent’s inducement?103 The burden is on the defendant to prove his reticence.104 Other

voicing their discretion in sentencing, however under the Guidelines “courts can ensure that the sentences imposed
reflect the defendants’ degree of culpability only if they are able to reduce the sentences of defendants who are not
predisposed to engage in deals as large as those induced by the government.”).
101
United States v. Palo, No. 97-50167, 1999 WL 51507, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 1999) (stating that the
Ninth Circuit has identified two available remedies for valid sentencing entrapment claims: 1) “a sentencing court
may decline to apply the statutory penalty provision for the greater offense that the defendant was induced to
commit, and instead apply the penalty provision for the lesser offense that the defendant was predisposed to
commit[;]” or 2) “a sentencing court may exercise its discretion to depart downward from the sentencing range for
the greater offense that the defendant was induced to commit.”).
102
Circuits that recognize sentencing entrapment use similar tests that revolve around predisposition. See
United States v. Woods, 210 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen a defendant, although predisposed to commit a
minor or lesser offense, is entrapped in committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment.”); United States
v. Gutierrez-Herrera, 293 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen the government causes a defendant initially
predisposed to commit a lesser crime to commit a more serious offense.”); United States v. Citro, 842 F.2d 1149,
1152 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing five factors used to determine sentencing entrapment: “1) the character, reputation
and previous conduct of the defendant; 2) whether the government initiated the crime in question; 3) whether the
defendant was engaged in the crime in question for profit; 4) whether the defendant exhibited reluctance at
committing the crime in question; and 5) the nature of the government’s inducement.”); Padilla, 2003 WL
22016886 at *6 (stating that the Eighth Circuit defines “sentencing entrapment as ‘outrageous official conduct’ that
overcomes the volition of an individual who was predisposed to commit a less serious crime and unduly influences
them to commit a more serious crime for the purpose of increasing the resulting sentence of the entrapped
defendant.”) (citing United States v. Rogers, 982 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1993)).
103
See United States v. Stavig, 80 F.3d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that sentencing entrapment “may
occur where outrageous government conduct overcomes the will of a defendant predisposed to deal only in small
quantities of drugs, for the purpose of increasing the amount of drugs and resulting sentencing); United States v.
Aikens, 64 F.3d 372, 376 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that sentencing entrapment “may occur where outrageous
government conduct overcomes the will of a defendant predisposed to deal only in small quantities of drugs, for the
purpose of increasing the amount of drugs and the resulting sentencing imposed against the defendant.”); United
States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607, 624 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that “sentencing entrapment occurs when a defendant,
although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is entrapped in committing a greater offense subject to a
greater punishment.”); United States v. Si, 343 F.3d 116, 1128 (9th Cir 2003) (stating that “[s]entencing entrapment
occurs when a defendant is predisposed to commit a lesser crime, but is entrapped into committing a more
significant crime that is subject to more severe punishment because of government conduct.”).
104
See United States v. Nieto-Cruz, No. 03-50420, 2004 WL 886346 at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 2004) (stating
that the defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that “he had neither the intent nor the ability to produce the
amount of drugs involved.”); United States v. Medina, No. 99-10332, 2002 WL 1808705, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug 6,
2002) (stating that “[t]he defendant bears that burden of showing sentencing entrapment by a preponderance of the
evidence.”); United States v. Naranjo, 52 F.3d 245, 250 & n. 13 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating “[i]n making a sentencing
entrapment claim, the burden in on the defendant to demonstrate both the lack of intent to produce and the lack of
capability to produce the quantity of drugs at issue.”);
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courts105 focus instead on what they call “sentencing manipulation” and look solely at whether
the undercover agents themselves deployed any outrageous tactics to induce the defendant into
committing a greater crime; this is much like the “objective” test for regular entrapment.106 A
few courts apparently consider both,107 but the failure rate of these defense maneuvers makes this
point almost moot.108 “Sentencing entrapment” is the far more common approach and term.109
In the academic literature, “sentencing entrapment” is a general phrase used to describe the

105

See United States v. Cunningham, 2002 WL 1896932, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2002) (Recognizing
sentence manipulation but has not used the doctrine to depart downward from the Guidelines).
106
“Outrageous government conduct” is used sometimes instead of “sentencing manipulation,” and may
result in an acquittal rather than a lower sentence, even though it addresses the same basic phenomenon of
undercover agents ratcheting up the sentence as the sting operation proceeds. Acquitting a defendant outright can
serve no other purpose than possibly punishing the police, which I have argued elsewhere is misguided public policy
that acquittals do not deter police because police are focused on arrests rather than convictions; that there is little
economic or psychological basis for assuming that the police suffer disutility when a third party (like a defendant)
receives a benefit or increased utility; that the type of police most likely to engage in reprehensible conduct are the
least likely to be deterred by such an abstract form of punishment; and that the potential for greater payoffs in some
cases outweighs the inconvenience of acquittals in other cases. See generally Stevenson, supra note __. See also
United States v. Padilla, 2003 WL 22016886 at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2003) (stating that “[s]entencing manipulation
by definition is not a defense . . . . [and] has no bearing on the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Succeeding under this
theory will result in the court granting a downward offense level adjustment under the guidelines.”); State v. Soto,
562 N.W.2d 299, 305 (Minn. 1997) (stating that “[s]entencing manipulation is outrageous government conduct
aimed only at increasing a person’s sentence. Whereas sentencing entrapment focuses on the predisposition of the
defendant, the related concept of sentencing manipulation is concerned with the conduct and motives of the
government officials.”).
107
See Padilla, 2003 WL 22016886 at *7 (stating that “the First Circuit[ ] commingle[s] the sentencing
manipulation and sentencing entrapment doctrines.”); Dehaney v. United States, No. 97 CR. 545(BSJ), 2001 WL
1242289, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2001) (noting that the Second Circuit recognizes sentence manipulation but also
requires that one must necessarily prove that “he was not predisposed to commit the offense.”).
108
See United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that “garden variety manipulation
claims are largely a waste of time,” because sentencing manipulation “is a claim only for the extreme or unusual
case.”).
109
The First Circuit uses the terms sentencing entrapment and sentencing factor manipulation, which are
used to describe the same conduct. Padilla, 2003 WL 22016886 at *5 (quoting Woods, 210 F.3d at 75). The Eighth
Circuit, Seventh Circuit, and Ninth Circuit use the term sentencing entrapment and have recognized the defense. Id.
at *5, *6. The D.C. circuit recognized sentencing entrapment in Shepherd. 857 F. Supp. 105. The First Circuit and
Second Circuit recognize sentence manipulation. Id. at *7 (citing Woods, 210 F.3d at 75; Dehaney, 2001 WL
1242289, at *5). The Fifth Circuit recognize sentence manipulation but has not departed downward. Id. (citing
Cunningham, 2002 WL 1896932, at *10). In United States v. Jones, the Fourth Circuit recognizes the existences of
sentence entrapment and sentence manipulation, however the viability of either defense was not addressed. 18 F.3d
1145 (4th Cir. 1994). For more discussion, see Joan Malmud, Comment: Defending A Sentence: The Judicial
Establishment Of Sentencing Entrapment And Sentencing Manipulation Defenses, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1359 (1997)
(distinguishing between the doctrines of sentence entrapment and sentence manipulation, also noting that the Sixth
Circuit and Eighth Circuit have recognized the existence of some form of the sentence manipulation doctrine); Todd
E. Witten, Comment: Sentence Entrapment And Manipulation: Government Manipulation Of The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AKRON L. REV. 697 (1996) (discussing the evolution and history behind the different
circuits’ treatment of sentencing entrapment and sentence manipulation).
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whole area – the agents’ tactic itself, the defense, and the body of cases or concept – rather than
to describe one test as opposed to another.
This phrase seems to have been coined by the Eighth Circuit (or rather, by defense
counsel appearing before the Eighth Circuit) in the 1991 case U.S. v. Lenfesty.110 This was a
novel argument from a defendant at the time and did not go over well: “We are not prepared to
say there is no such animal as ‘sentencing entrapment.’”111 The same week, the Eighth Circuit
addressed it in another ruling, U.S. v. Stuart,112 this time less dismissively: “Perhaps there is such
a thing as ‘sentencing entrapment,’ but we are not persuaded that [the defendant] has succeeded
in establishing it.”113 A slow onslaught of cases ensued in various circuits over the next year; the
first court to recognize “such an animal” as sentencing entrapment (the Eighth Circuit’s phrase
was frequently repeated) was a district court in Minnesota, in United States v. Barth,114 where the
court found that the Sentencing Commission had “failed to adequately consider the terrifying
capacity for escalation of a defendant's sentence based on the investigating officer's
determination of when to make the arrest.”115
The federal courts have split on whether to recognize sentencing entrapment at all,116
meaning the Supreme Court may have to settle the question. A few circuits have not yet
considered it;117 those that do recognize it in theory generally reject it in individual cases.118

110

923 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 968 (1991).
Id. at 1300.
112
923 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1991).
113
Id. at 614.
114
788 F. Supp. 1055 (D. Minn. 1992).
115
Id. at 1057.
116
Padilla, 2003 WL 22016886 at * 5, *7 (stating that the circuits are split on both the sentence
entrapment doctrine and the sentence manipulation doctrine). See United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74, 76 (7th Cir.
1996) (rejecting sentence manipulation as a matter of law); United States v. Perez, No. Crim. A. Nos. 94-0192, 1996
WL 502292, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug 28, 1996) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit rejects sentencing entrapment as a
matter of law.)
117
Padilla, 2003 WL 22016886 at * 6, *8 (noting that to date, the Third Circuit has not recognized
sentencing entrapment or manipulation).
111
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Individual defendants often appear unsympathetic, given that they set out to commit some crime,
and the government agent simply orchestrated an incremental escalation.119 I have some
suggestions to offer for the approach the Supreme Court should adopt if it does have the
opportunity to address the issue in the near future. The opportunity may not arise, however, if
the current decline in cases continues.

B. Decline in Sentencing Entrapment
Sentencing entrapment cases reached their peak in 1996-97, at least in the federal courts (the
state cases are too rare to speak of a pattern), and the cases have dropped off steadily since then.
In addition, the claims do not fare well at all. In the mid- 1990’s this seemed like the new, fresh

118

See e.g. United States v. Case, 217 F. Supp. 2d 158, 161-162 (D. Me. 2002) (rejecting the defendant’s
claim that his sentence should be reduced for the final sale, which occurred after the agents could had arrested him
for making a ten pound sale); United States v. Lora, 129 F. Supp. 2d 77, 94 (D. Mass. 2001) (holding that the
defendants were predisposed to buy cocaine and were not offered “artificially favorable credit terms” that induced
them to purchase more cocaine than they had resources for); Gutierrez-Herrera, 293 F.3d at 377 (holding that the
defendant was predisposed to distribute cocaine by his admittance of supplying two kilograms to individuals
intended for them to resell it); United States v. Estrada, 256 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting defendant’s claim
that he was offered bargain basement prices for cocaine, given generous credit terms to accept the larger amount
even though he originally requested a much smaller amount, and that he only had enough money on him to
purchase 3.75 kilograms of the 5 kilogram purchase);United States v. Ross, No. 02-50226, 2004 WL 1375522, at
*12 (9th Cir. June 21, 2004) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the defendant was
predisposed to commit an offense involving 100 kilograms of cocaine); United States v. Vega, Nos. 02-50253, 0250499, 2004 WL 785311, at *3 (9th Cir. April 7, 2004) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to reduction of
his sentence because he was “predisposed to sell in amounts up to whatever he could handle, including the 233 gram
sale (referring to heroin offense that he is charged with)[ ]”); United States v. Rice, No. 02-1383, 2004 WL 1240824,
at *3 (10th Cir. June 7, 2004) (rejecting the defendant’s sentencing factor manipulation claim that he was improperly
induced into manufacturing and selling twenty machine guns because of the government’s fronting him with the
money to purchase supplies); United States v. Hightower, No. 03-1015, 2004 WL 729255, at *4 (10th Cir. April 6,
2004) (holding that the defendant was not a victim of sentencing entrapment when the agent specifically asked for
crack when he had knowledge that the defendant could also supply other drugs which carried less penalty).
119
As discussed by the district court in United States v. Kaczmarski, the difference between sentence
entrapment and manipulation may be significant due to the possibility that even if a sentencing entrapment defense
is not available to a defendant that is predisposed to commit a greater crime, a sentence manipulation claim might
still be available. 939 F. Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1996); but see Garcia, 79 F.3d at 76 (stating that Seventh Circuit
rejects sentence manipulation because “the government must be permitted to exercise its own judgment in
determining at what point in an investigation enough evidence has been obtained.”).
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area of entrapment law (although it is not entrapment proper, but very similar); it now has the
same earmarks of decline, disuse, and discredit as the regular entrapment defense.120

C.

Risk, Uncertainty, and Sentences
The 1996-97 peak in sentencing entrapment cases, followed by a drop-off in numbers,

provides a vivid illustration of the effects of legal uncertainty on criminal litigation. As
mentioned above, the idea of sentencing entrapment first appeared in the Lenfesty case in
1991,121 and more defense attorneys attempted to raise the argument nationwide over the next
few years. Most of the early holdings created a state of almost “perfect” legal uncertainty: the
court recognized that the defense of sentencing entrapment might exist, although no fact pattern
had yet arisen that would suffice – including the case at bar.122 This atmosphere of uncertainty

120

Combining the state and federal cases, the numbers are as follows:
2001-2004=86 cases
2003-2004=30
2002-2003=27
2001-2002=29
1998-2001=107 cases
2000-2001=31
1999-2000=32
1998-1999=44
1995-1998=147 cases
1997-1998=47
1996-1997=60
1995-1996=40
1994-1995=30 cases
From the numbers, it seems like 1996-1997 was the year for sentencing entrapment cases. Before and after 19961997 the numbers remain fairly steady but are decreasing. Note that this includes some cases that procedurally
occurred as an appeal for ineffective assistance or counsel due to counsel not arguing the defense at district court
level.
121
Lenfesty, 923 F.2d at 1300.
122
See, e.g., United States v. Knecht, 55 F.3d 54, 57 (2nd Cir. 1995) (expressing that the validity of the
defense has not been determined, even if it was, the defendant was predisposed to launder proceeds from illegal
activity with the knowledge that it was probably drug money); United States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 12791280 (5th Cir. 1995) (choosing not to address the viability of the theory due to the facts of the case);United States v.
Wright, No. 93-4228, 1995 WL 101300, at *3 (6th Cir. March 9, 1995) (declining to address the issue of accepting
the sentencing entrapment doctrine, because even in a court that accepts the doctrine, the facts of the case would not
support a claim), United States v. Cotts, 14 F.3d 300, 306 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that even is sentencing
entrapment is a viable theory, defendant failed to present evidence that outrageous conduct occurred); United States
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functioned as a type of “green light” for defendants to try this claim, with no way of knowing
whether the facts of their case would foreclose the option (but also having little to lose, if they
are already at the sentencing phase of their case). As more of these cases made their way
through the appeal process (which can take two or three years),123 the rules became clarified,
comments to the sentencing guidelines were added and judicially noticed, and more defendants
could see the outcome of the claims ahead of time. This led to a decrease in the number of cases.
Sentencing entrapment and regular entrapment are conceptually distinct. The former is a
mitigating factor for punishments, while the latter allows the defendant to go free if the claim is
successful.124 Yet there must be some interplay between the two, as evidenced buy the fact that
the tests for sentencing entrapment are simply adaptations of the two tests for regular
v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging the existence of the defense and elaborating upon it, but
holding that the facts of the case do not warrant the defense).
123
Between 1994 and 1996, numerous sentence entrapment cases were addressed on appeal. For examples
of cases, see Figueroa v. United States, 19 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Satterwhite, 23 F.3d 404 (4th Cir.
1994); United States v. Jones, 102 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding defendant’s entrapement defense not
reviewable); United States v. Broomfield, 103 F.3d 131 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Wright, 48 F.3d 1220 (6th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Murphy, 16 F.3d 1222 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Williams, 97 F.3d 1455 (7th Cir.
1996); United States v. Castellanos, 70 F.3d 117 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Garcia, 53 F.3d 334 (7th Cir.
1995); United States v. Okoro, 42 F.3d 1392 (7th Cir. 1994); Roldan v. United States, 33 F.3d 56 (7th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Cotts, 14 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 1994) (affiriming sentencing judgment of the lower court); United
States v. Shipley, 62 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Doyle, 60 F.3d 396 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that
government did not engage in outrageous government conduct by offering the defendant leniency in exchange for
cooperation to lead to a more culpable drug dealer); United States v. Clark, 36 F.3d 1101 (8th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Merical, 32 D.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hulett, 22 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the
record failed to support that the defendant was entrapped as a matter of law, and that the issue of entrapment was
properly submitted to the jury); United States v. McLinn, 19 F.3d 24 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Warren, 16
F.3d 247 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the government’s repeated undercover puchases of drugs from the defendant
does not constitute outrageous conduct); United States v. Appel, 105 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 1996); Nobles v. United
States, 105 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lutz, 103 F.3d 142 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Mitchell,
103 F.3d 142 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lee, 99 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. McCord, 99 F.3d
1147 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bui, 97 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Robinson, 94 F.3d 1325
(9th Cir. 1996) (concerning a government sting operation for manufacturing and selling counterfeit credit cards);
United States v. Castaneda, 94 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming the trial courts decision that the defendant was a
victim of sentencing entrapment but reversed defendants sentence because the trial court failed to adjust his
sentencing); United States v. Brown, 73 F.3d 370 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ashley, 72 F.3d 135 (9th Cir.
1995); United States v. Graves, 67 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Gamboa, 66 F.3d 336 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Chavez-Vasquez, 64 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Valencia, 61 F.3d 914 (9th Cir.
1995); United States v. Davis, 56 F.3d 74 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Simpson, 64 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Arivizo, 53 D.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Banh, 33 D.3d 60 (9th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Gibbs, 15 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1994).
124
Se, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74, 75 (7th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between sentencing
manipulation” and the objective test or outrageous government conduct.)
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entrapment.125 Obviously, courts have been influenced by traditional entrapment law in crafting
rules for these newer types of cases. What may be less obvious is the fact that sentencing
entrapment cases are can influence future decisions on regular entrapment. Court in sentencing
entrapment cases are still defining the boundaries and subtleties of “predisposition,” “inducement
vs. opportunity,” and “outrageous government conduct”– the elements of the traditional defense
under alternative rules. The precedents established are not irrelevant or completely
distinguishable. “Predisposition” is being used in almost the same way, semantically, whether it
is the predisposition to go from selling zero drugs to one gram, or to go from selling nine grams
to ten; in either case, it means something like readiness, willingness, or a lack of resistance to
lawbreaking.126 The problem is that sentencing entrapment cases are bad test cases for these
125

For examples of the objective approach to sentence entrapment (referred to as sentence manipulation),
see United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1994) (“When an accusation of sentencing factor manipulation
surfaces, the judicial gaze should, in the usual case, focus primarily--though not exclusively--on the government’s
conduct and motives.”); United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 194 (1st Cir. 1992) (hinting that sentence
manipulation may occur even if the facts of the case are “insufficiently oppressive to support an entrapment defense
. . . or [a] due process claim . . . .”);United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1153 (4th Cir. 1994) (linking sentence
manipulation to outrageous government conduct and holding that a successful manipulation claim only arises when
“outrageous government conduct that offends due process could justify a reduced sentence.”); United States v.
Okey, 47 F.3d 238, 240 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that “[s]entencing manipulation occurs when the government
engages in improper conduct that has the effect of increasing a defendant’s sentence.”).
For examples of the subjective approach to sentence entrapment, see Woods, 210 F.3d at 75 (“[W]hen a
defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is entrapped in committing a greater offense
subject to greater punishment.”); Gutierrez-Herrera, 293 F.3d at 377 (“[W]hen the government causes a defendant
initially predisposed to commit a lesser crime to commit a more serious offense.”); Citro, 842 F.2d at 1152 (stating
the five factors used in determining sentencing entrapment: “1) the character, reputation and previous conduct of the
defendant; 2) whether the government initiated the crime in question; 3) whether the defendant was engaged in the
crime in question for profit; 4) whether the defendant exhibited reluctance at committing the crime in question; and
5) the nature of the government’s inducement.”).
126
See, e.g., Biggs v. U.S., 3 Fed.Appx. 445, 448, 2001 WL 128413 at *2-3 (6th Cir. 2001):
. . . [T]he record reveals that Biggs was predisposed to deal in distribution-sized quantities of
methamphetamine. Biggs was charged following the execution of a reverse-sting operation in
which the government sold four pounds of methamphetamine to Biggs and his co-defendant.
Biggs sought to purchase the drugs so that he could resell them in Memphis, Tennessee. Biggs met
an informant at a nightclub and gave the informant $2,000 for the purchase. Later, during a
telephone conversation that was recorded, the informant stated that he felt a pressing need to be rid
of the four pounds of methamphetamine he was about to possess and that Biggs could have all
four pounds for $5,000. Biggs accepted the bargain, delivered $2,500 to make the purchase, and
was arrested after he and his co-defendant took possession of all four pounds of
methamphetamine. At sentencing, Biggs stated that it was never his "intention to buy four pounds
of crystal meth." He stated that, "If they had not been practically give [sic] to me, I wouldn't be in
the trouble I am now."
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concepts. The defendants are so unsympathetic that some courts refuse to recognize the
defense,127 and those who do usually refuse to apply it in a given case.128 The precedents
generated will be almost uniformly unfavorable, but a definition of “predisposition” generated in
a sentencing entrapment case would be appropriate to cite as authority in the traditional type of
case, as the word is being used in the same way. This influence of bad test cases on the core
concepts of the defense will cause a shift over time that is unfavorable to defendants.
The other problem is that despite the nearly complete semantic overlap between the two
occurrences of “predisposition”129 (both types of cases use the term to refer to a lack of
resistance on the defendants part to an offer, request, or suggestion from an undercover agent),
there is an important difference that most people would recognize but find difficult to articulate.
A predisposition to commit a crime in the first place seems greater in degree than a
predisposition to move from selling nine grams to ten.130 The latter is merely an incremental
change. The former, in contrast, seems to be a step from one category into another, from noncriminal to criminal, from not guilty to guilty. This is a large semantic step. Sentencing
entrapment cases involve a move from “criminal” or “guilty” to slightly “more criminal” or
“more guilty.”

127

See United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 668, 673 (11th Cir. 1992) (“as a matter of law, we reject Duke’s
sentence entrapment theory. . . . [b]ecause this circuit rejects this theory as a defense, we need not address it
further.”).
128
See United States v. Kimley, No. 01-4324, 2003 WL 1090706 (3rd Cir. March 12, 2003); United States
v. Brown, No. 02-4741, 2003 WL 21541050 (4th Cir. July 9, 2003); United States v. Jernigan, Nos. 01-2121, 012304, 2003 WL 463483 (6th Cir. Feb. 18, 2003); United States v. Bew, No. 03-2931, 2004 WL 1178196 (7th Cir.
May 26, 2004); United States v. Parks, No. 03-2844, 2004 WL 87659 (8th Cir. Jan. 21, 2004); United States v.
Searcy, No. 02-2882, 2003 WL 282449 (8th Cir. Feb 11, 2003); United States v. Ross, No. 02-50226, 2004 WL
1375522 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2004); United States v. Villa-Serrano, No. 03-30210, 2003 WL 22954240 (9th Cir. Dec.
8, 2003); United States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that one out of five defendants should have
their sentence vacated and remanded); United States v. Hinds, 329 F.3d 184 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
129
The same analysis could be applied to the other core terms as well.
130
See, e.g., U.S. v. Arvizo, 53 F.3d 340 (Table), 1995 WL 261137 (9th Cir.1995) (change from one kilo to
four).
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The sentencing guidelines and codified gradations of felonies, however, transform this
incremental step into a qualitative change. The increased certainty of the legal rules alters the
semantic play of the terms. The consequences are significant – if the court decides the term is
applicable, it can mean a difference of several years in prison.131 Now both uses of
“predisposition” refer to a line between significant categories – the legal significance is no longer
picayune and incremental even though the action seems incrementally different to the actor at the
time. The legal rules frame the situation differently that the actor in the commission of the
offense. The undercover agents will be more aware of this phenomenon than the offender will.
The problem is that there is no linguistic wall or boundary to keep a court’s application of
“predisposition” to one set of factors from affecting its application to another type of case. This
is different from the specialized uses of other legal terms like “agreement,” which may have
distinct meanings depending on whether it is a criminal case or a contracts case. With
entrapment, the combination of semantic blurring between the elements/core terms across
different types of entrapment cases, and the semantic effect caused by codified, mechanical
punishment factors, creates a linguistic effect that pushes all entrapment cases away from
favoring defendants.
The federal sentencing guidelines themselves present an interesting study in the effects of
legal uncertainty. The guidelines were created with the purpose of limiting judicial discretion.132

131

See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1 (1995), and the explanation offered by Professor
Neal Katyal:
. . . [O]ne kilo of crack yields a 188-235 month sentence and one kilo of heroin yields 121-151
months. The four level enhancement increases a crack sentence to 292-365 months--an average
increase of about ten years. The enhancement increases a heroin sentence, however, to 188-235
months, a much smaller increase of about six years.
Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2385, 2422 (1997).
132
See Goldstein, supra note 10, at 1958; Note, The Ills of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Search for a Cure: Using Sentence Entrapment to Combat Governmental Manipulation of Sentencing, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 197, 201-09 (1996); Comment: Sentencing Entrapment: An Overview And Analysis, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 773,
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The drafters and proponents of the guidelines feared that too much judicial discretion allowed for
abuses, or at least disparities in punishments from judge to judge, and such disparities seemed
unfair (fairness being equated with sameness).133 Indeed, legal vagueness does confer discretion
on the relevant state actors. For example, in administrative law, enabling statutes containing
vague, open-ended terms serve to delegate authority from the legislature to agency officials.134
With the sentencing guidelines, the original thought was to “undelegate” (i.e., expropriate or reappropriate) punishment discretion from judges to the legislature.135
Many judges and commentators believe this process backfired, resulting in more
unfairness and draconian punishments than before – the literature is almost too vast to cite.136 In
addition, many commentators on sentencing entrapment blame the sentencing guidelines for the
776 (2003) (Before enactment of the Guidelines, federal judges had almost completely unfettered discretion in
imposing sentences, the exercise of which was generally not reviewable on appeal.”).

133

See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL. CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1972) (describing
“almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers” possessed by judges in determining sentencing); Kevin R. Reitz,
Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 1441, 1445 (1997) (discussing sentencing review in the federal system); Goldstein, supra note 10, at 1959.
134
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Judith N. Levi, Regulatory Variables and Statutory Interpretation, 73
WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 1103 (1995). Eskridge and Levi argue that governmental discretion or decision-making is often
delegated through what they call "regulatory variables," linguistic devices in the statute that leave the delegated
interpreter a range of meanings and applications. See id. at 1107-08 (they eventually shift to the term "regulatory
variability" out of fear that readers will imagine a list of magic words that delegate discretion). It is well-established
that the legislature intends to delegate some of its authority to agencies; the focus here is on the mechanism for
delegation, which is essentially a linguistic one. Some portions of enabling statutes may be specific and directive,
other provisions contain ambiguity, requiring the authorized official or administrator to exercise discretion to fill in
the gaps or flesh out the practical meaning. This linguistic feature of vagueness or ambiguity inherently delegates
authority. As Eskridge and Levi observe, "The level of linguistic generality permits an inference about the speaker's
willingness to delegate gap-filling discretion to another person (i.e., police officers and judges). The more general
the statutory term, the more discretion the directive is implicitly vesting in the implementing official." Id. at 1111
(noting that this discretion may be "vested deliberately or inadvertently"). Stronger examples of regulatory variables
are "reasonable," “substantial,” “good-faith,” and the phrase "all deliberate speed." Id. at 1113.
135
Although the nondelegation doctrine has received a fair amount of treatment in the academic literature,
there seems to be a mirror-image phenomenon that we might call an “undelegation” doctrine, by which Congress
uses greater specificity and detail in its enactment to appropriate more power for itself and away from other
branches of government or the citizenry at large. A thorough discussion of this issue, however, is outside our scope
here.
136
See, e.g., Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L. J. 1681 (1992) (discussing the sentencing process); Jose A. Cabranes,
Incoherent Sentencing Guidelines, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1992, at A11; Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A
Dismal Failure, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 1992, at 2.
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phenomenon of agents “ratcheting up” punishments during stings; these commentators claim that
the sentencing guidelines simply shifted discretion from judges to prosecutors and law
enforcement.137
This conclusion is misguided. Legal uncertainty was blamed for being the vehicle by
which too much delegation of discretion and authority took place (conferred on the judges); this
is a plausible enough argument. It seems paradoxical, then, to argue that a lack of uncertainty or
vagueness confers or delegates discretion on a different branch of government. Normally power
is delegated to enforcement agencies through vague, open-ended statutes, just as it was with the
judiciary before the guidelines were in place. The confusion here is that the issues are being
framed in terms of discretion, which is really a problem of legal vagueness and agency costs.
Instead, the issue should be framed as one of legal certainty, which is a problem of informational
asymmetries and the abolition of windfall benefits in isolated cases. Prosecutors and undercover
agents did not receive more discretion – i.e., more freedom – after the enactment of the
guidelines. They were just as free to suggest that a target bring a firearm to a set-up drug deal
before as they are now. If anything, prosecutors and agents have lessfreedom and discretion
now, because there are mechanical rules controlling the outcomes, around which they must plan.
The guidelines merely afforded some possible incentives that influence strategy. The world of
both judges and prosecutors alike is less free and discretionary; everything is more predetermined.138 Greater certainty, however, completely changes investment decisions of state
actors, as well as their strategy games when moving toward trial.
137

See supra note 132 and sources cited therein.
But see WILLIAM D. RICH, L. PAUL SUTTON, TODD M. CLEAR, AND MICHAEL J. SAKS, SENTENCING BY
MATHEMATICS: AN EVALUATION OF THE EARLY ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT SENTENCING GUIDELINES
159-60 (1982) (a study of localized experiments that predates the enactment of the federal guidelines):
[T]hese diverse measures almost unanimously converge on a single conclusion: sentencing
guidelines have had no detectable, objectively manifested impact on the exercise of judicial
sentencing discretion. Judges frequently departed from the sentencing recommended by the
138
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When sentences were uncertain, the world of punishments was comparable to a
Knightian market where future demands are uncertain; under Frank Knight's model,139
uncertainty is the only environment where true entrepreneurial profits can occur (as opposed to
net revenue, which is really just a compensation for the owner’s time, talents, and risk of lost
investment dollars). These “true profits” are analogous to occasional windfall benefits for
defendants in the form of acquittals (and if one wants to study the problem from the
prosecution’s standpoint, there were occasional windfall results in the form of particularly severe
sentences on certain bad actors). It is true that the lack of guidelines conferred discretion on
judges, allowing them to express their own preferences, but the result for defendant was an
occasionally very lucky break, a shower of mercy – or an occasional unfortunate turn. Frank
Knight’s model of differentiating between risk and uncertainty for purposes of results and
investments implies that greater certainty in the outcomes flattens out any profits across the
board. As outcomes become more predictable, uncertainty shifts toward straightforward,
quantifiable risk.
Fixing the payouts of punishment eliminates extreme turns in fortune and levels off the
possible “lucky breaks” to defendants. Thus, the sentencing guidelines appear to impose more
draconian results. At the same time, Knight’s model concludes that uncertainty in outcomes
probably generates a net loss across the whole system; the losses of all the failed entrepreneurs

guidelines. Denver judges rarely provided written reasons for their departures. There was no
clear increase in the proportion of sentences that fell within the guidelines’ prescriptions. Racial
and sexual disparities, where extant before guidelines, showed no signs of reduction. Neither was
there a significant diminution of statistically unexplained variation in sentences. Sentencing
guidelines did not enhance the predictability of sentences.
The authors concede, however, that in each of the experimental settings, compliance with the suggested guidelines
was voluntary and there was no sanction for a judge ignoring the recommendations. The authors posited that the
results would be different if compliance could be enforced. Id.
139
See generally KNIGHT, supra note ___.
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taken together must outweigh the windfall profits of occasional winners.140 Highly predictable
outcomes (Knight’s favorite example is statistical-based insurance markets)141 flatten profits but
probably result in an incremental net increase in societal wealth, because the increase in
transactions with better information allows for increasingly efficient allocations of wealth and
resources.
This means that the advent of mechanical sentencing guidelines would result in most
cases settling as plea bargains (ninety-five percent now do on the federal docket),142 and
defendants overall being slightly better off, but getting no breaks. The sentencing guidelines in
this sense probably benefit defendants overall, very incrementally, but the individual defendant
has far less chance of mercy or a lucky break.
That is only part of the picture, however, because in criminal law, the individual is
always pitted against the state. This match is in place even before the decision to commit crime
occurs. Greater specificity in legal rules tends to benefit parties who are more established and
have greater access to ex ante legal information, enabling them to plan around rules or exploit
loopholes in the rules.143 Administrative regulations, for example, are usually more burdensome
for would-be market entrants in the regulated industry than those already established (thus, more
specific rules flattens true profits but increases the potential for oligopoly rents). 144 In contexts
where the individual is pitted against the state, greater legal certainty will almost always benefit
the state and disadvantage the individual. This scenario may be better for society overall, and
therefore beneficial to most individuals in society, as its overall wealth increases incrementally.

140

See generally KNIGHT, supra note ___ at __.
Id. at __.
142
For more discussion if the strategy influences on the high plea bargain rate, see RICHARD A. POSNER,
FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 365-67 (2001).
143
See Ferguson & Peters, supra note 35, at __.
144
Id.
141
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But the individual in an adversarial position to the state can only get lucky if there is legal
uncertainty. This is a matter of informational asymmetries and the disparate position to exploit
loopholes created by specificity in the rules. Prosecutors and undercover agents learn the rules
ahead of time (or by being repeat players in the game), and plan their decisions around those.145
Most criminals are in less of a position to do this, and end up losing.146 Perhaps they should lose
– if they are, after all, criminals. The point here is not to defend or attack the guidelines, but to
explain that this is not a matter of increased “discretion” for law enforcement, but the result of
advantages that legal certainty brings to the (informationally) dominant party.
If a court is considering a rule to adopt for cases of sentencing entrapment or
manipulation, my proposal is that “predisposition” is a problematic test, due to its semantic
fluctuations and overlap with other categories of cases. Similarly, looking at the conduct of
agents (the objective/outrageous government conduct approaches) will usually result in a win for
the prosecution, because the agents are in a position to plan carefully around the rules. Any
“wrongdoing” on their part will almost always appear to be nothing more than “playing it smart”
or being more clever than the defendant. Perhaps a better test is to weigh the disparities in
information access. An experienced criminal or one who “should have known better” should
have less leniency in sentencing entrapment than a true novice to crime. The guidelines, of
course, already have provisions recognizing the defendant’s background, separating first-time
offenders from repeat offenders, but these are usually downward departures after the sentence

145

For a discussion of some of the strategic advantages held by prosecutors, and the incentives motivating
their decisions, see POSNER, supra note __, at 365-67. For example, due to the government’s enormous resources,
prosecutors can spread these resources out strategically but unevenly, “extracting guilty pleas by the threat to
concentrate its resources against any defendant who refuses to plead and using the resources thus conserved to
wallop the occasional defendant who does invoke his right to a trial.” Id. at 367.
146
Admittedly, certain types of criminals, like those perpetrating computer crimes, are very well-networked
and informed of law enforcement policies. The vast majority of entrapment cases, however, involve drug crimes,
and these defendants are not necessarily characterized by expertise in the law.
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has been ratcheted up for aggravating factors. My proposal is that enhancements should be
subject to a quick-look approach to screen out setups of true novices.

D.

Entrapment By Estoppel
Entrapment by estoppel involves no subterfuge and no undercover agents, unlike

traditional entrapment.147 The defense applies instead to situations where 1) there was some
official assurance of the legality of a certain action,148 2) by an appropriately authorized state
actor,149 3) followed by a reasonable reliance150 on the assurance by the defendant, and 4)
criminal charges against the defendant for carrying out the action. 151

147

It is, really, the criminal-

See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 447-48. Marcus notes that “much of the rationale for the claim implicates
due process concerns under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.” Id.
148
See, e.g., U.S. v. Aquino-Chacon, 109 F.3d 936, 939 (4th Cir. 1997) (defendant required to show “active
misleading” by government); U.S. v. Trevino—Martinez, 86 F.3d 464, 466 (5th Cir. 1996); State v. Krzeszowski, 24
P.3d 485, 490 (Wash.App. 2001) (“active representation” by government agent required); see also MARCUS, supra
note 1, at 48-49.
149
See, e.g., U.S. v. Bunnell, 280 F.3d 46, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2002) (firearm violation); U.S. v. Spires, 79 F.3d
th
464, 466 (5 Cir. 1996) (holding that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on entrapement because of
there was not evidentiary support in the record); U.S. v. Ormsby, 252 F.3d 844, 851 (6th Cir. 2001) (state
government official’s assurances cannot be basis of reasonable reliance for federal law firearm regulations); United
States v. Mendoza, No. 03-10070, 2004 WL 385678, at *2, (9th Cir. March 2, 2004); People v. Chacon, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 211 (2004) (holding that the defense of entrapment by estoppel not available because the defendant did no
rely on a government agent’s advice); State v. Woods, 616 N.W.2d 211, 217-18 (Mich.App. 2000) (presenting
elements of the entrapment by estoppel defense); see also MARCUS, supra note 1, at 49.
150
The question of whether the defendant’s reliance was reasonable tends to be the most common point of
dispute in the cases. For a good discussion of the doctrine generally and of this point in particular, see U.S. v. Gil,
297 F.3d 93, 107-08 (2nd Cir. 2002) (vacating and remanding to allow crucial evidence to be presented). See also
MARCUS, supra note 1, at 48; U.S. v. Parker, 267 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2001) (child pornography case, where
defendant claimed he was supplying the government with leads on other violators); State v. Kremlacek, 1999 WL
759970 (Neb. App. 1999); U.S. v. Rector, 111 F.3d 503, 506 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the defendant is not
entitled to the entrapment by estoppel defense because he did not met the element that he was relying on a
government agent’s advice).
151
A succinct explanation of this defense, distinguishing it from similar strategies a defendant could use, is
found in United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1994):
We find considerable assistance in negotiating our way through this area from the roadmap recently
provided by the Eleventh Circuit in Several defenses may apply when a defendant claims he performed the
acts for which he was charged in response to a request from an agency of the government . . . First, the
defendant may allege that he lacked criminal intent because he honestly believed he was performing the
otherwise-criminal acts in cooperation with the government. "Innocent intent" is not a defense per se, but a
defense strategy aimed at negating the mens rea for the crime, an essential element of the prosecution's case
. . . A second possible defense is "public authority." With this affirmative defense, the defendant seeks
exoneration based on the fact that he reasonably relied on the authority of a government official to engage
him in a covert activity. The validity of this defense depends upon whether the government agent in fact

54

16 J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2005)

Entrapment By Numbers

law version of promissory estoppel in contracts.152 The appellation “entrapment” is somewhat
misleading, because there is little association with the rest of entrapment law.153 The challenged
actions of the state agents are nearly always inadvertent, and the agent’s association with the
government open and obvious.
The defense sounds straightforward enough: many people would be surprised to learn, in
fact, that the defense rarely works,154 as it usually arises in cases where the defendant cannot

had the authority to empower the defendant to perform the acts in question. If the agent had no such *882
power, then the defendant may not rest on the "public authority" [defense] . . .A third possible defense ... is
"entrapment by estoppel." This defense applies when a government official tells a defendant that certain
conduct is legal and the defendant commits what would otherwise be a crime in reasonable reliance on the
official's representation.
See also U.S. v. Burrows, 36 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1994) (adopting the above passage as its own rule). A strange
illustration of the foregoing distinctions can be seen operating in the background of United States v. George, 266
F.3d 52 (2nd Cir. 2001), where the prosecution requested that the defendant be acquitted, if at all, under the theory of
entrapment by estoppel, rather than a lack of the requisite mental state, to avoid creating unfavorable precedent.
152
See, e.g., EDWARD J. MURPHY ET. AL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 129 (Robert C. Clark et al.
eds., Foundation Press 6th ed. 2003) : “The doctrine of equitable estoppel is founded on concepts of equity and fair
dealing. It provides that a person may not deny the existence of a state of facts if he intentionally led another to
believe a particular circumstance to be true and to rely upon such a belief to his detriment. The elements of the
doctrine are that (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall
be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to bleive it was so intended; (3) the
other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.”.
153
See Sean Connelly, Bad Advice: The Entrapment By Estoppel Doctrine In Criminal Law, 48 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 627, 628 (1994):
Entrapment by estoppel differs markedly from the traditional entrapment defense because a
defendant need not show that a government official "induced" his conduct but only that the official
offered an honest, albeit mistaken, opinion that the conduct was lawful. Similarly, the defense
differs from the "outrageous government misconduct" defense that some courts have recognized as
a matter of substantive due process in cases where, even though the defendant was criminally
predisposed, the government induced the crime or participated in it through means that "shock the
conscience."
154
In the last few years, the defense was only successful in one reported federal case,
United States v. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2004). Batterjee was convicted for violating a federal statute
prohibiting non-immigrant aliens from possessing firearms or ammunition; Batterjee was residing in the States on a
student visa. He ordered a pistol and filled out federal Form 4473 to obtain a permit for the weapon, indicating
truthfully that he was not a citizen on the forms. He provided additional materials requested by the gun store owner,
a firearms licensee, and assurances from the store owner that he was completing the license application properly.
The statute prohibiting certain aliens from possessing firearms, however, was amended before the defendant’s gun
purchase, making it illegal for him to consummate the purchase, although the instructions on the application forms
were not updated to reflect this change. When prosecuted, Batterjee claimed that the form and the store owner (a
federal licensee) had misled him. The district court rejected this defense, but his conviction was reversed on appeal;
he reasonably relied on the licensee’s representations as to his eligibility to possess a firearm.
In state courts, entrapment by estoppel seems to have succeeded only twice in the last few years, and in one
of these cases the acquittal was reversed on an appeal by the state. People v. Chacon, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 211 (2004)
(successful defense at trial reversed on appeal); State v. Hagan-Sherwin, No. CR 03-249, 2004 WL 743808 (Ark.
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meet the test – where there was either no assurance or not reasonable reliance.155 Although the
cases cover a wide range of crimes,156 by its nature the defense is best-suited for regulatory
offenses, especially firearms violations.157 It is exceedingly rare, of course, that an official
would encourage a citizen to commit some common-law crime of violence or theft; and the
entrapment by estoppel defense would probably not apply such a case anyway, because on such a
suggestion would probably seem “unreasonable” to a court.
Firearm violations dominate this field.158 Convicted felons purchase guns, a rather
predictable violation of federal law, under a blithe or simplistic hope that the prohibitions do not

April 8, 2004) (successful estoppel defense where defendant was charged with appropriating insurance premiums for
own use, where state regulators had tacitly condoned the practice).
155
See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 49 (“Defendants have had a difficult time demonstrating that these
elements are present.”).
156
Recent entrapment by estoppel cases include tax fraud (see United States v. Young, 350 F.3d 1302 (11th
Cir. 2003)), food and dairy regulations (see United States v. Lagrou Distrib. Sys., Inc., No. 03 CR 605, 2004 WL
524438 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2004)), trafficking in endangered animals/animal products (see United States v. Kapp, No.
02-CR 418-1, 2003 WL 23162408 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2003)), defrauding HUD (see United States v. Westover, No.
02-40012-01-SAC, 2003 WL 1904046 (D. Kan. March 6, 2003)), securities fraud (see United States v. Greyling,
No. 00CR.631(RCC), 2002 WL 424655 (S.D.N.Y. March 18, 2002)); violation of insurance regulations (see State v.
Hagan-Sherwin, No. CR 03-249, 2004 WL 743808 (Ark. April 8, 2004); operation of pyramid scheme (see People
v. Micheau, No. 241076, 2003 WL 22358874 (Mich. App. Oct. 16, 2003)); election code violations (see
Commonwealth v. Cosentino, No. 2122 C.D.2003, 2004 WL 1103678 (Pa. Cmwlth. May 13, 2004)); violation of
alimony orders (see White v. White, 564 S.E.2d 700 (Va. Ct. App. 2002)); welfare fraud (see United States v.
Whitecloud, 59 Fed.Appx. 918, No. 02-50206, 2003 WL 1459508 (9th Cir. March 18, 2003)), operation of nudist
club (see Poppell v. City of San Diego, 149 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 1998)); child pornography (see United States v.
Hilton, 257 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2001)); drug possession (see United States v. Guevara, No. 02-1426, 2004 WL 1147091
(2nd Cir. May 21, 2004)); importation and sale of drug paraphernalia (see United States v. Marshall, 332 F.3d 254
(4th Cir. 2003)), and immigration violations (see United States v. George, 266 F.3d 52 (2nd Cir. 2001); United States
v. Alba, 38 Fed.Appx. 707, No. 01-2510, 01-2907, 2002 WL 522819 (3rd Cir. April 8, 2002) (holding that the
defendant’s entrapment by estoppel failed to meet the elements); United States v. Mendoza, 89 Fed.Appx. 632, No.
03-10070, 2004 WL 385678 (9th Cir. March 2, 2004) (rejecting the defendant’s claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel based on his attorney’s failure to recognize the entrapment by estoppel defense); United States v. MirandaRamirez, 309 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2002) (concerning an immigrantion violation). The most common crime charged
is firearm violations (see infra note __ and cases cited therein).
157
A few of the cases involve former government informants who had temporary authority to go along with
illegal activities as part of a sting operation (or so it was claimed), but this authorization expired while the defendant
continued. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton, 257 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2001) (arguing that the defendant’s previous
collaboration with the government mislead him to believe that collecting child pornography was legal as long as he
turned over the material to a government agent).
158
See, e.g., United States v. Bunnell, 280 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that there was no basis for a
defense of entrapment by estoppel); United States v. Emerson, 2004 WL 180360, 86 Fed.Appx. 696, No. 03-10104
(5th Cir. Jan. 28, 2004) (ruling that there was no basis for entrapment by estoppel defense or for ineffective
assistance of counsel claim); United States v. Ormsby, 252 F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that the defendant
could not present an entrapment by estoppel defense); United States v. Haire, 89 Fed.Appx. 551, No. 02-2162, 2004
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apply in their case. The purported assurances usually come in the form of written instructions on
the permit application form (which are admittedly confusing),159 verbal instructions about the
application from gun shop owners (in rare cases held to be agents of the state, due to their special
role in administering the federal applications).160 Some claims assert assurances or tacit approval
from courts, police, or probation officers who fail to admonish the defendant properly.161

WL 406141 (6th Cir. March 2, 2004) (affiriming judgment against the defendant that claimed he was not aware that
felon-in possession laws have been revised); Hood v. United States, 342 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim pertaining to his unlawful possession of a firearem charge);
United States v. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2004) (accepting the entrapement by estoppel defense because the
defendant reasonably relied on the advice of a government agent); United States v. Scott, 41 Fed.Appx. 372, No. 017124, 2002 WL 1150819 (10th Cir. May 30, 2002) (“Defendant failed to establish a reasonable probability that his
entrapment defense would have changed the outcome of his case and thus failed to establish the prejudice required
for a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel”); United States v. Kubowski, 85 Fed.Appx. 686, No. 02-6343,
2003 WL 23033199 (10th Cir. Dec. 30, 2003) (denying the defendant’s entrapment by estoppel defense because
there was no evidence the statements actively misled him); Swartz v. Iowa, No. C00-2065, 2003 WL 32173383
(N.D. Iowa Aug. 30, 2002); Fehr v. Coplan, No. Civ. 03-59-M, 2003 WL 22489735 (D.N.H. Nov. 4, 2003); People
v. Babich, No. A098521, 2003 WL 21958615 (Cal. App. Aug. 18, 2003); People v. Sparazynski, No. 243381, 2004
WL 345371 (Mich. App. Feb. 24, 2004); State v. Krzeszowski, 24 P.3d 485 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (denying the
entrapment by estoppel defense because appellant was not affirmatively misled); State v. Leavitt, 27 P.3d 622
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the defendant was misled when he failed to receive notice of the statute
prohibiting firearms); State v. Morley, No. 21357-9-III, 2004 WL 171587 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2004). These
are all recent cases; surveys going back further reveal a similar predominance of firearms violations as the
underlying substantive offense.
159
See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 41 Fed.Appx. 372, No. 01-7124, 2002 WL 1150819 (10th Cir. May 30,
2002) (“Defendant failed to establish a reasonable probability that his entrapment defense would have changed the
outcome of his case and thus failed to establish the prejudice required for a showing of ineffective assistance of
counsel”); United States v. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2004) (accepting the defendant’s entrapement by
estoppel defense because the defendant reasonably relied on the advice of a government agent).
160
See, e.g., Fehr v. Coplan, No. Civ. 03-59-M, 2003 WL 22489735 (D.N.H. Nov. 4, 2003); United States
v. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the entrapement by estoppel defense was successful because
the defendant reasonably relied on the advice of a government agent); United States v. Scott, 41 Fed.Appx. 372, No.
01-7124, 2002 WL 1150819 (10th Cir. May 30, 2002) (“Defendant failed to establish a reasonable probability that
his entrapment defense would have changed the outcome of his case and thus failed to establish the prejudice
required for a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel”); People v. Sparazynski, No. 243381, 2004 WL 345371
(Mich. App. Feb. 24, 2004).
161
See, e.g., United States v. Haire, 89 Fed.Appx. 551, No. 02-2162, 2004 WL 406141 (6th Cir. March 2,
2004) (defendant told by state police he could own firearms; not valid defense on federal charges); United States v.
Kubowski, 85 Fed.Appx. 686, No. 02-6343, 2003 WL 23033199 (10th Cir. Dec. 30, 2003) (assurances from judge);
Hood v. United States, 342 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the unlawful ineffective assistance of counsel claim
for possession of a firearem); Swartz v. Iowa, No. C00-2065, 2003 WL 32173383 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 30, 2002);
Swartz v. Mathes, 291 F. Supp.2d 861 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (stating that the record shows that “the prisoner did not
present his entrapment by estoppel claim as a constitutional issue, and did not overcome his failure to do so by
showing cause, prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice”.); State v. Johnson, 83 P.3d 772 (Haw. Ct. App.
2004) (manslaughter plea/violation of probation); People v. Babich, No. A098521, 2003 WL 21958615 (Cal. App.
Aug. 18, 2003) (sheriff returned guns to defendant’s possession after confiscation); United States v. Ormsby, 252
F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 2001) (reliance on probation officer); Miller v. Com., 25 Va.App. 727, 492 S.E.2d 482 (Va.App.,
Nov 04, 1997) (defense successful where probation officer authorized gun possession).
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Eligibility requirements – like the no-felon rule for gun licenses– are particularly suited
for creating the scenarios where this defense arises. Misstating one’s eligibility or hiding
disqualifying factors on federal forms are commonplace transgressions (whether intentional or
careless), but can still trigger criminal sanctions.162 This offense, in turn, can constitute a
probation violation, so that the consequences for some defendants are quite severe.163 If one
thinks of “entrapment by estoppel” primarily in terms of fudging on gun license applications and
the like, the limited usefulness of the defense becomes apparent. There is only one academic
article devoted to the subject from the last ten years,164 and only two bar journal articles,165
indicating the small amount of interest this doctrine generates. Eligibility requirements come up
in many of the non-firearms cases as well, especially with certain immigration/illegal re-entry
cases.166

162

See supra note __ and cases cited therein.
See, e.g., U.S. v. Spires, 79 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1995) (affiriming the trial court’s refusl to instruct on the
entrapment by estoppel defense because there was no evidenciary basis in the record to support the defense); State v.
Howell, 1998 WL 807800 (Ohio App. Nov 17, 1998); People v. Dingman, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 211 (Cal.App. 1996); see
also United States v. Whitecloud, 59 Fed.Appx. 918, No. 02-50206, 2003 WL 1459508 (9th Cir. March 18, 2003)
(welfare fraud violates probation); State v. Johnson, 83 P.3d 772 (Haw. Ct. App. 2004) (plea agreement in homicide
case violated probation in another jurisdiction); Poppell v. City of San Diego, 149 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 1998)
(operation of nudist club).
164
See Connelly, supra note __ (arguing that the defense should only apply to crimes not requiring proof of
culpable intent, and that the applicability of the defense in a given case should be decided by the court, not the jury).
Two older articles provided some of the conceptual framework for courts addressing this issue before it took on its
present name. See Note, State Estopped To Prosecute Criminal
Conduct Suggested By Police, 81 HARV. L. REV. 895 (1968), discussing People v. Donovan, 279 N.Y.S. 2d 404 (Ct.
Spec. Sess. 1967); Note, Applying Estoppel Principles in Criminal Cases, 78 YALE L.J. 1046 (1969).
165
Michael S. Pasano, Walter J. Taché, & Thierry Olivier Desmet, Using the Defense of Entrapment by
Estoppel, 26 CHAMPION 20 (May 2002); Mark S. Cohen, Entrapment By Estoppel, 31 COLO. LAW. 45 (Feb. 2002).
Both articles are descriptive law summaries designed to aid practitioners, without advocating for a significant
change in policy.
166
See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 89 Fed.Appx. 632, No. 03-10070, 2004 WL 385678 (9th Cir. March
2, 2004) (“Defendant did not demonstrate that his asserted defense of entrapment by estoppel had a "reasonable
probability" of success, so he did not demonstrate prejudice based on his attorney's failure to recognize it.”); United
States v. Alba, 38 Fed.Appx. 707, No. 01-2510, 01-2907, 2002 WL 522819 (3rd Cir. April 8, 2002); United States v.
Miranda-Ramirez, 309 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. George, 266 F.3d 52 (2nd Cir. 2001) (holding that
jury instructions were erroneous); U.S. v. Santana Cruz, 216 F.3d 1074 (Table), 2000 WL 900207 (2nd Cir. 2000);
U.S. v. Ramirez-Valencia, 202 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the entrapment by estoppel defense failed
because defendant had no reasonable basis to rely on the advice given); U.S. v. Gutierrez-Gonzalez, 184 F.3d 1160
(10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to entrapment by estoppel defense because the legal
conseling organization he consulted was not a government agency); U.S. v. Ortegon-Uvalde, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir.
163
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Like other entrapment defenses, the number of cases in this area has been decreasing for
the last few years.167 The Supreme Court addressed the doctrine in three cases,168 the third being
in 1973 when Court actually used the term “entrapment by estoppel” for the first time (previous
cases simply called it a due process violation).169 The federal cases peaked around 1995170
(similar to sentencing entrapment) and have declined since then.171 This is a rapid rise and fall

1999) (holding that the defendant could not avail himself of the entrapment by estoppel defense because he did not
rely on the Immigration and Naturalization Service's erroneous warning);; U.S. v. Aquino-Chacon, 109 F.3d 936 (4th
Cir. 1997) (“Active misleading did not occur unless the government affirmatively told a citizen that an activity was
lawful. The court held that defendant was not actively misled because the notice did not affirmatively state that it
was legal to re-enter the United States after five years without the consent of the Attorney General.”); U.S. v.
Thomas, 70 F.3d 575 (11th Cir. 1995) (affirming the defendant’s sentence because he failed to show that reliance
upon the erroneous form when he reentered the United States).
167
From 1994-1997 in federal court the defense was raised in forty-two reported cases, from 1998-20
01 it
was raised forty-nine, and from 2002-2004 only twenty-nine times.
168
United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973) (remanding case to allow the
corporation to present evidence of its reliance to satisfy the defense of entrapment by estoppel); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 559 (1965) (holding that the defendant’s conviction could not be sustained based on his reliance of the
sheriff’s dispersal order); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959) (finding that the convictions of three defendants was
precluded because they were instructed by a government agent that they had a right to refuse to answer questions).
169
Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. at 674.
170
See, e.g., United States v. Achter, 52 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that the defense of entrapment by
estoppel is excluded because the elements were not satisfied); Roberts v. State, 48 F.3d 1287 (1st Cir. 1995)
(holding that defendant would be given a sentencing hearing with no mandated minimum sentence because his
arresting officer failed to tell him all of the consequences that could result from his refusal to take the blood/alcohol
test); United States v. French, 46 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The court affirmed the lower court's determination of
the length of defendant's sentence and his past criminal history.”); United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39 (2nd Cir.
1995) (defining all elements of entrapment by estoppel); United States v. Sims, 68 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Kyle, 67 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Light, 64 F.3d 660 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Campbell, 65 F.3d 962 (D.C.Cir. 1995) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to entrapment by estoppel
because he did not demonstrate any basis for the defense); United States v. Caron, 64 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1995)
(finding that the petition for rehearing en banc granted but limited to certain issues); United States v. Collins, 61
F.3d 1379 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the defendant’s prior felony convictions were properly used as predicate
offenses for his conviction and sentencing); United States v. Heavilin, 60 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Valentine, 59 F.3d 171 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Neufeld, 908 F.Supp. 491 (S.D.Ohio 1995) (holding that
entrapment by estoppel barred prosecution); United States v. Indelicato, 887 F.Supp. 23 (D.Mass. 1995).
171
A growing number of these cases, interestingly, have the procedural posture of being ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, indicating that the defense functions sometimes as an afterthought or last resort. See,
e.g., United States v. Strube, 65 Fed.Appx. 865, No. 01-3526, 2003 WL 21246540 (3rd Cir. May 30, 2003) (holding
that the defense of entrapment by estoppel and outrageous conduct by the government not available to the
defendant); United States v. Emerson, 86 Fed.Appx. 696, No. 03-10104, 2004 WL 180360 (5th Cir. Jan. 28, 2004)
(finding that the defendant had not shown that he had a valid defense of entrapment by estoppel, so he could not
have shown that his attorney's failure to request an instruction or to object to the lack of an instruction was
professionally unreasonable or that he was prejudiced); Hood v. United States, 342 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Lewis, 62 Fed.Appx. 757, No. 01-10270, 2003 WL 722128 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2003) (finding that a partially
redacted article that gave some evidence that defendant’s were guilty, was not unfairly prejudicial, and thus did not
adversely affect the jury's attitude toward defendants apart from their judgment of guilt as to the crimes charged);
United States v. Mendoza, 89 Fed.Appx. 632, No. 03-10070, 2004 WL 385678 (9th Cir. March 2, 2004); United
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for a criminal defense; it is very difficult to find any estoppel cases at all before 1981 in the
federal district or circuit courts,172 and then there were less than five reported cases per year
nationwide until the early 1990’s.173
The state patterns are different. They are still increasing,174 although they got off to a
much slower start: there are almost no reported state cases before 1988,175 and then only one or
States v. Scott, 41 Fed.Appx. 372, No. 01-7124, 2002 WL 1150819 (10th Cir. May 30, 2002); Ex Parte Dwyer, No.
08-01-00059-CR, 2002 WL 28018 (Tex. App.-El Paso Jan. 10, 2002).
172
The cases up to 1988 were concentrated in the Ninth Circuit: U.S. v. Clegg, 846 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1988
(“The court held that the defense of reliance on government officials was available to defendant.”) U.S. v. Burke,
863 F.2d 886 (Table), 1988 WL 132598 (9th Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1987) (Holding
that the prosecution and conviction of defendant for the receipt and possession of firearms violated due process,
because he was misled by the government agent who sold him the weapons into believing that his conduct would not
be contrary to federal law.); U.S. v. Chen, 754 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1985).
173
U.S. v. Mandel, 951 F.2d 364, 1991 WL 268719 (9th Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Hurst, 951 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir.
1991) (finding that defendants not entitled to an entrapment by estoppel instruction because there was no evidence
that they were ever told by a state official that their actions were legal); U.S. v. Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that the defendant was not permitted to offer evidence as to his mindset for the defense of entrapment
by estoppel because the defense focused on the mindset of the government official); U.S. v. Fauls, 946 F.2d 887
(Table)1991 WL 206293 (4th Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Mitran, 937 F.2d 610 (Table), 1991 WL 130221 (7th Cir. 1991);
U.S. v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that the proposed evidence did not justify a finding of
entrapment by estoppel); U.S. v. Ham, 944 F.2d 902 (Table) 1991 WL 186858 (4th Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Etheridge,
932 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1991) (affirming that the district court properly excluded evidence of the defendant’s claim
that he relied on advice by a state court judge because the government that prosecuted him was not the government
that mistakenly and misleadingly interpreted the law); U.S. v. McErquiaga, 930 F.2d 30 (Table), 1991 WL 45291
(9th Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding that the trial judges refusal to give the
requested charge on the theory of the defense of entrapment by estoppel was reversible error); U.S. v. Austin, 915
F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that the sales clerk at the pawn shop was not a government official for purposes of
an entrapment by estoppel defense); Mount v. Cooperman, 912 F.2d 469 (Table), 1990 WL 125346 (9th Cir. 1990);
U.S. v. Reyes Vasquez, 905 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court properly excluded evidence
related to appellant's public authority defense); U.S. v. Jones, 908 F.2d 978 (Table), 1990 WL 94971 (9th Cir.
1990); U.S. v. Hawkins, 902 F.2d 41, 1990 WL 56143 (9th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Tapuvae, 896 F.2d 556, 1990 WL
15093 (9th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Collamore, 751 F.Supp. 1012 (D.Me., Nov 13, 1990) (finding that the factual
predicates for defendant's assertions were lacking, so his due process claim based on vindictive prosecution failed);
U.S. v. Marcos, 1990 WL 16161 (S.D.N.Y., Feb 15, 1990); U.S. v. Rodriguez, 878 F.2d 387, 1989 WL 69934 (9th
Cir. 1989); U.S. v. Evans, 712 F.Supp. 1435 (D.Mont., May 16, 1989); U.S. v. Brady, 710 F.Supp. 290 (D.Colo.,
Apr 6, 1989) (finding that the defendant could not be convicted because his possession of a revolver was in
reasonable reliance of a state court judge’s erroneous order that he could possess a firearm while hunting); Burkett
v. State, 518 So.2d 1363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the "lack of knowledge defense" to a violation of
the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon statute, was available only to a defendant who was not aware of his
possession of a firearm, not to a defendant who asserted he did not know he was a convicted felon); United States v.
Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1987). United States v. Hsieh Hui Mei Chen, 754 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1985).
174
The defense was raised three times from 1994-1997, ten times from 1998-2001, and twelve times from
2002-2004, at least in the cases (published and unpublished) available on Westlaw.
175
See Burkett v. State, 518 So.2d 1363 (Fla.App. 1988). There are three or four cases from the early
1970’s that discuss the scenarios now typical for this defense under the rubric of “entrapment OR estoppel,” using
traditional elements for the former and equitable estoppel analysis for the latter, very skeptically. See, e.g., Cohen v.
City of New York, 329 N.Y.S.2d 596, 69 Misc.2d 189 (New York 1972); People v. Larson, 308 N.E.2d 148, 17
Ill.App.3d 683 (Ill. 1974) (finding that elements of the entrapment defense were not met); State v. LeDent, 176
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two per year (nationwide) from 1992 to 1998.176 Since then the defense has become more
commonplace in the state courts, and the numbers are catching up to the federal cases. This is
surprising, in a sense, given the continuing predominance of federal regulatory crimes.
The cases prior to 1981 (i.e., in the 1970’s) involved fact patterns that actually blurred the
lines between entrapment by estoppel and the traditional entrapment defense, such as bribery
cases.177 An agent posing as a government official pretending to accept a bribe (typically
immigration officers) is in some sense being open and explicit about their government status, but
there is nonetheless a ruse at work, as with the traditional defense. This recurring fact scenario
prevented entrapment by estoppel from “coming into its own” as a distinct legal doctrine until
the 1980’s. It is somewhat unfortunate that the terminology choice did not settle on simple
“estoppel” or “government estoppel” rather than including “entrapment”; it would have been less
confusing, and more descriptive.
Entrapment by estoppel provides another illustration of legal uncertainty and differing
levels of access to legal information. The interplay with these concepts differs somewhat from

N.W.2d 21, 185 Neb. 380 (Neb. 1970) (. . .[E]stoppel is no defense to a criminal action.); People v. Lawrence, 18
Cal.Rptr. 196, 198 Cal.App.2d 54 (Calif. 1962) (finding that the convictions were not erroneous due to the
defendant’s claim of entrapment).
176
See State v. Johnson, 1998 WL 1701 (Ohio App. 1998); Miller v. Com., 492 S.E.2d 482 (Va.App.
1997); People v. Dingman, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 211 (Cal.App. 1996) (affirming the trial court’s judgment because the
statute was not unconstitutionally vague); Com. v. Twitchell, 416 Mass. 114, 617 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1993); State v.
Fogarty, 607 A.2d 624 (N.J. 1992) (finding that the common law and constitutional entrapment defense was
unavailable to defendant because the police had not coerced defendant into driving his vehicle, but instead had
ordered defendant to leave in his vehicle, without knowledge of his intoxication, while they were attempting to
break up a fight in a parking lot). There are no reported cases using the phrase “entrapment by estoppel” in state
courts anywhere for the years 1989-91, or 1994-95.
177
See, e.g., U.S. v. Anderton, 629 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1980) (reversing and remanding because the jury
instructions misled the jury); State v. DeKay, 387 So.2d 570 (La., Jun 23, 1980) (finding no evidence of
entrapment); U.S. v. Sarno, 596 F.2d 404 (9th Cir.(Nev.), May 07, 1979); Harary v. Blumenthal, 555 F.2d 1113
(2nd Cir. 1977) (affirming the lower court’s conviction of public accountant that bribed a special agent of the
Internal Revenue Service); People v. Strohl, 57 Cal.App.3d 347, 129 Cal.Rptr. 224 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., Apr 19, 1976)
(“[T]he evidence sufficiently supported the jury's finding that the criminal intent to commit the bribery originated in
the mind of defendant, not the agent's or coroner's, and thus, there was no unlawful entrapment.”); Johnston v.
National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 356 F.Supp. 904 (E.D.N.Y., Mar 21, 1973) (finding that a claim of entrapment did
not violate the accused's civil rights and was dismissed); U.S. v. Caracci, 446 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.(La.) (affirming the
bribery conviction), Jun 02, 1971); U.S. v. Chisum, 312 F.Supp. 1307 (C.D.Cal., Apr 24, 1970).
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the previously discussed categories of defenses. Sentencing entrapment results from high levels
of certainty in punishment rules; entrapment by estoppel results from high levels of certainty in
conduct rules, or more better, in eligibility or authorization rules.
First, the offenses that give rise to entrapment by estoppel are almost all technical
violations of statutes, albeit serious ones.178 Many of the defendants could not have been
charged with a common law crime having basic act-intent requirements; instead, the case turns
on breaching a line drawn somewhat arbitrarily (but still legitimately) by the legislature.
Licensing and eligibility regulations, such as those pertaining to firearms, sometimes serve an
important public policy function, but the parameters themselves are not a matter of public
morality as the need to have some sort of structure or framework in place. This means that the
offenders are unlikely to have moral intuitions or inculcated social norms about the precise
requirements of the law. If the rules were unclear, vague, or general, defendants would be better
able to rebut the charges on the merits, arguing that there was either a lack of criminal intent or
that their behavior did not rise to the level of the criminality contemplated by the statute. The
178

That is, violating firearm licensing requirements, etc. The main exception to this statement is the line of
cases involving former government informants who claim to have had temporary authorization to engage in criminal
activity (such as collecting child pornography or storing narcotics as part of a pervious sting operation), who
continued to do so after their period of authorization ended. See, e.g., United States v. Fulcher, 188 F.Supp.2d 627
(W.D. Va. 2002) (DEA agent acknowledged that he might have mislead the defendant into believing he had
authority to investigate drug dealing between guards and inmates, therefore the defense was valid );United States v.
Hilton, 257 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2001) (arguing that the defendant’s previous collaboration with the government mislead
him to believe that collecting child pornography was legal as long as he turned over the material to a government
agent). See also United Sates v. Clegg, 846 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1988) (government knew and encouraged the
defendant to sell firearms); United States v. Rosenthal, 266 F.Supp.2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (arguing that his
deputization by the city reflected the federal government’s approval of cultivating marijuana, but the defense failed
because immunity under the controlled substance act was only granted when enforcing a law under the act); United
States v. Guevara, No. 02-1426, 2004 WL 1147091 (2nd Cir. May 21, 2004) (claiming that she was recruited by a
government informant to distribute heroine, but in order to prevail on the defense the government, not the informant,
had to give her actual authority to act as an informant); United States v. Strube, 65 Fed.Appx. 865, No. 01-3526,
2003 WL 21246540 (3rd Cir. May 30, 2003) (claiming that an informant recruited him to help in a government drug
trafficking investigation, however the defense failed because he was not directly authorized by the government);
United States v. Parker, 267 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2001) (claiming he was compiling images of child pornography for
government agents, however he did not have authorization by a government agent); United States v. Pickard, 278
F.Supp.2d 1217 (D. Kan. 2003) (Defendant had a relationship with the DEA and other governmental agencies as an
informant, but the defense failed because he could not prove that his conduct in manufacturing LSD was
authorized).
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certainty and precision of the rules at issue in these cases create a type of strict liability (or
something close to it). Rules on the strict liability end of the continuum are the ones most likely
to give rise to an entrapment by estoppel defense.
Greater certainty in legal rules is more likely to give rise to strict liability (that is, the
elimination or weakening of the intent requirement), although there are a few exceptions where
statutes have higher gradations of regulatory felonies for “knowing” or “intentional” violations,
as in the case of some tax fraud regulations. It is not only a type of crime (regulatory or
eligibility requirements) that lends itself to this defense, but a level of verbal certainty and
precision in the rule itself.
Technical violations also place the citizenry at the mercy of the government for adequate
information or notice about the rules; it is harder to guess, for example, what might be the
exceptions (if there are any) to the felon-firearm rule, much less the “exceptions to the
exceptions.”179 Ignorance of the law, however, is generally no excuse,180 even with regulatory or

179

For examples, see People v. Dingman, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 211 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); United States v.
Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1987); United Sates v. Clegg, 846 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Bunnell, 280 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Emerson, 86 Fed.Appx. 696, No. 03-10104, 2004 WL 180360
(5th Cir. Jan. 28, 2004); United States v. Alba, 38 Fed.Appx. 707, No. 01-2510, 2002 WL 522819 (3rd Cir. April 8,
2002); United States v. Marshall, 332 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Ormsby, 252 F.3d 844 (6th Cir.
2001); United States v. Haire, 89 Fed.Appx. 551, No. 02-2162, 2004 WL 406141 (6th Cir. March 2, 2004); Hood v.
United States, 342 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93 (2nd Cir. 2002); United States v. George, 266 F.3d 52 (2nd Cir. 2001); United States v. Strube, 65
Fed.Appx. 865, No. 01-3526, 2003 WL 21246540 (3rd Cir. May 30, 2003); United States v. Miranda-Ramirez, 309
F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2002). Commonwealth v. Cosentino, No. 2122 C.D.2003, 2004 WL 1103678 (Pa. Cmwlth. May
13, 2004).
180
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 47 (1991) (noting that this "substantive
principle is sometimes put in the form of a rule of evidence, that every one is presumed to know the law"). It is
exactly this form of the rule that this section brings into question. See also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW 147-158 (2nd ed. 2001); Model Penal Code § 2.02(9) (1996) (“Neither knowledge nor recklessness
nor knowledge as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law
determining the elements of an offense is a defense.").
Holmes' explanation includes a strong dose of "tough luck" in typical Holmesian prose:
The true explanation of the rule is the same as that which accounts for the law's indifference to a
man's particular temperament, faculties, and so forth. Public policy sacrifices the individual to the
general good. It is desirable that the burden of all should be equal, but it is still more desirable to
put an end to robbery and murder. It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the
criminal could not have known that he was breaking the law, but to admit the excuse at all would

63

16 J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2005)

Entrapment By Numbers

technical offenses; active misinformation or miscommunication might be, and that is the essence
of the entrapment by estoppel defense. Heightened legal certainty in eligibility or authorization
rules creates a special, paradoxical situation: adequate (effective) communication of the rule is
necessary for compliance, but not necessary for liability. Certain individuals – generally, those
disqualified from the eligibility in question – could not know the exact parameters of the rule
without being told.181 Yet actual notice (basically, effective communication from the
government) is not required for conviction, only “constructive notice” (that is, some sort of token
communication to the public).182 This conundrum is true with many criminal laws, of course –
most people do not know exactly what the laws in their jurisdiction say,183 which is no defense to
crime, while the government has some technical duty of generalized notice.184 The tension is
more evident, however, with eligibility requirements.

be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has determined to make men know and obey, and
justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scales.
HOLMES, at 48. See also PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 545-53 (1997); DRESSLER at 165-77 (summarizing the
general rule and its traditional rationales). Dressler notes that ignorance of the law is more likely to constitute a
defense if it somehow negates a mens rea requirement for the specific crime in question. Sometimes, of course,
mistake of law (which I believe is different from, but overlaps with, ignorance of the law, although Dressler treats
them together) can be an excuse where the defendant in the case relied upon an official interpretation of the law,
such as an Attorney General opinion letter. See Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 619 (Mass. 1993);
Miller v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 482, 484-87 (Va. App. 1997).
181
See, e.g., Doctor’s Hospital of Hyde Park v. Appeal of Daiwa Special Asset Corp., 337 F.3d 951 (7th Cir.
2003) (“There are an enormous number of state laws, and it might be unreasonable to expect a person . . .to
determine in advance the possible bearing of all of them.”); Torres v. INS, 144 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 1998)
(immigration laws changed without public announcement or publication).
182
See, e.g., North Carolina v. White, 2004 LEXIS ___ (Jan. 20, 2004) (“Although ignorance of the law is
no excuse, due process requires that the defendant have knowledge, actual or constructive, of the statutory
requirements before he can be charged with its violation.”); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 201, 206-12 (1985). See also WAYNE R. LA FAVE, PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW 217-18 (2003). Regarding strict liability, La Fave says that “…some attention should be given here
to the question of whether liability may be imposed for an omission when the defendant was…unaware of the
existence or scope of the legal duty.” Some courts refuse to hold defendants liable for crimes of omission without
having knowledge of the statute creating the duty omitted, according to La Fave, but courts generally assume that
defendants have (constructive) knowledge of statutes when they violate them with affirmative actions.
183
In a recent study of educated citizens in four different states, the results confirmed the hypothesis that
“people do not have a clue about what the laws of their states hold on . . . important legal issues.” John M. Darley,
Kevin M. Carlsmith, and Paul H. Robinson, The Ex Ante Function of the Criminal Law, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 165,
167 (2001).
184
See, e.g., Cambell v. Bennett, 212 F.Supp. 2d. 1339, 1343 (M.Dist. Ala. 2002) (“. . .[T]he due-process
concept of fair notice. . . . is central to the legitimacy of our legal system: Elementary considerations of fairness
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This tension is worse, perhaps, due to the nature of eligibility requirements. People are
more likely to engage in wishful thinking or excessive optimism that they are part of an
“included group” than they are to think that an act of violence, theft, possession of contraband,
etc. is somehow legal; this seems especially true when the “included group” is the majority of the
population, as with non-felons who want gun licenses.
Finally, the numbers of cases seem to reflect the changing levels of uncertainty pertaining
to the defense itself. The scarcity of cases until recently is rather striking; it is hard to believe
that government agents throughout history have managed to communicate better than they have
in the last ten years. Rather, it seems that the idea of raising the defense simply occurs to more
defendants now that the elements of the defense have been crystallized, as evidenced by the
failure rate/weakness of the defense itself in the reported cases. The federal cases, however, did
not increase in response to the crystallization of the rule in the early 1970’s; the jump in the
number of cases is probably more related to changes in federal gun-licensing laws in the late
1980’s or early 90’s, or a shift in focus of federal law enforcement, such as the War on Drugs.

dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct
accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted."); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511
U.S. 244, 264 (1994).
Probably the most well-known case about the notice requirement in criminal law, at least from the United
States Supreme Court, is Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), involving a residency registration law for
felons visiting Los Angeles. The defendant had just moved to the city and did not know about the requirement; the
Supreme Court held that her conviction under the ordinance violated due process rights. It is not clear, however,
that the Court was concerned entirely with the notice issue, although the opinion certainly relies on that in part;
Lambert’s crime also involved a simple omission or passive act (not registering), which would not have been a
crime at all under common law. Moreover, the Court may have simply disliked the residency registration
requirement because of the general chilling effect that such requirements have on interstate travel. The ambiguity of
its holding, and the other complicating factors in the case, have caused it to have little value for precedent compared
to other Supreme Court decisions in the criminal law area. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 9, at 171-73
(discussing Lambert and possible interpretations of its holding); LA FAVE, supra note 11, at 203:
It is important to note, however, that the Lambert decision does not require legislative tampering
with the doctrine that ignorance of the criminal law is no excuse. Ignorance of the law, after all, is
an excuse when it negatives a required mental element of the crime, so it would be fairly simple to
redraft legislation of the kind condemned in Lambert so that guilt depends upon a knowing
violation of a legal duty.
Another reading of the case is that it stands for the notion that unlimited uncertainty – uncertainty in the rules (i.e.,
vagueness) severe enough to undermine the deterrent effect – is invalid.
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The ongoing increase of estoppel cases in state court is probably attributable to the fact that it is a
much newer defense at that level, and many states have yet to consider their first test case or
apply the defense to a significant range of facts.185

V.

ENTRAPMENT AND NEW TECHNOLOGY

As crime has gone online in recent years, so has law enforcement. Certain crimes, like
identity theft, electronic money laundering, and attacks on websites, depend inherently on the use
of computers, and it is not at all surprising that solving or preventing such crimes involves
computer surveillance and enforcement.
What is somewhat more surprising, although the novelty has long worn off and the
causes self-evident, is the use of computers and the Internet for one of the most base, impulsedriven, and unsophisticated sorts of crimes: sexual predation on children.186 This section is
devoted primarily to this crime, rather than on what are sometimes called “core” computer
crimes, such as hacking and denial of service attacks on websites; although these crimes present
interesting issues for possible entrapment claims, the tech-entrapment cases themselves are
almost entirely focused on pederasty.

185

See, e.g., State v. Hagan-Sherwin, No. CR 03-249, 2004 WL 743808 (Ark. April 8, 2004) (state claimed
the defense was not available because it was not a recognized defense in the state, but it was allowed by the court.) .
186
An interesting historical observation was made by a federal court in New York:
The interest of federal law enforcement officers in the flow of child pornography over the Internet
was evidently piqued by the much-publicized case involving the abduction of a ten-year old
Maryland boy . . . Bureau agents investigating the matter discovered that computer on-line
services were being used to entice children into sexual encounters with adults, and that child
pornography was being distributed regularly by computer. The Baltimore office of the FBI
subsequently spearheaded an investigation wherein law enforcement agents would sign on to
computer services and attempt to identify traffickers of image files containing child pornography.
Evidence against defendant in the case at bar originated from the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement.
U.S. v. Lamb, 945 F.Supp. 441, 445 (N.D.N.Y., Nov 05, 1996)
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Pedophiles find the Internet particularly suited for pursuing their ends; it allows (now
somewhat limited) anonymity, freedom from normal social inhibitions, and a wide range in
which to search for “consenting” youth to victimize, which is obviously more convenient than
victims who run or fight.187 Apart from recruitment efforts, pedophiles who like to associate
with others sharing the same preferences and desires are able to find one another much more
easily, to communicate freely across long distances, and to share child-porn images or stories
instantly.188 In rational-choice terms, the transaction and search costs for pedophilia, which once
were quite high outside an extended family, have been drastically reduced. While some may
contend that online sex-related activities simply reflect the real-world of sexual enterprise,
pedophilia is a special case that has almost always carried severe social stigma, limited
opportunities, and complications with finding cooperative victims. The online environment is
particularly conducive to the commission of this type of crime.
The Internet is also particularly conducive to certain types of sting operations; to the
extent that the Web has altered the landscape for pedophilia (more so than for most crimes, it
seems), it has also altered law enforcement – again, particularly in this area.189 It is easy (both in
the sense of being simple and cheap) for officers or agents to troll online chatrooms posing as
adolescents seeking sexual experimentation to lure pedophiles into extended correspondence
(accumulating incriminating evidence from conversations and emailed images). Eventually they

187

See Gregg, supra note 16, at 161-66 (discussing ways in which computers and the Internet facilitate
child
- related sex crimes); Yamagami, supra note 15, at 550.
188
Id.
189
See Hanson, supra note __, at 536 (“The ease with which law enforcement officials can assume false
identities in cyberspace and the suitability of cyberspace for consensual or victimless crimes indicate a probable
increase in undercover sting operations.”).
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arrange a real-life sexual rendezvous, which usually becomes the occasion and location for the
arrest.190
The rules regulating sting operations, of which the entrapment defense is a major part,191
have not adapted fully to this new environment.192 These cases proceed under traditional rules
for entrapment in the given jurisdiction, generally resulting in an unsuccessful defense. Those
more concerned about overly aggressive law enforcement could see this is a bad trend;193 those
more concerned about the seriousness of this particular crime tend to see the trend of a brokendown entrapment defense as a miniscule move in the right direction.194
Traditional rules for entrapment are becoming inapplicable. There are five major
problems with applying the traditional rules, which have made the entrapment defense
unworkable in these cases to the point of becoming nearly obsolete:

190

See, e.g., U.S. v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2000) (meeting at hotel in another state,
surprised by agents); State v. Ryerson, 2004 WL 1433672, 2004-Ohio
- 3353, (Ohio App. Jun 28, 2004) (“Appellant
arrived at the restaurant at the designated time, stayed there a short while, and then traveled to a nearby gas station . .
. [The police] had been watching appellant from his squad car, followed him into the gas station. There, he arrested
appellant and transported him to the police department.”); State v. Cunningham, __ N.E.2d __, 2004 WL 829881
(Ohio App. 2004) (“arrested by . . . police while attempting to meet 'Molly,' the other supposed fourteen-year-old
virgin; Molly was actually a policeman. . .”); State v. Turner, 805 N.E.2d 124 (Ohio. App. 2004) (involving a
minister that arranged through the Internet to commit unlawful sexual acts with a minor); State v. Canaday, 641
N.W.2d 13 (Neb. 2003) (finding that the defendant was induced to commit the offense because the undercover agent
repeatedly tried to encourage defendant to have sexual relations with her young daughter); ., U.S. v. Mitchell, 353
F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Mitchell left his home in Elkhart, Indiana on December 15, 2001, and drove to the
pre-arranged meeting spot in the parking lot of a Holiday Inn in Hillside. Once there, he called Dena to let her know
that he had arrived. . . Shortly thereafter, a Sheriff's Deputy posing as Dena approached Mitchell and he was
arrested.”); Com. v. Zingarelli, 839 A.2d 1064 (Pa.Super.,2003) (defendant arrested while waiting at ice cream stand
for supposed victim, with a box of condoms, a key to a hotel room prepared with bottle of wine, etc.); Laughner v.
State, 769 N.E.2d 1147 (Ind. App., 2002) (arrested at gas station rendezvous).
191
Apart from internal procedural guidelines for undercover operations, of course.
192
See generally Hanson, supra note __ , at 536 (“[T]he current entrapment doctrines as applied to
cyberspace do not effectively address the concerns behind the entrapment defense . . . requiring law enforcement to
meet a reasonable-suspicion standard before engaging in undercover operations would better address those
concerns.”).
193
See generally id.; Graham, supra note __, at 480-83.
194
See, e.g., Gregg, supra note __, at 188-93.
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1. “Predisposition,” usually the critical element under the subjective test, is a foregone
conclusion in almost all of the cases, because the defendants actively log onto certain chat
rooms, engage in repeated, typed communications with their intended victims.195

2. In states using the objective test, on the other hand, the conduct and conversations of the
agents can be very difficult to trace or verify. There is less accountability for government where
the enforcement method is cheap and relatively invisible when orchestrated.196 Traditional stings
typically require a host of armed “backup” agents nearby in case the primary undercover
operative encounters trouble (i.e., gets discovered) and elaborate surveillance equipment;
catching pedophiles can be done mostly from a cubicle in an office.197 In addition, the Internet
enables a single officer to entrap multiple individuals at once, simultaneously, as through online
bulletin board postings (i.e., “pre-teens wanted”). This multiple-simultaneous feature of online
entrapment may not be undesirable from a policy perspective, but it is a significant change from
the traditional arrangement that the entrapment defense contemplated.

3. The inexpensive, relatively invisible nature of such operations also permits private
entrapment to become rampant, which is not the case offline settings or with other crimes.
Online vigilantism against pedophiles, in fact, has taken on expected proportions. Traditional
195

See Hanson, supra note __, at 541-43 (arguing that the subjective test is inadequate for protecting the
innocent in cyberspace).
196
See id. at 544-47, arguing that the objective test is also inadequate to protect innocent individuals from
police setups online. Hanson’s argument on this point is different than the one offered here; he argues that the rules
for the objective test are too unclear and unsettled to apply to this new context. I would contend, on the contrary,
that the objective test makes it easy for courts to generate bright-line rules, but that the inexpensive online setting
makes it easy for police to work around these clear rules.
197
There is an underlying assumption in my reasoning that costs contribute to the sense of “reasonableness”
for a court evaluating law enforcement methods; questionable methods that involve exorbitant costs are more likely
to evoke the ire of the judiciary, I assume, than questionable methods whose cost-benefit justification is readily
apparent. Even for those who disassociate rights from efficiency concerns, costs in the real world can function as a
proxy for “reasonableness” on the part of the government, because grossly disproportionate devotion of resources to
an individual target is likely to evince something unfair and undemocratic.
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entrapment rules do not allow consideration of “private entrapment.” Individuals tempted,
induced or set up by anyone besides a state agent cannot raise an entrapment defense to criminal
charges.198 Historically this was not a problem, because most individuals, even if they had the
motivation to entrap others, do not have the resources to orchestrate a sting while protecting
themselves from retaliation if caught; private entrapment was therefore a rare occurrence. The
Internet has changed this, for better or worse, at least for the crimes perpetrated partly online.

4. Traditional entrapment rules have tended to relax certain evidentiary rules, particularly about
“past crimes.”199 Online stings present special, new evidentiary problems because the online
conversations, although “recorded” on a computer’s storage system, are out of context when later
submitted as evidence in court; this is essentially a hearsay problem. These records are easily
altered, redacted, and otherwise manipulated after the arrest, without detection or evidence of the

198

This is true except in cases of “derivative entrapment,” where the private party who entrapped the
defendant was in turn entrapped by an agent. “Derivative entrapment” and “vicarious entrapment,” as seen in U.S.
v. Valencia, 669 F.2d 37 (2nd Cir. 1981), and Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994); see also LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW 452-54 (§ 5.2(a)); John E. Nilsson, Of Outlaws and Offloads: A Case for Derivative Entrapment, 37
B.C. L. REV. 743 (1996). “Vicarious entrapment” refers to the situation where the original targets of the sting
operation act on their own to recruit additional members of the conspiracy; the Valencia court held that if the
original party had a valid entrapment defense, the spouse who was subsequently recruited could also use the defense.
“Derivative entrapment” refers to situations where the undercover agent uses an unsuspecting middleman as a means
of passing on an inducement to a distant target. In rare circumstances, an entrapment defense has succeeded for the
distant target, as in United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1997). So far, the cases are still quite rare
and usually unsuccessful; see, e.g., U.S. v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e have expressly refused to
recognize as a basis for an entrapment defense.”); U.S. v. Turner, 2003 WL 22056405 (D. Mass., Sep 04, 2003)
(derivative entrapment defense held unavailable where intermediary was not found to have been entrapped); United
States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 573-74 (4th Cir.2000) ("[I]n the Fourth Circuit, a defendant cannot claim an
entrapment defense based upon the purported inducement of a third party who is not a government agent if the third
party is not aware that he is dealing with a government agent.").
199
See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 458 (Roberts, J. dissenting); LAFAVE, supra note 12 at § 5.2(d). For example,
North Carolina has codified this evidentiary exception in its Rules of Evidence. North Carolina Rules of Evidence.
Rule 404(b) (2001) makes evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" inadmissible "to prove the character of a
person in order the show that he acted in conformity therewith," but admissible for other purposes "such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident."
See, e.g., Di Frega v. Pugliese, 596 S.E.2d 456, 460 (N.C. App., 2004); State v. Bush, 595 S.E.2d 715, 719 (N.C.
App., 2004).
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alteration (unlike most physical evidence).200 In addition, agents can structure their online
conversations linguistically to elicit particularly incriminating statements that the defendant may
not otherwise have made.201

5. Many of these cases frame the charges as “attempt” crimes (“attempted molestation of a
minor,” etc),202 with exclusion of a few cases where the charges include the completed crime of
sending sexually explicit images to a minor.203 Attempt charges have a strange interplay with
certain defenses. Most jurisdictions use a test requiring only that the defendant take some

200

See, e.g., State v. Bolden, 2004 WL 1043317 (Ohio App. 2004) (State's alleged failure to preserve
missing logs of Internet conversations did not constitute Brady violation); U.S. v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692, 695 n. 1
(9th Cir. 2000) (“The government was unable to produce the text of the original e-mail at trial, but Poehlman offered
undisputed testimony as to its substance.”).
201
See, e.g., Poehlman, 217 F.3d at 696, n. 2: “Much of the evidence in this case is in the form of e-mail
messages sent back and forth between Sharon and Poehlman. In the breezy, informal style of e-mail, there are
numerous grammatical, spelling and syntax errors in the messages. Because indicating each mistake with a [sic]
would be too distracting, and correcting all of the errors poses the risk of altering the meaning of the messages, we
reproduce the messages in their original form, warts and all.”
202
See, e.g., Com. v. Zingarelli, 839 A.2d 1064 (Pa.Super.,2003) (refusing to hold that public policy
required the elimination of undercover sting operations); Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147 (Ind. App., 2002)
(finding that impossibility to commit the crime because the child was actually an undercover agent was not a valid
defense); United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2002) (attempt to entice minor to engage in sexual
activity); U.S. v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2000) (referring to his initial state-court charges of
attempt);U.S. v. Crow, 164 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 1999) (involving Internet child exploitation); Hatch v. Superior Court,
94 Ca; Rptr 2d 453 (Cal. App. 2000).
Conspiracy charges can be used in jurisdictions allowing a “unilateral” approach to conspiracy (where the
only “conspirators” besides the defendant are government agents). An illustration (where the entrapment defense
happened to be successful) is State v. Canaday, 641 N.W.2d 13 (Neb. 2002). Solicitation, closely related to attempt
and conspiracy, also appears in these cases, although more often with a “real” child victim. See, e.g., U.S. v.
Dhingra, __ F.3d __, 2004 WL 1243995, (9th Cir. 2004).
203
See, e.g., People v. Martin, 2001 WL 1699653 (Mich. App. 2001). At least one court considers
attempted sex crimes with children to be a completed crime of sexual abuse of a minor, even though the “minor”
was a middle-aged undercover agent in an Internet chat room; see People v. Chow, 2002 WL 857763 (Mich.App.,
May 03, 2002).
There are several other examples where the statute at issue allows the prosecution to charge the defendant
with a completed crime. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mitchell, 353 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 2003) (defendant charged with federal
crime of traveling across state lines for sex with a minor, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)); U.S. v. O'Brien,
27 Fed.Appx. 882, 2001 WL 1609763 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); State v. Snyder, 801 N.E.2d 876 (Ohio App. 2003)
(soliciting underage female online and going to prearranged meeting place constituted crime of “importuning” under
Ohio law). Some cases, of course, include charges for both types of offenses. See, e.g., State v. Ryerson, 2004 WL
1433672, 2004-Ohio- 3353, (Ohio App. Jun 28, 2004) (attempt and “importuning”); Kirwan v. State, 96 S.W.3d 724
(Ark. 2003) (attempted rape and “pandering” obscenity via email); People v. Superior Court, 2003 WL 21246774
(Cal. App. 2003) (included both charges of attempt and charges of the completed crime of distributing harmful
material to a minor over the Internet, a violation of California Crim. Stat. Sec. 288).
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“substantial step” toward the commission of an offense (along with the specific intent to commit
the crime) in order to convict of attempt; this step itself does not necessarily have to be an illegal
action.204 Not having to wait for a completed crime or transaction allows law enforcement to use
simplified stings, and prosecutors to muster less evidence than with some substantial offenses
that require proof of harm or injury. The abbreviated fact pattern of an attempt charge gives the
defense less with which to work in concocting an entrapment defense.
Under the subjective test, it may be easier to prove that a defendant was “predisposed” to
attempt a crime than to complete it; it often takes more resolve and planning to guarantee one’s
criminal goal than to simply start off on the road in that direction (take a substantial step).205
Under an objective test, it may take somewhat less government inducement to prompt an
attempt, as opposed to a completed crime, for the same reasons; thus thee is less likelihood of
objectionable activity by the agents. In addition, traditionally the best defense to attempt charges
was “factual impossibility”; situations where the crime went uncompleted are often ones where
completion became impossible for some reason (admittedly, many jurisdictions have abolished
the impossibility defense for attempt for a number of reasons). Yet an “impossibility” theory for
the defendant may be mutually exclusive with an entrapment defense, particularly where the
latter requires an ex ante admission of committing the crime charged. It can greatly complicated
or weaken a defense to argue alternatively both impossibility and entrapment.
There may be good reason to leave the entrapment defense behind in online pedophile
cases. As discussed above, the Internet drastically reduces the search and transaction costs for
sexual predation on minors, creating an artificially conducive environment for the crime. Online
204

See generally Audrey Rogers, New Technology, Old Defenses: Internet Sting Operations and Attempt
Liability, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 477, 502-7 (2004) (discussing the problems of applying attempt liability to Internet
child
- sex crimes, and suggesting a more robust mens rea requirement as a possible solution).
205
This would be a general problem with mixing entrapment under a subjective test with attempt charges
for any crime, not just online sexual predation.
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sting operations offset this effect, not only by catching perpetrators, but by creating a chilling
effect in the chat rooms generally. The uncertainty introduced by the presence of an unknown
number of undercover agents online can function as a deterrent that is not only healthy, but
perhaps necessarily in order to re-establish a balance. If the entrapment defense is both
infeasible and undesirable in one particular area like this, concerns of judicial economy may
justify abandoning it in this narrow class of cases.
If there is a need to preserve the entrapment defense for innocent citizens who somehow
become beguiled by sexual conversations with an apparent child online, I offer two modest
proposals. First, an exclusionary rule for online entrapment-related evidence would bolster the
accuracy of the results in these cases,206 even if exclusionary rules have doubtful effect on the
police themselves.207 I am not suggesting an adoption of this rule across the board; only for
online sting operations, where the recorded text of conversations is particularly susceptible to
tampering. The technology is widely available to record automatically online conversations
from a given computer; a simple rule requiring certification that such recording was running all
the time, not selectively, would suffice.208
206

Australia handles entrapment as an exclusionary rule rather than an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Paul
Marcus & Vicki Waye, Australia And The United States: Two Common Criminal Justice Systems Uncommonly At
Odds, 12 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 27, 72-79 (2004); Ridgeway v. Regina, 184 C.L.R. 19 (1995).
207
See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 363 (1999) (using behavioral and motivational theory to demonstrate why the rule is structurally unable to
deter individual police officers from performing most unconstitutional searches and seizures, as well as showing that
the rules present troubling dilemmas for judges due to defendants with “dirty hands”); Carol A. Chase, Rampart: A
Crying Need to Restore Police Accountability, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 767 (2001) (“Rather, the ‘penalty’ for police
officer misconduct is suppression of evidence, which often renders a case unprosecutable, thus benefiting the
criminal defendant while simultaneously failing to penalize the law-breaking police officer.”).
208
Several commentators have argued for a modified entrapment defense for online crimes that requires a
showing of individualized “reasonable suspicion” on the part of law enforcement to justify the sting operation – a
concept borrowed from constitutionally-based exclusionary rules. See, e.g., Hanson, supra note __ at 547-51; See
Comment, Lead Us Not into (Unwarranted) Temptation: A Proposal to Replace the Entrapment Defense with a
Reasonable-Suspicion Requirement, 133 U PA L REV 1193, 1216 (1985); Note, The Government as Pornographer:
Government Sting Operations and Entrapment: United States v. Jacobson 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112
S.Ct. 1535 (1992), 61 U CIN L REV 1067, 1088-94 (1993); Comment, If the Postman Always "Stings" Twice, Who Is
the Next Target?--An Examination of the Entrapment Theory, 19 J CONTEMP L 217, 244 (1993); Note, United States
v. Jacobson: A Call for Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity as a Threshold Limitation on Governmental Sting

73

16 J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2005)

Entrapment By Numbers

The second proposal is to build entrapment safeguards into the elements of attempt,
rather than having entrapment function (or fail to function) as an affirmative defense. Audrey
Rogers, for example, has suggested incorporating a clearer definition of the requisite intent for
criminal liability online, to account for varying levels of user error or confusion.209 Another
approach would involve nothing more than specifying what qualifies as a “substantial step” for
attempt, that is, something offline and objective.210 Almost all the cases involve stings that
culminated in an arranged meeting at a motel or restaurant. Requiring some sort of incriminating
statement at the supposed rendezvous confirming he defendant’s continuing intention would not
be particularly burdensome on the police, but would make the results of the cases more
predictable and certain. Of course, such a move would make the entrapment defense
unnecessary in these cases; again, given the state of the defense, it is justifiable to develop a
policy that wastes fewer judicial resources on doomed, declining defenses.

Operations, 44 ARK L REV 493, 510 (1991).
I disagree. Entrapment is a common-law defense; the Supreme Court has not recognized it as a
constitutional issue, like the exclusionary rules. Catching online pedophiles seems to be the worst possible scenario
for implementing such a requirement (although government pandering of child pornography, as in Jacobson, is a
different matter), where waiting for reasonable suspicion will often mean waiting for a child victim to be discovered.
209
Rogers, supra note 200, at 510-23. For a contrary view (arguing that the intent rules are already too
lax), see Yamagami, supra note 15, at 570-78.
210
Attempt liability draws an imaginary line, so to speak, between “mere preparation” and a “substantial
step” toward consummation of the offense; the latter triggers criminal liability, which is not present up to that point.
The exact placement of this line, however, is somewhat uncertain in most jurisdictions, with courts defining
“substantial step” mostly on a case-by-case basis. If we conceive the defendant as moving along a continuum from
“mere preparation” to completion of the crime, whether the continuum consists of a series of steps or the passage of
time, then sting operations present the troubling scenario of helping the criminal skip some of the steps or time that
the crime would usually require, arriving at the line of a “substantial step” more quickly or easily. If the usual
progression, however, is also a progression of accumulated culpability, then the defendant whose crime was
facilitated in some way by undercover agents has arrived at the threshold of criminal liability without passing
through the usual process of accumulating culpability or blameworthiness. One way to account for this accelerated
blameworthiness may be to have a clearer, more objective line for “substantial steps.” With computer-related crime,
one obvious way to do this would be to have the step from online activity to real-world actions constitute a brightline rule for liability. This would be less useful where the charges involve completed crimes of sending obscene
material to minors, but more useful in situations where the defendant goes to a pre-arranged location to meet his
supposed victim, and later denies having an intention to consummate the crime with a minor.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Studying the entrapment defense in terms of the numbers and varieties of reported cases
provides a fascinating glimpse into the trends in our criminal law system. The classic defenses
studied in law school courses are not simply sets of rules and exceptions; some go through long
periods of disuse, then become popular issues of litigation, and then fade again toward disuse. It
is also interesting to see that “entrapment” is not simply a defense, but a number of conceptually
distinct defenses or claims that we often cluster together.
The numbers of cases in which these defenses fail is also very telling. Studying a defense
as a set of elements or rules often involves looking at some exemplary cases or hypothetical
situations where the requirements are met; this, in turn, can create the impression that the defense
simply “works” when A, B, and C happen together. Recognizing that the defenses fail the vast
majority of the time enriches our understanding by adding a functionalist dimension. The
defenses are often a last resort for defendants in a rather desperate situation. The procedural
posture of a number of cases supports this conclusion. Studying entrapment by the numbers
reveals a defense on the decline.
Mathematical, precise rules for matters such as sentencing or gradation of felonies
influence this area in a very concrete way – particularly sentencing entrapment, but also the other
entrapment defenses. Issues of legal certainty and uncertainty affect all these cases in two ways.
First, as legal rules become more detailed and enumerated, there arises a significant disparity in
the legal information readily available to state agents as opposed to potential defendants, and this
informational disparity operates in the background of each of the scenarios that give rise to the
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entrapment defenses (sting operations, firearm licensing procedures, etc.). Some legal rules
become so precise and mechanical, numerical benchmarks take on increased importance,
whether in specified amounts of contraband for certain sentencing factors, numbers of previous
convictions, etc. As seen in the foregoing discussion, there is a sense in which many defendants
are entrapped by the numbers.
Second, as courts rule on a larger number of cases asserting an entrapment defense, an
individual defendant is better able to assess the chances of succeeding on the defense in
quantifiable terms, making pleas more likely. The greater certainty in these numbers helps
explain the decline of the defense, both in frequency and procedural strength.
New technology has changed the playing field for certain crimes, like sexual predation on
children, and at the same time has transformed the nature of law enforcement efforts against
these very crimes. The traditional rules of entrapment do not adapt well to this new
environment, and a change is needed. While it may be possible to revamp the existing defenses
to address these developments, it may be more efficient to build entrapment principles into the
elements of the crimes themselves, achieving the same goals with better judicial economy.
The approach taken in this essay, although novel, could be used for fruitful research in
other areas of criminal law as well. It would enrich our understanding of all the classic criminal
defenses (insanity, impossibility, duress, etc.) to analyze their functional role in our justice
system and their numerical relevance for defendants today. In additional, the effects of legal
uncertainty on each defense could be an important consideration for future policy discussion.
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